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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HERMAN H. HORNE'S INTERPRETATION 
OF JOHN DEWEY'S DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Subject of the Study 
Herman H. Horne has written a friendly interpretation of 
Democracy and Education by John Dewey. This companion volume 
to Dewey's famous work is significant, both from the Idealist's 
as well as from the Pragmatist's points of view. Horne's 
volume entitled The Democratic Philosophy of Education at­
tempted to philosophically elucidate and elaborate upon the 
pragmatic and idealistic positions. His intent was not nec­
essarily to criticize Dewey nor the pragmatic points of view, 
but rather to (a) offer an expository analysis of the main 
points in the argument and to (b) provide a contrasting point 
of view which he concluded was necessary if a fundamental phi­
losophy of life was to be effected. Such an endeavor was 
needed, believed Horne, and would serve as a stimulus in the 
study of philosophies of education.^ Horne obviously holds 
certain philosophical views notably different from those
^Herman H. Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. vii.
presented by Dewey in Democracy and Education. According to 
Herne, . . a  two-fold need has arisen for this work; the 
first is to understand Dr. Dewey more readily, and the second 
is to estimate his views more discriminatingly.The validity 
of such an exploration as revealed in The Democratic Philosophy 
of Education is the subject of this study.
Statement of the Problem 
Although many well-informed writers have expressed a keen 
interest in Dewey's Democracy and Education, few have demon­
strated the insight of Herman H. Horne and few have so skill­
fully undertaken the systematic and logical approach toward such 
an interpretation as has Horne.
The purpose of this dissertation is to make a comparative 
study of John Dewey's Democracy and Education and Herman H. 
Horne's The Democratic Philosophy of Education. Further, this 
dissertation will undertake to determine which of the two inter­
pretations of the principal themes developed in both of these 
books is more valid. The criterion for making this determin­
ation is: which of these two philosophies constitutes the
most adequate basis for developing a philosophy of education 
for a democratic society.
Nature of the Study 
A careful study of Herman H. Horne as philosopher would 
represent a worthwhile endeavor. However, due to the scope of
^Ibid., p. ix.
his philosophical discussions, certain delimitations are nec­
essary. The first delimitation is that no attempt will be made 
to evaluate and analyze Horne as an Idealist. His philosophic 
posture will, to some extent, be reflected in his analysis of 
pragmatism and subsequent implications inherent in his study 
of a philosophy of education.
A second delimitation is that the analysis for this study 
will be concerned chiefly with Horne's volume. The Democratic 
Philosophy of Education in which he carefully interprets John 
Dewey as he views him and his philosophy of education.
In conclusion, other writings of Horne will be examined 
for the purpose of obtaining a better understanding of his 
philosophy of education. These may be identified as other 
books written by Horne and include the following: The Philos­
ophy of Education; The Psychological Principles of Education; 
Idealism in Education; Free Will and Human Responsibility.
Significance of the Study
One of the main reasons Herman H. Horne has been success­
ful in effectively contrasting the philosophies of idealism 
and pragmatism is due to the clarity with which he presents 
his points of views in his "Comments." Such clarity in his 
writing is indicative of the familiarity and understanding 
which Horne had achieved. His work is aimed at a clarification 
of positions, rather than to enforce a stronghold of philosoph­
ical posture. As a result, the reader clearly identifies two 
alternative views, each left to stand on its own merit. The
value of each must ultimately be determined by the scholar.
In this way, the opportunity for examination and discrimin­
ation has been provided by Horne. Although the philosophies 
of pragmatism and idealism have often been viewed as anti­
thetical, there appears to be a neglect in the area of an 
intensive study which logically compares, analyzes, inter­
prets, and then projects into education the subsequent contri­
butions and consequences of each. It may be asserted that 
Horne, as philosopher, has had little direct influence on 
contemporary education and educational practices. Yet, the 
influence of idealism, the system of philosophy which he repre­
sents should not be ignored nor depreciated. One of the most 
significant influences has been the manner in which he has 
attracted and interested other writers who represent the 
idealist's position in education, or those who have under­
taken to portray the various philosophies of education.
John S. Brubacher^ refers to Horne as the most prolific 
writer on the idealistic philosophy of education in the twen­
tieth century. Brubacher believed this to be true due to the 
fact that "at a time when idealism was beginning to fade as 
the dominant American theory of education, Horne managed to 
draw together the strains of idealism into a systematic edu­
cational elaboration."* Brubacher^ further identifies at least
^John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 128.
*Ibid.
5Ibid.
two points of views attributable to Horne. One was his emphasis 
on volition and effort in learning. In this connection, Horne 
is seen to agree with Froebel in that the child, like the plant, 
can withhold his response. Therefore, all education may be 
viewed as self-education; it is the result of voluntary effort 
put forth by a self-active mind. According to Horne, if effort 
is aided by interest, well and good. If not, then, like Kant, 
Horne would urge that the pupil put forth the greater effort 
in obedience to what he "ought to do." A second notable point 
in Horne's exposition, as identified by Brubacher, is that 
Horne did not make any significant alteration in the develop­
mental theory of education in the light of the Darwinian theory 
of evolution. Obviously, Horne realized that evolution had 
made the developmental process irreversible in contrast to the 
Aristotelian pattern of matter. Nevertheless, the Absolute 
had no difficulty in assimilating this new theory of develop­
ment. Horne could still say that the Absolute is; only the 
finite becomes.& Philosophically, this position would appear 
to describe education as the process by which the child still 
becomes what he was always meant to be.
In addition, Theodore Brameld? describes Horne as one of 
the most outstanding idealists. Brameld goes further in identi­
fying Horne as one of the early and most influential essentialist
-Ibid.
^Theodore Brameld, Philosophies of Education in Cultural 
Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955),
p. 239.
leaders. Thus, it is noteworthy that such an influential 
idealist should address himself to Dewey's pragmatic philos­
ophy of education as presented in Democracy and Education.
This investigation is designed to analyze Horne's interpre­
tation of John Dewey's classic statement of the democratic 
ideal and its connection with education.
Related Studies 
The chief classification of related studies may be found 
as incidental references to Horne's educational views. These 
generally are found as brief statements and are referred to by 
writers in discussions of idealism or the idealist's philosophy 
of education. Typical of this classification are statements 
made by John Brubacher and Theodore Brameld. Brubacher^ has 
identified Horne as representing a strong reaction against 
pragmatism and especially the aims of progressive education.
As a critic of the philosophy of pragmatism, Horne has been 
cited as emphatically denouncing growth as the aim of education.
A further rejection by Horne was that growth for the sake of 
growth simply did not go far enough. Brameld^ alludes to Horne 
as a staunch representative of essentialism. An interesting 
and significant observation was made by Brameld with respect 
to the idealist's view of school and society. In this discussion.
^Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education, p. 20.
ÜBrameld, Philosophies of Education in Cultural Per­
spective, p. 241.
he finds an inconsistency which points to a swinging back and 
forth from the pole of education as cultural reinforcement to 
the pole of education as a guide to social change. Brameld*s 
conclusion was that such a position constituted an attempt to 
accommodate both aims within the idealist's theory of educa­
tion, thereby conveying a degree of eclecticism, if not 
ambiguity.
Organization of the Study
Chapter One of this study introduces the purpose, nature, 
and significance of this study. Related literature and the 
basic organization of the remainder of the study are also 
included in this chapter. The study is then divided into 
chapters as designated by specific philosophic considerations 
made by Horne. Special emphasis will be given to contrasts 
and their respective contributions to philosophy, especially 
as these are viewed as significant contributions to a philos­
ophy of education. Although the study is divided into chapters, 
it is not implied that each section is considered distinct and 
self-contained. Each chapter overlaps to some extent with all 
other chapters. The specific chapters under investigation are 
determined by the logical divisions as presented by Horne in 
The Democratic Philosophy of Education.
In Chapter Two, "Education as a Need and Function of 
Society," the specific considerations which are presented for
l°Ibid.
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analysis include the following: (1) Education as a Necsssity
of Life; (2) Education as a Social Function; (3) Education as 
Direction; (4) Education as Growth; (5) Preparation, Unfolding, 
and Formal Discipline; (6) Education as Conservative and 
Progressive. These topics as interpreted by Horne will be 
carefully analyzed and criticized in an attempt to establish 
a better perspective relative to these selected philosophical 
considerations.
Chapter Three, "Democracy in Education," reviews those 
philosophic considerations as they relate to education in a 
democracy. The major themes in this chapter include the fol­
lowing : (1) The Democratic Conception in Education; (2) Aims
in Education; (3) Natural Development, Social Efficiency and 
Culture as Aims; (4) Interest and Discipline; (5) Experience 
and Thinking; (6) Thinking in Education; (7) The Nature of 
Methods; (8) The Nature of Subject Matter; (9) Play and Work 
in the Curriculum; (10) The Significance of Geography and 
History; (11) Science in the Course of Study. In this chapter 
are to be found the most significant philosophical themes as 
presented by Dewey and interpreted by Horne.
Chapter Four is entitled, "Our Educational Limitations.” 
The subject for this chapter concerns an explicit discussion 
of educational values as these relate to the total curriculum. 
Prior attention to the subject of values has been made, espe­
cially in relation to aims and interests. This aspect of 
values has been critiqued in Chapter Three, "Democracy and
Education." Included in this chapter are the following topics; 
(1) Educational Values; (2) Labor and Leisure; (3) Intellec­
tual and Practical Studies; (4) Physical and Social Studies;
(5) The Individual and the World; (6) Vocational Aspects of 
Education.
Chapter Five, which is entitled, "The Philosophy of Edu­
cation," presents a summary account of all previous chapter 
discussions. In this chapter, an explicit consideration of 
a philosophy of education is found. The three topics in which 
Dewey's key philosophical themes have been interpreted are:
(1) Philosophy of Education; (2) Theories of Knowledge;
(3) Theories of Morals. Due to the nature of this chapter, 
it is anticipated that it will serve to effect a synthesis 
and a consolidation of earlier topics under consideration in 
this study.
The concluding chapter contains a summary of findings made 
in this study. Appropriate findings will be presented accord­
ing to the aforementioned chapter divisions. Conclusions, 
where applicable, will also be identified in this chapter.
CHAPTER II
EDUCATION AS A NEED AND FUNCTION OF SOCIETY
Education as a Necessity to Life
1. Renewal of Life by Transmission
The considerations in this discussion were basically the 
definition of education in its broadest sense. Initially, 
attention was focused upon the origin of life and subsequent 
implications for philosophy. The Idealist (Creationist) and 
the Pragmatic positions were contrasted for the purpose of 
establishing that such a consideration was valid in order to 
present a sound philosophy of education which was whole and 
complete.
Horne expressed considerable concern with the "phenomenon 
of life,"^ especially in view of his contention that Dewey had 
failed to raise the basic question concerning "the nature of 
life and its origin."2 There was, however, no agreement con­
cerning the origin of life. The strength of Horne's position 
was diminished by the finding that neither the speculative 
scientists nor the philosophers had found satisfying answers 
to this problem. Nevertheless, Horne continued to assert that




the philosophical view one holds relative to this question 
makes a considerable difference. "To believe in chance or 
necessity as the origin of life is to diminish its value.
The category of chance is haphazard and the category of nec­
essity is blind."3 Rejecting both these categories, Horne 
identified the category he believed as best suited to give 
life its greatest value:
The category of creation and the category of 
purposeful development alike mean life was intended.
If this is the case, then life conscious of itself, 
as in man, may sense its unity with, and cooperate 
with, the ultimate Source of things.^
Since a concern with this question necessarily called
for speculation and a transcendental projection, Dewey found
little need for concentrating on the origin of life as a
basis for a philosophy of education. Furthermore, he found
no purpose for such an endeavor for a sound philosophy could
not be predicated upon a metaphysical orientation. At the
same time, Dewey was concerned with the nature of life and
the transmission of an ever increasingly enriched life.
Essentially, Dewey's view on this point was that life and
society were significantly interwoven. The imperative need
for the effective transmission of life was analogous to the
biological life.
Society exists through a process of transmission 
. . .  a transmission which occurs by means of commu­
nication of habits of doing, thinking, feeling from
3Ibid., p. 8. 
*Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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the older to the younger. Without this communication 
of ideals, hopes, expectation, standards and opinions, 
social life could not survive.^
Since this renewal obviously was not automatic, nor 
destined to be, it was up to man to effect a genuine and 
complete transmission for the perpetuation of life and society. 
Thus, the task for education was identified for Dewey.
Since the activities of this domain were so great and 
pressing, Dewey found no necessity for pursuing the specula­
tive, uncertain, vague, and a priori considerations where 
education and its task was concerned. Concentrating on the 
formative stage of the process of transmission, Dewey held the 
opinion that societal transmission was analogous with that of 
biological life:
I believe that all education proceeds by the 
participation of the individual in the social 
consciousness of the race. This process begins 
unconsciously almost at birth, and is continually 
shaping the individual's powers, saturating his 
consciousness, forming his habits, training his 
ideas, and arousing feeling and emotions.&
Dewey's early views, as expressed in his writings, con­
sistently identified the nature of life with the growth of 
the individual. The educative process thus was seen as 
beginning at birth and continuing by way of the social process 
which man had shaped. Thus, the responsibility for the per­
petuation of life as well as sustaining quality of life, was
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 5-6. 
Gibid., p. 360.
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in the hands of man void of any pre-determined direction or 
impetus to the life of man.
Contrasted to this position, Horne viewed life and growth 
in terms of the a, priori considerations. The effects of this 
concept meant that the school and education in general were 
necessarily guided by fixed and determined external influences.
Speculation regarding the origin of life was an imperative 
for Horne. He believed that only in this way could an adequate 
philosophy of education be found. In Dewey's philosophy of 
education, such a position was essentially irrelevant to the 
consideration of a thorough and adequate philosophy since 
speculation could yield nothing in a positive sense. Educa­
tion, for Dewey, began at birth, and the quality of process 
and the extent to which the individual developed, was deter­
mined by man in his natural social setting.
2. Education and Communication
The chief criticism made by Horne was aimed at the writing 
style effected by Dewey. Specifically, Horne called attention 
to Dewey's use of the term "communication."
. . .Dr. Dewey's style is to give a familiar word 
an unfamiliar meaning. We ordinarily think of 'communi­
cation' in connection with a note, letter, telegram, . . . 
whereby some news is communicated by one individual to 
another individual. Communication is thus a product, a 
communication, and individual. To Dr. Dewey it is a 
process of sharing common interests, holding things in 
common, or transmitting things held in common.?
7Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 10.
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Horne's use of the term did not hold the scope nor breadth 
in comparison with Dewey's usage of the term. The added dimen­
sion to the term, as used frequently by Dewey, was the social 
connotation. Basically, the term was used by Horne in a 
singular, personal sense. For Dewey, communication involved 
a group and was therefore social. Dewey suggested that like- 
mindedness was a prerequisite to the formation of a community. 
But there was more than a verbal relationship between the 
terms, "common," "community," and "communications." He believed 
an interdependence existed between these terms and that each 
served as a complement with the other. Such a relationship 
was expressed when Dewey stated:
Men live in a community in virtue of the things 
which they have in common, and communication is the 
way in which they come to possess things in common.
What they must have in common in order to form a 
community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, 
knowledge. The communication which insures par­
ticipation is one which secures similar emotional and 
intellectual dispositions.®
Dewey recognized that not all aspects of social life 
produced genuine educational products. Routine and haphazard 
communication between individuals ceased to be educative. 
Effective communication was viewed as a process and must 
have been effected as the result of a formulated experience.
The extent to which communication became educative was 
dependent upon the quality and genuineness of a given unit
8Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 5.
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of experience found in the social life. It was from this 
viewpoint that Dewey held a concern in this discussion. Mere 
acknowledgment of a common goal did not constitute a social 
group even though maximum cooperation had been attained.
Rather, it was the sharing of a common end with a common 
interest so that all activity became regulated and directed 
toward the achievement of a specific goal. Thus, the process 
of communication becomes a necessity. "Consensus demands 
communication.
In its most meaningful sense, the term "communication" 
for Dewey was something more than the simplistic connotation 
of sending a letter, a telegram, or a note. It was more than 
the exchange of news between individuals. Viewed from Dewey's 
point of view, communication denoted the sharing of experiences 
and interests in such a way as to modify or change the behavior 
of both parties. To the extent that this was accomplished, 
communication could properly be considered educative.
3. The Place of Formal Education
Horne interpreted Dewey's position as one which was far 
too informal. It seemed to Horne that Dewey's informal method 
was similar to that of "social participation of primitive 
man."^® In other words, Horne saw in Dewey's scheme formal
*Ibid., p. 6.
Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 11.
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education acquired informally, if not unintentionally. Horne 
rejected this procedure unless it was supplemented by a more 
formal method.
Dewey recognized the role of formal education in modern 
society. However, Horne believed the term "formal" in the 
context of Dewey's writing meant that it was formal only in 
the sense that the school was an institution intentionally 
designed to transmit the resources and achievements of society.
Dewey did recognize the role of formal education as an 
imperative because of the increased complexity of society. He 
pointed out that education must not be viewed as incidental, 
n r  left to accident and chance. The school was purposely 
organized in order to serve as a deliberate directive force. 
Dewey believed that only when the school was so viewed and 
perpetuated could the educative process hope to effect a 
change in the attitudes and behavior of the young. Dewey's 
posture on this consideration was as follows:
Without such formal education it is not possible 
to transmit all the resources and achievements of a 
complex society. Such [formal education] also opens 
a way to a kind of experience which would not be 
accessible to the young, if they were left to pick 
up their training in informal associations with others, 
since books and symbols of knowledge are mastered.^
Dewey's Justification for distinguishing between the
broad, informal aspect of education and the formal, direct,
and intentional institution was apparent upon examination of
11Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 9.
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his text. He was opposed to the narrow, prescriptive aspect 
of traditional formal education which he believed to be void 
of vitality and meaning. Furthermore, Dewey wished to avoid 
the pitfall of allowing formal education to become an end in 
itself; that is, assuming the position of isolation from life 
and experience. Dewey recognized an inherent danger when the 
transition was made from the indirect to the direct or formal 
type of education:
Formal instruction easily becomes remote and 
dead— abstract and bookish. There is the standing 
danger that the material of formal instruction will 
be merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated 
from the subject matter of life-experience.
It was not difficult to ascertain Dewey's concern as
expressed above. Far too often the notion of education had
depreciated social necessity and as a consequence social
interests had been lost. As a consequence, the emphasis is
easily transferred to verbal signs or form, rather than upon
meaningful content identified with, and projected into, human
association. Dewey warned that when such concern for the
conscious life of the individual was omitted, learning in the
formal sense became mere acquisition of information.
Although opposition to formal education was not found in
Dewey's exposition, he remained conscious of the undesirable
effects which resulted when a division was allowed between the
informal and the formal experience. He exhorted the educator
to strive for a balance between the formal, intentional
l^ibid., pp. 9-10.
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operations and the informal, incidental operations. Because 
of the rapid growth of technology and attendant implications, 
Dewey believed there was an even greater danger of merely 
acquiring knowledge without meaning in the social sense. When 
this condition was permitted to exist, Dewey saw the permanent 
and practical aspects of education seriously impaired.
Horne's criticism of Dewey's discussion was not in terms 
of his opposition to formal education in the school. However, 
Horne did find objectionable Dewey's method of implementation 
and his close identification to the informal with the formal.
Education as a Social Function
1. The Nature and Meaning of Environment
Again, Horne has focused his attention upon terminology. 
"The novelty is the twist given the dictionary meaning of the 
term "environment." Like the term "communication," "environ­
ment" had been used by Dewey in a manner which suggested an 
unfamiliar meaning. Horne preferred the use of this term with 
a more limited meaning and significance for the individual.
He stated: " . . .  the things to which a man responds, though
remote in space and time, are his environment, while the things 
to which he does not respond, though at hand, are not a part 
of his environment."^* Dewey viewed man and his environment
^%orne. The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 14.
l*Ibid.
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differently. Though simply stated, Dewey's usage of the word 
possessed greater depth and was dependent upon man for its 
characterization. "The things with which a man varies are 
his genuine environment."^^ In other words, the genuine 
environment for the individual were not necessarily his sur­
roundings, but rather, those things, near or remote which 
really concerned him, with which his activities are continuous. 
Viewed from this perspective, only those things or conditions 
which directly affected or influenced man represented his 
genuine environment. This Dewey believed to be the case since 
these were the conditions which produced change in the active, 
living being. Dewey continued to stress the active element 
of experience in his formulation of man's environment. ". . . 
the environment consists of those conditions that promote or 
hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of 
a living being.
2. The Social Environment
Horne's primary concern in this discussion was the nature 
of the learner's environment as presented by Dewey. In partic­
ular, he attacked Dewey's concept of activity as a basis for 
learning. Horne pointed out "that while children can learn as 
animals learn, animals can not learn as children c a n . "^7 An
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 13.
IGlbid.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 18.
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additional concern for Horne was also identified. He stated:
Children can and do learn by the 'law of effect,' 
viz., that satisfaction in an act leads to its repetition, 
and annoyance in an act leads to its avoidance. But if 
children learned only in this way, . . .they could become 
at best only sublimated pleasure-seekers and pain avoiders ... .18
Horne believed it was dangerous to assume that learning was 
restricted to this method. Dewey, too, was cognizant of this 
fact. For him, setting up stimulant conditions which brought 
about different or modified ways of behaving was but the first 
step. This condition was the initiating agent and served as 
the element best suited for making an activity a learning expe­
rience. The second and final step was then attained when the 
individual became a sharer or partner in the activity so that 
he acquired the associated successes and failures as his own.
Horne disclosed that the essential difference was found 
in the fact that animals can not share in the uses of the 
activities in which they engage; Dewey maintained that the 
significant difference was that animals do not share in the 
uses of the activities in which they were engaged. Both Horne 
and Dewey agreed that the essential element in this connection 
was that the absence of the animal's ability to share experiences 
suggested a superior brain capacity and that a higher order of 
learning was possible in addition to that achieved by the "law 
of effect." Horne acknowledged the fact that Dewey's theory
l®Ibid.
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goes far beyond the supposition that all learning must be 
kept on the basis of physical activity. Dewey recognized 
that in one instance we were dealing with training— modifi­
cation of behavior eventually producing habituation. This 
level constituted a low order of learning as compared with 
teaching which could properly be called educative. In other 
words, not all shared experiences resulted in increased 
meaning. The quality of experience was the element which 
would determine the degree to which a shared experience or 
activity was educative. Insofar as words were concerned, 
Dewey's principle remained constant. Indeed, the use of 
language as a tool used to convey or acquire ideas was but 
an extension of the principle that "things gain meaning by 
being used in a shared experience or joint action."19 Dewey 
further emphasized this point when he stated: "When words do
not enter as factors into a shared situation, either overtly 
or imaginatively, they operate as pure physical stimuli, not 
as having a meaning or intellectual value."^0
To grasp fully the implications of Horne's position, atten­
tion had to be given to his view of the mind and man's superior 
brain capacity. For him, this meant that thinking was an intel­
lectual pursuit which enabled man to transcend human intelli­
gence. This view was antithetical to Dewey's physiological
1 QDewey, Democracy and Education, p. 19,
ZOibid.
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organic response concept of the mind. Where meaning and per­
ception were concerned, Horne's posture appeared somewhat 
hypothetical and highly speculative. Dewey believed that 
social activity and the mutual sharing in the social envir­
onment remained the best activity for effecting the desired 
stimulus to a higher kind of thought process. It was this 
kind of process which could properly be viewed as educative 
rather than the isolated process which resulted in a trained 
individual. For Dewey, the superior intellect of man was not 
the deciding factor. It was what man did with his intelligence 
that made the difference between man and lower forms of animals, 
By contrast, Horne asserted; "Only low-grade intelligences 
require only an activity basis of learning."^1 From his dis­
cussion, it appeared that Horne equated activity with physical 
activity and failed to perceive the mind as an active agent 
rather than a passive one. If he had viewed mind as active, 
his appreciation for activity would have increased. For Dewey, 
language remained the chief instrument of learning, but meaning 
was found in shared activities which, in effect, suggested 
social activity. From this point of view, shared experiences 
became the basis for shared meaning for the individual and 
among individuals. Dewey stressed the utilitarian aspect of 
language. Language was socially meaningful because it was 
based on social experience as found in associated activity.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 19.
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Although Horne was obviously aware of the fact that Dewey 
was not a behavior 1st, his interpretation in this study was 
bent in that direction. Horne believed he saw in Dewey's 
writing the suggestion that the young learn in much the same 
way as do animals. Nothing could be found in his discussion 
which alluded to this narrow, mechanistic approach found in 
behaviorism.
3. The Social Medium as Educative
Horne was not particularly antagonistic with Dewey in 
discussing the unconscious influence of environment, but Horne 
would have given more credit to example, imitation, and sug­
gestion as these were related to the discussion. Horne did 
object to Dewey's principle of situation-response whereby the 
situation provided the objects which stimulated certain capac­
ities to respond and develop, while others, if lacking in 
proper stimuli, lie dormant.
Basically, Horne objected to Dewey's naturalistic approach 
to learning and his failure to give consideration to self- 
consciousness and the habits of religious life. He believed 
these were traits or characteristics which all individuals 
possessed. "No individual is without self-consciousness and 
no society is without religion."^2 Nevertheless, the signif­
icance of Dewey's "unconscious influence of the environment" 
was applicable even should these two dimensions be added to
Z^Ibid., p. 21.
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learning through experience. The following statement was per­
tinent and deserved consideration in this discussion;
Just as the senses require sensible objects to 
stimulate them, so our powers of observation, recollec­
tion, and imagination do not work spontaneously, but 
are set in motion by the demands set up by current
social occupations.23
Although Dewey did not give special emphasis to the knowl­
edge of self nor to religious feelings, the task of the educator 
was to recognize the necessity for development of these. Dewey 
believed that these traits only accumulated as the result of 
small-unit family relationships and other common influences 
which had been exerted upon the young. He readily recognized 
that the primary characteristics found in the disposition of 
the young were basically formed independent of formal school­
ing. Dewey clarified this position when he stated:
What conscious, deliberate teaching can do is 
at most to free the capacities thus formed for fuller 
exercise, to purge them of some of their grossness, 
and to furnish objects which make their activity more
productive of m e a n i n g .
Therefore, we basically see two lines of approach. One 
line represented by Horne, illustrated concern for the influ­
ence exerted by example, imitation, and emulation. These, he 
believed were the most relevant factors found in the environ­
ment. The other was Dewey's situation-response. The latter 
view presented a situation whereby objects would be provided
23Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 20.
Ẑ lbid.
25
which in turn would stimulate certain capacities to respond, 
while others would lie dormant.^5 a  study of the writing of 
both Horne and Dewey revealed that the broader context of 
each implied that the two approaches eventually resulted in 
the same thing. Neither position totally ignored the other.
It was in the area that was emphasized that a departure was 
noted.
Finally, Dewey believed that while there might be other 
methods ot inculcating attitudes and forming dispositions 
necessary for growth, the significant criteria where true 
development of the individual was concerned could only be 
measured by the extent to which he was capable of sharing and 
participating in the activities deemed most worthwhile by 
society.
4. The School as a Special Environment
Horne recognized the school as a formal, planned agency 
and did not disagree with Dewey that as such this agency was 
probably the best equipped to accomplish the task with which 
it had been charged. As expressed in other discussions,
Horne's chief concern in this matter was the omission of some 
yardstick or standard by which the school environment could 
be evaluated.26 Specifically, Horne concentrated on the chosen 
environment of the school and its three specific functions as
25Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 21.
26ibid., p. 24.
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outlined by Dewey. These were: (1) to provide a simplified
environment to which the individual could respond; (2) to 
eliminate undesirable features of the environment— purified 
medium of action; (3) to provide a balanced and representative 
social environment thereby assuring each individual the oppor­
tunity to go beyond limitations characteristic of his social 
group.27
Expressing concern for Dewey's first function, Horne 
raised the question as to which features of our complex 
society were to be selected.2®
A fundamental postulate for Dewey was that no fixed stand­
ard existed. The point stressed by Dewey was that there must 
be a beginning in this endeavor. Dewey adopted a kind of 
spiraling process. In order to avoid confusion in this selec­
tive process, Dewey began by selecting those features "which 
are fairly fundamental and capable of being responded to by 
the young."29
From this point, a progressive order was called into 
play proceeding from the simple to the complex. The process 
was essentially one which proceeded from the simple to
27Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 24.
28Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.
29Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 24.
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the more complex as responses of the young changed due to 
growth, maturation, and other changing environmental factors. 
Since no set standard could be ascertained by Dewey, he con­
tinued to strive for the best and most efficient features 
where selection of a simplified environment was concerned.
Horne's second concern was with the task of eliminating 
undesirable features of the environment. The question raised 
by Horne concerned determining the best features found in the 
environment and then deciding which should be eliminated due 
to undesirability.30 Dewey recognized that a total elimination 
of undesirable features from the environment would be impos­
sible, but he believed such an attempt was necessary if the 
best was to be accrued from the environment for educative 
purposes. The central element at this point, as Dewey viewed 
it, was the pluralistic characteristic of a democratic society. 
Unlike a monistic society, a democratic society demanded 
diversified representation of different groups. An attempt 
to identify those features in society which more nearly served 
the needs of its youth was imperative. When members of any 
group were isolated, their horizons are narrowed thereby 
placing an undue restriction of vision upon them. Dewey 
addressed himself to the factor of plurality found in a democ­
racy and the subsequent focus for education when he stated:
3®Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.
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It is this situation which has, perhaps more than 
any other one cause, forced the demand for an educa­
tional institution which shall provide something like 
a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young.
Further recognition descriptive of society was given when 
Dewey stated: . . a  modern society is many societies more
or less loosely connected.
Although Horne did not express complete disagreement with 
Dewey's concern for societal simplification, purification, and 
the need for social balance, he did reject these attempts as 
unsound until some yardstick or standard had been identified. 
Until such a formula was presented, Horne rejected Dewey's 
approach as an unsound one where significant school improve­
ments could be made.33 Essentially, Horne's thought in this 
matter was dominated by a plea for absolutes. Only from such 
a definite frame of reference could we point to the school 
environment as one conducive to harmonious learning conditions,
Education As Direction
1. The Environment as Directive
While conceding that education might well be viewed as 
directive, Horne was reluctant to accept the concept of edu­
cation as direction as presented by Dewey. Horne viewed such
31Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 25.
^^Ibid., p. 24.
Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.
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an approach as “vague unless we know the direction in which 
the educative process should go."34 Again, Horne's strategy 
called for a design or plan before education as a directive 
force could be considered. He believed this task to be that 
of the teacher since he was the one who was in a position to 
know the direction toward which the student should be directed. 
Without such a design, any direction afforded by education 
would be aimless and haphazard. In this sense, Horne envi­
sioned a kind of fixed, ideal society. Only when viewed in 
this context, could appropriate attempts at direction be real­
ized to the fullest extent.
Although the exact nature of such a society was not read­
ily characterized nor identified by HOrne, he did present a 
possible prerequisite for such a consideration. "Democratic 
relations in society and an unselfish character might repre­
sent the needed social and personal goals of education as 
directing."35 if these would be viewed as acceptable guides, 
then it becomes possible to consider education as an educative 
force which provided direction for the young.
Both Horne and Dewey discussed control in terms of the 
individual and his development. The distinction between the 
two when using the term "control" may be found in both the 




arbitrary setting for control pointed toward an external, 
coercive condition of control. Where control and direction 
were concerned, Horne would assign a leading role to the 
teacher who at all times was the inspirer of the learner.
Dewey did not overlook the significant value of the personal 
relationship between teacher and student. However, he cau­
tioned against the traditional role of the teacher where the 
teacher believed himself to be the director and originator 
of all activities and learning. For Dewey, greater educa­
tional value in the activity was produced by the interpersonal 
relationship between the student and his problem situation.
His profound disagreement with the position presented by 
Horne may be seen from the following; " . . .  purely external 
direction is impossible The environment can at most only 
supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses pro­
ceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual.
Dewey recognized that such a system of external direction 
might result in efficiency yet efficiency under these condi­
tions tended to be temporary at best. Furthermore, operating 
within this framework presented the possibility of promoting 
negative behavior in the future.
The negative aspect of this point of view was expressed 
by Dewey. He stated:
36Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 30.
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. . . the control afforded by the customs and 
regulations of others may be short-sighted. It may 
accomplish its immediate effect, but at the expense 
of throwing the subsequent action of the person out 
of balance. Those engaged in directing the actions 
of others are always in danger of overlooking the 
importance of the sequential development of those 
they direct.37
Dewey intentionally gave consideration to the aspect of 
individuality and individual interests. Nevertheless, the 
individual, as viewed by Dewey, was by far more interested 
in cooperative activities which resulted in benefits for the 
whole society. If this were not the case, then how can a 
community of interests and a subsequent community of living 
be realized? For Dewey, any system of government which pro­
jected compulsion or coercion also jeopardized its educational 
ideas and practices; furthermore, such a system would stifle 
effective direction of the individual. The desirable control 
to which Dewey ascribed was both intrinsic and internal. This 
became evident when he stated: "Control, in truth, means only
an emphatic form of direction of powers, and covers the regu­
lation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite 
as much as that brought about when others take the lead."3® 
Dewey's objective where education and direction of the 
individual was concerned was the gradual development of self- 
control and self-direction. These, he believed, effected 




which the mature individual must possess if his growth was 
to be effective and if it was to continue uninterrupted.
Thus, the concept described by Dewey took into consideration 
the present as well as a projection into subsequent conse­
quences. Dewey further identified the task of the school 
when he stated that "to achieve this internal control through 
identity of interest and understanding is the business of
education."39
2. Modes of Social Direction
Horne's interpretation revealed an obvious objection to 
the modes of sound direction, as presented by Dewey. In terms 
of direction, the question raised by Horne was which kind of 
direction was the most effective— the direct and personal or 
the indirect and impersonal. For Horne, it appeared that it 
was the direct, personal control which held the dominant, 
although not exclusive, place in the educative process.^0 
Furthermore, he viewed Dewey's preference for the indirect 
and impersonal as a situation which resulted in an inappropriate 
evaluation of the direct, personal mode of social direction. 
Horne further identified his position when he stated: " . . .
let the reader recall the greater influences that have shaped 
his life; are they not persons rather than things controlled 
by persons?
3*Ibid., pp. 47-48.
^®Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 31..
41ibid.
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The second criticism cited by Horne was that Dewey had 
placed a secondary importance on sensation as a source of 
knowledge. As a result, Horne contended that an unnecessary 
obstacle regarding knowing had been created:
Those born blind can know nothing of light and 
color by acquaintance, though they may learn much 
about them by description. Those born deaf know 
nothing of tones and noise. . . .  it is the sensa­
tion and not the use that gives the knowledge, and 
without sensation there could be no intelligent u s e . 42
Thus, for Horne, mere sensation may constitute knowledge. 
The discrimination presented by Horne would seem to be a subtle 
one. Admittedly, the sensations may provide the materials of 
knowledge, and, in effect, result in a kind of knowing.
"Through sensation we may know what we do not use. . . ."43 
In his analysis, Horne admitted that a thing can be best known 
only when it can be interacted with or used. Thus, the know­
ing projected by Horne was indeed a kind of knowing, but at 
best it was rudimentary. It could hardly be placed on the 
highest plane as an intellectual approach to knowledge. Over­
emphasis upon the sensations as a source of knowledge further 
suggested a dependence factor best suited for the immature. 
Learning about a thing by description is at best a poor sub­
stitute for knowledge which has been acquired as the result 
of participation with and use of things in such a way as to 




one may gain a certain knowledge about the stars by way of 
sensations. Yet, such knowledge, as presently existing, 
would be void of meaning in terms of use in the present or 
in the future.
Psychologically speaking, Horne was correct in recogniz­
ing that the sensations played a primary role in acquiring 
knowledge. The significance of this condition would be depend­
ent upon the degree of action which accompanied such knowledge. 
Unless knowledge of this variety leads to further knowledge 
or to some future usage, then the individual has only been 
afforded the materials or furnishings of knowledge insofar as 
any decisive perceptions and insights are concerned.
Horne's general conclusion was that direct control deserved 
the greater emphasis in the guidance and molding of the imma­
ture. By contrast, Dewey would have us form a complementary 
disposition for responding or behaving while Horne forms a 
direct guiding hand in directing and controlling the habits 
of the young. The key consideration in Dewey's theory was that 
the mind was an instrument actively engaged in the process of 
control and direction. Dewey identified his position when he 
stated:
The philosophy of learning has been unduly domin­
ated by a false psychology. It is frequently stated 
that a person learns by merely having the qualities of 
things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of 
the senses. Having received a store of sensory impres­
sions, association or some power of mental synthesis is 
supposed to combine them into ideas— into things with a 
meaning. The difference between an adjustment to a 
physical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter 
involves response to a thing in its meaning; the former 
does n o t . 44
44Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 34-35.
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In other words, Dewey viewed direct influence of one per­
son on another as impossible except as use was made of the 
physical environment as an intermediary.^5 Dewey called 
attention to a need for examining in greater detail the social 
medium if social direction of the young and its implications 
were to be fully realized. He issued a caution concerning the 
separation of the physical from the social environment. Such 
a condition represented both a psychological as well as a 
philosophical f a l l a c y . T h a t  which resulted from the above 
arrangement tended to be a vague, if not blind, response to 
a physical stimulus. Admittedly, such activity might produce 
a kind of training for the individual, but little would be 
accomplished in the sense of an educational gain.
Concerned with the intellectual aspect and its relation­
ship to social control, Dewey stated:
. . . the fundamental means of control is not 
personal but intellectual. It is not 'moral' in the 
sense that a person is moved by direct personal 
appeal from others. . . .  It consists in the habits 
of understanding which are set up in using objects in 
correspondence with others. . . . Mind as a concrete 
thing is precisely the power to understand things in 
terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is 
the power to understand them in terms of the use to 
which they are turned in joint or shared situations.
And mind in this sense is the method of social control.




Dewey saw social habituation achieved through the intel­
lect. The individual has been educated to act intelligently 
only when he acts with a certain end in view which carries 
with it a certain meaning. Performing the act for the sake 
of that meaning constituted intelligent action from the stand­
point of Dewey.
4. Imitation and Social Psychology
Horne concluded that the views presented by Dewey on 
imitation were understated and were ". . . a  way of de­
personalizing the educative process."*8 At the same time, 
Horne did not doubt that among certain people, especially 
the intelligent, " . . .  there is much similarity of action 
that is not due to imitation. They see the reason for doing 
as others."49 Imitation probably plays a far greater role 
than admitted by Dewey especially during the formative years 
of the child. A failure to recognize this facet of the edu­
cational process, or to dismiss it as insignificant, could 
result in a defect at some point in the development of the 
child. The emphasis and importance of imitation as an influ­
ence in learning was stressed by Horne. He stated; "But it 
remains true that direct personal control of the right sort 
and the imitation of worthy models taken as examples are among
4®Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 34.
49ibid., p. 33.
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the best, most common, and most influential ways of forming 
mental and moral dispositions."^®
By sharp contrast, Horne favored this method and saw in 
it no danger for the child. "We can control children directly 
without being arbitrary and we can imitate our superiors with­
out being slavish. We must continue to be what we want our 
children to become."51
A study of Dewey's text revealed that he had not avoided 
a consideration of imitation and its role. For Dewey, this 
method of learning received a different emphasis. He also 
believed that imitation and emulation needed to be viewed in 
proper perspective. According to Dewey's theory, that which 
has been referred to as imitation was a misleading name for 
the act of partaking with others in a use of things which
COleads to consequences of common interest.
Dewey was fully cognizant that some "learning" had taken 
place as a result of imitation. Such a condition was not, 
however, the case of an individual choosing by way of his 
own initiative. Recognizing and viewing a prescribed model 
is one thing. Accomplishing what another person has accom­
plished is quite another where the individual is concerned.
If one continues to imitate another as a pattern for learning.
5®Ibid., pp. 34-35.
S^Ibid., p. 35.
52Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 41.
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participation on the part of the individual and by the indi­
vidual likely will be neglected. Dewey recognized that in 
observing individuals collectively, they may appear to be 
imitating one another on the surface or at first glance. In 
this case, what appears to be the condition and what really 
is happening are two different activities. Aware of some of 
the hazards associated with imitation, Dewey believed there 
was no need to consciously appeal to this method as though it 
were a valid activity in learning. He stated;
The basic error in the current notion of imitation 
is that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes an 
effect for the cause of the effect. There can be no doubt 
that individuals in forming a social group are like- 
minded. They tend to act with the same controlling 
ideas, beliefs, and intentions, given similar cir­
cumstances . . . they might be said to be engaged in 
'imitating' one another. [But]'imitation' throws no 
light upon why they so act: it repeats the fact as 
an explanation of itself.
The educational concern expressed by Dewey was that the 
eventual outcome was conformity requiring little imagination 
or originality. Such a position only served to depreciate 
the true educative function and learning in the broadest sense 
of the term.
Further elaboration on this point was made by Dewey when 
he recognized the role of interest and self-initiative:
Imitation may come in but its role is subord­
inate. The child has an interest on his own account; 
he wants to keep it going. He imitates the means of
S^lbid.
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doing, not the end or the thing to be done. . . he 
imitates the means because he wishes, on his own 
behalf, as part of his own initiative, to take an 
effective part. . . .54
Dewey noted a defect in the scheme of imitation when it 
became apparent it was the ends which the individual was 
imitating. Such an emphasis at best produced an artificial 
and therefore temporary result. While it may appear to be 
effective, its ineffectiveness must be evaluated in terms of 
the long-range effect upon the disposition of the young.
In summary, Dewey believed the individual might well 
observe the means of doing a particular thing in order to 
improve his own actions but the observation of the model or 
pattern must remain a secondary function where learning and 
the learning process are concerned.
5. Some Applications to Education
The major pedagogical criticism made by Horne relative 
to imitation in its social context was that he believed Dewey 
placed far too great an emphasis upon the manipulation of 
things rather than a concern for persons and personal relation­
ships.^^ There is little doubt that learning is accomplished 
from association of persons and from personal relationships. 
From Dewey's point of view such learning was extrinsic and 
likely to be imposed from without. Too great a reliance upon
54lbid., p. 42.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 37.
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this method was dangerous since it might well be an impair­
ment to learning. Dewey viewed this form of experience as 
beneficial, but it was only a beginning and represented an 
initial, if not a lower form of learning, in the process of 
education. By comparison, Dewey contended that learning stems 
from a personal involvement in the meaningful manipulation of 
things or ideas. He believed that only in this way could the 
learner truly find understanding and meaning for himself. 
Actually, Dewey did not aim at an emphasis upon things or 
persons where the intellectual endeavor of learning was con­
cerned. He stated:
Only by engaging in a joint activity, where one 
person's use of material and tools is consciously 
referred to the use other persons are making of their 
capacities and appliances, is a social direction of 
disposition attained.56
Therefore, Horne's appeal to learning by way of passive 
absorption was not consistent with Dewey's theory of social 
interaction as a basis for learning. Any isolation of learn­
ing from the social use of materials was not only pseudo­
intellectual, but also self-defeating. The essence of social 
control for Dewey was to be found in a common understanding of 
the means and ends of action. The thrust was not to be found 
in the situation, but rather in the control and direction of 
the situation made by the learner as he attempted to gain an 
understanding common to all in the social context. Dewey
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 47.
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further warned against extreme control over others in an 
attempt to directly influence their actions:
. . .  we are likely to exaggerate the importance 
of this sort of control at the expense of a more 
permanent and effective method. The basic control 
resides in the nature of the situation in which the 
young take part. In social situations the young have 
to refer their way of acting to what others are doing 
and make it fit in. This common understanding of the 
means and ends of action is the essence of social 
control. It is indirect, or emotional and intel­
lectual, not direct or personal.5'
In contrast with Horne's extrinsic appeal to the dis­
position of the person, Dewey's appeal was to the intrinsic, 
internal force, not the external, coercive. Dewey ascribed 
to the school a major social task in order to achieve the 
internal control which he described. "Schools require for 
their full efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activ­
ities in which those instructed take part, so that they may 
acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials 
and appliances used.
Education as Growth
1. The Conditions of Growth
The key factors for Horne as conditions of growth are 
direction and guidance. The failure of some in the process 
of proper growth was viewed by Horne as an outgrowth of poor 




possessed with a bent toward activity, he maintained that 
only through adequate guidance imposed by society could we 
ultimately effect growth in the right direction. An avoid­
ance of selfishness might be achieved through proper guid­
ance and direction of the young. "A proper social guidance 
of their 'eager and impassioned activities' might well have 
led to that social sharing which is the antithesis of self­
ishness."59 Therefore, Horne's scheme called for a kind of 
social responsiveness which in turn determined the quality 
and quantity of growth. He stressed that growth became an 
induced activity purposefully planned and designed by the 
shadow of the adult. Horne's position in this connection 
was clearly identified when he stated; "Our children are 
what they are made to be until they get old enough to help 
make themselves."GO If this be the case, then the individual 
himself has little opportunity for participation and little 
or no influence upon his own growth. Nor do potential and 
capacity serve as key factors when so viewed.
The antithesis of this position was presented by Dewey. 
He emphatically stated:
. . . immaturity designates a positive force or 
ability,— the power to grow. We do not have to draw 
out or educe positive activities from a child, as 
some educational doctrines would have it. Where 
there is life, there are already eager and impassioned
59Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 43.
*Olbid.
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activities. Growth is not something done to them;
it is something they d o . ^
A far greater sensitivity for personal action on behalf 
of the young was designated by Dewey. Intense social direc­
tion need not be subjected upon the young. They naturally 
possess a far greater capacity for individual direction than 
was recognized by Horne. They are not as immature at social 
intercourse as the adult might imagine. On the contrary, 
Dewey's position recognized a greater facility and capacity 
for growth through social interaction than was to be found 
in the adult. Recognizing the facility for independent growth, 
Dewey turned his attention to the social concern. The dif­
ference between Horne and Dewey was not found to be in the 
recognition of certain dangers inherent in increased personal 
independence. Rather, it was found in the solution. Both 
Horne and Dewey recognized the potential conditions which 
could eventually lead to indifference to others and their 
needs. However, for Horne, the solution was found by estab­
lishing the power of dependence— adult domination over the 
young. Conversely, Dewey suggested that ultimately the key 
was to be found in setting up the conditions conducive to a 
state of interdependence so that the need for others parallels 
growth at a time when the possibility for both were at a peak. 
Central to this theme, Dewey asserted:
61Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 50.
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It is essentially the ability to learn from 
experience; the power to retain from one experience 
something which is of avail in coping with the dif­
ficulties of a later situation. This means power 
to modify actions on the basis of the results of 
prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions^ 
Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible.
2. Habits as Expression of Growth
In Horne's interpretation, his chief criticism relative
to the treatment of growth stemmed from the significance which
Dewey attached to habits and habituation in the growth process.
Indicative of this concern, Horne emphasized:
Note that the whole process of growth is sub­
sumed under the conception of habit-formation. Even 
the moral, emotional, and intellectual phases of 
life are treated as effects of the environment on 
the responsive organism, as cases of habit.63
Dewey's appeal to the naturalistic emphasis in the whole
process of growth was inadequate for Horne. He believed that
a naturalistic emphasis as related to growth failed to take
into account the higher powers of mind held by all men.G*
Addressing himself to this criticism, Horne stated:
Particularly is this evident if we raise the 
question whether judgment and decision can change a 
bad habit into a good one. Apparently not, since the 
choices and decisions are presented as themselves a 
part of the emotional disposition which is itself in 
turn made by habit.65
^^Ibid.. p. 53.




Horne's conclusion to this question was negative. He 
also objected to the significant role assigned to man's 
environment as an agent for promoting the active use of 
intelligence. The implicit criticism in this consideration 
was that Dewey had relieved man of responsibility by focusing 
attention upon his surroundings— his environment. According 
to Horne, ". . . this whole treatment of habit makes the 
response and not the respondent responsible."66 Horne called 
for a different treatment of man's inner life, one which 
would not be evaluated from the viewpoint of habit alone.
Thus, a consideration of some metaphysical or spiritual 
attribute guiding or giving direction would represent a more 
stable and a more nearly complete base upon which to evaluate 
growth.
At this point, Dewey projected an attempt to evoke an 
opposite point of view. It was obvious to him that such a 
frame of reference necessitated a total rejection of dualism 
as was suggested in the Idealist's theory. Choices and 
decisions were a part of the individual's emotional disposi­
tions and the formation of habits as a function of growth was 
not dependent exclusively upon either internal nor external 
influences. Man's decisions and choices were concluded as 
an outgrowth of the active agent of intelligence. Like con­
formity, habits were neither good nor bad in and of themselves, 
The criterion of either condition was the direction in which
GGlbid.. p. 49.
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these led the individual and subsequent responses which 
resulted. A basic pedagogical concept for Dewey was 
sequential development. Therefore, how development was 
conceived becomes a major consideration for him in assessing 
the educative process. While Horne would identify fixed 
goals and ends for education, Dewey viewed the educative 
process as its own end.
False ideas relative to growth are, for Dewey, dangerous 
when these become associated with growth, i.e., education in 
a democratic society. Dewey believed that fixation of goals 
constituted one of the major drains in the process of educa­
tion. This philosophical posture, he believed, constituted 
an important element since other considerations of educational 
theory were built around this position. Furthermore, any 
metaphysical orientation, when viewed as serving as a stimu­
lus to growth, also gave rise for concern when viewed from 
Dewey's concept of growth.
Essential to Dewey's position was an understanding that 
neither habits, organic changes in the individual, nor an 
isolated environment provided an adequate focal point. The 
ability of the individual to effect habits which later enabled 
him to adjust to his environment was the essential point.
Mere habituation, similar to that suggested by Horne, 
does not lead to growth since this suggests a passive accom­
modation of the individual to his environment which may or may 
not prove beneficial. Less attention to the use of intelligence
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was called for in Horne's scheme. Therefore, one might expect 
the results to amount to a mere adaptation of the individual 
to his environment.
Dewey believed the significance of habits was dependent 
upon the extent to which intelligence was associated with 
them. Relevant to this connection Dewey stated;
Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of 
acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which 
we are enslaved just in the degree in which intel­
ligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits 
are unthinking habits; 'bad' habits are habits so 
severed from reason that they are opposed to the 
conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision.
For Dewey, the characteristic of habit which determined 
its significance was the quality of action or activity and 
the direction it in turn leads the individual. The effi­
ciency of action when viewed with habit was to be found in 
the quality of habit. If these be low-grade in quality, 
then intellectual forces will be at a minimum. As a result 
of this condition, a fixed habit may also lead to ". . . 
routine ways, with loss of freshness, open-mindedness, and 
originality. Fixity of habit may mean that something has a 
fixed hold upon us, instead of our having a free hold upon
things."68
The significance of habit was further identified by 
Dewey when he stated:
6^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 58.
*Gibid., p. 57.
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It means formation of intellectual and emotional 
disposition as well as an increase in ease, economy, 
and efficiency of action. Any habit marks an 
inclination— an active preference and choice for the 
conditions involved in its exercise. A habit also 
marks an intellectual disposition.
The text of both Horne and Dewey revealed that habits in 
the form of habituation provided the individual the necessary 
background for growth. Dewey's projection held that when 
habits provided the capacity to adjust or readjust activities 
in order to meet new conditions, then growth had occurred.
For Dewey, all human growth naturally and necessarily took 
place within the social context. For Horne, the activity 
and productivity of habit were minimized and the possibility 
of spiritual and metaphysical initiative was maximized.
3. The Educational Bearings of the Conception of Development 
Since growth was a key concept in the educational philos­
ophy of Dewey, Horne, like other critics, has directed much 
attention toward his interpretation of the term. The dif­
ficulty with Dewey's growth process which suggested that 
growth produced more growth was made clear when Horne stated:
"It is not enough to say 'education is growth'; we must add 
education in growth in the right w a y . T h e  factor omitted 
in Dewey's theory was that a standard or some form of a criterion
**Ibid.
70Horne, The Democratic philosophy of Education, p. 52,
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needed to be identified if right growth, rather than wrong 
growth, was to be the result. Repeatedly, Horne has called 
for some directing force as a guide in the process of edu­
cation. Yet, who or what should constitute such a force was 
not revealed by Horne in his discussion. From his general 
views on education, Horne assigned a leading role to the 
teacher. Again, an external influence dominated growth of 
the individual without sufficient attention given to involve­
ment of the learner. The inspirer and director of what Dewey 
termed the "cumulative movement of action" must, then, be the 
teacher. The traditional point of view held by Horne was 
fully taken into account by Dewey. He believed that such a 
view had placed great emphasis upon the immaturity of the 
young. Furthermore, it focused constant attention upon his 
state and subsequently set out to elevate the young to an 
adult environment. The adult environment, therefore, was 
seen as the model and pattern toward which the young should 
be directed. This was the condition as presented by Horne.
For him, a premium was placed upon the personal relationship 
between student and teacher.
Dewey did not discount the value of such a relationship; 
however, the greater educational value for him was to be found 
in the activity produced by the impersonal relationship between 
the student and his problem situation.
The fear of faulty or destructive growth leading to 
malignant growth was but a failure on the part of the critic
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to recognize and understand the essential meaning of the 
growth concept as conceived by Dewey. Justifiably, Dewey 
consistently advocated the true meaning of the growth concept 
which implied a dynamic process of continuous, positive, and 
healthy development.
A major concern for Horne in this connection was that 
Dewey had abandoned imposed goals. The theory of growth for 
more growth, and education subordinated only to more education 
was a vague concept for Horne. His real objection remained 
in his conclusion that Dewey's growth was void of a goal.
"Its weakness is, growth needs a goal."^^ Consequently, 
without a goal the concept of growth was minimized and must 
be subjected to criticism. A definite reaction to this 
position was evident when Horne stated:
Children must be directed in their growth toward 
something worthwhile in person and social relations.
They must grow up to be something admirable by con­
stantly having admirable models and patterns and 
associations. Growth must be toward an ideal of 
human character.
Thus, for Horne, emulation and admiration of adults by 
the young produced the best results in terms of growth. In 
this way, satisfactory induction into the adult community 
could be brought about. Viewed within this framework, growth 
was viewed as having an end, rather than being an end. The 




growth by restricting, if not disregarding, the instinctive, 
creative powers of the young. Originality, when operating 
within this setting, has been reduced to a minimum. The 
character of individuality which must be viewed as an asset 
in terms of personal efficiency and in making a contribution 
to society has been stifled. Dewey, aware of these circum­
stances pointed out the dangers inherent in this process of 
external control. The nature of Horne's philosophy and 
Dewey's attendant concern were expressed when he stated:
Natural instincts are either disregarded or 
treated as nuisances— as obnoxious traits to be 
suppressed, or at all events to be brought into 
conformity with external standards. Since con­
formity is the aim, what is distinctively individual 
in a young person is brushed aside, or regarded as 
a source of mischief or anarchy.
Thus, the result of Horne's educative process of growth 
was a promotion of singularity as opposed to the open, 
pluralistic approach which welcomed and supported progress.
The use of external agents in education represented a 
semblance of maintenance, if not regression. The possibilities 
of new frontiers in education have been aborted. The exter­
nal method promoted by Horne encouraged a mechanical method 
predicated upon the attainment of an external end.
That which was most descriptive of growth for Dewey may 
best be understood when viewed in terms of the close association 
with life and the life process. In terms of education.
73Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 60.
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immaturity must not be viewed with impatience nor as some­
thing which must be abandoned as soon as possible. For 
Dewey, life meant growth and the significance of this con­
dition was that growth was as positive at one stage as it 
was at another. Supporting this position, Dewey stated:
. . . education means the enterprise of 
supplying the conditions which insure growth, 
or adequacy of life, irrespective of age. Life 
is not to be identified with every superficial
act and interest.
Much criticism of this key concept in Dewey's philoso­
phy stems from a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of 
the concept. Growth was not the uninhibited fostering of 
the child's inherent nature with the child's interest forming 
the center of all activity. On the contrary, growth was pred­
icated on the involvement and satisfactory solution of prob­
lems assisted by the teacher when the student recognizes an 
experienced difficulty in his personal fulfillment. Such a 
construct of growth makes a special kind of educational expe­
rience imperative. It demands an experience in which the 
student is permitted to see the difficulty for himself, formu­
late it into a problem, propose possible solutions, then 
validate his idea. Growth was never a stagnant, sometimes 
dormant, condition. It was that process which provided a 
foundation for more growth or fulfillment of purposeful
74Ibid., p. 61.
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activity. It is important that recognition be given to the 
fact that not all activity is purposeful and conducive to 
growth. Likewise, not all conduct of experience assures 
advancement toward learning. The emphasis and focus was 
upon the kind of activity in which the learner became 
involved. As for experience, the determinant relative to 
its educative value was to be found in the quality of each 
unit of experience.
A criterion of growth was established by Dewey. Develop­
ing out of a problem situation, it was the capacity of the 
solution to provide satisfactory consequences which would 
be immediately applicable as well as provide adequate means 
to deal successfully with future frustrations, problems, 
and difficulties.
The task of the school was also identified by Dewey;
The criterion of the value of school education 
is the extent in which it creates a desire for con­
tinued growth and supplies means for making the 
desire effective in fact.75
Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline
1. Education as Preparation
Although differing opinions were presented by Horne and 
Dewey in this consideration, the differences were primarily 
found in the area of emphasis. Horne believed that prepara­
tion for the future was not wholly an unconscious issue. He
75Ibid., p. 62.
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contended that preparation for the future may enter into the 
conscious, even to the extent of serving as a part of uncon­
scious motivation.76 This was an important consideration in 
the formulation of an educational program. Even so, Horne 
did not believe that such a consideration would lead to con­
fusion and a loss of motive power. His concern for the future, 
while living in the present, was not only possible but was 
viewed as an imperative if complete living in the present was 
to be achieved. In Horne's theory, getting ready for tomorrow 
was determined by being ready today.
A study of the text of both Horne and Dewey revealed 
that Horne placed great emphasis upon the term "preparation" 
while Dewey preferred the term "planning" and its connotation.
Obviously, the future may well not be all that the indi­
vidual had envisioned unless he has in advance employed a 
degree of serious thought and management of present affairs. 
Both writers on this subject were not in disagreement on this 
point. However, Dewey believed Horne had set up another dual­
ism in the time continuum. For Horne, it was a consideration 
of present and future; for Dewey, it was a consideration of 
present-future.
Horne clearly stated his position by declaring: "It
would seem to be a highly abstract and impractical point of 
view to separate the present entirely from conscious thought
76Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 61.
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of the future."77 it might be concluded that from the position 
taken by Horne a separation had already taken place. The 
aspect of "getting ready" for the future was further emphasized 
by Horne when he insisted that such a posture was the only 
safe thing for society. 7® The importance of timing and prep­
aration was also an important feature of Horne's theory. "The 
license to practice precedes the practice and the license is 
based on preparation, and conscious preparation."79
If Horne's interpretation which held that Dewey had totally 
disregarded the future by way of avoiding or neglecting it were 
true, then criticism was justified. Experientially, the ques­
tion becomes how can the young be preparing for, while at the 
same time be involved in his growth and development? Perhaps 
the most important aspect in a consideration of preparation 
or planning ought to be the nature of the individual's present 
activities. Does his focus and orientation demand a pre­
occupation with the future or does his orientation permit him 
to focus upon the quality and richness of present activity?
If the latter case be true, do these serve in such a way as 
to promote growth toward the desired direction? When these 
questions are answered, then a more nearly adequate appraisal 





Prolonged lingering and conjecture about the future was 
a condition which held damaging results, according to Dewey's 
philosophy. The fact that a child lives in the present 
logically provided an attendant asset which in turn ought to 
be seized upon and the most made of it. For Dewey, conscious 
preparation for the future and for future needs only served 
as a deterrent to present efforts and energies. Viewed from 
Dewey's point of view, the fallacy of the position assumed by 
Horne was in the fact that present efforts were likely to be 
misdirected, especially when consideration was given to the 
uncertainty of the future. However, for Horne, the future 
was not vague nor uncertain. The nature and character of 
adult living as it ought to be had long ago been identified, 
according to traditional thought.
Horne's position was not only futuristic; it also had a 
transcendent quality. Not only should educational practices 
focus on education as preparation in this life, but they 
should also serve as preparation for another life. The con­
dition of the young was one of probation. The assignment for 
the young was a kind of preparation geared to equip him for 
an ultimate future in which he could fully participate and 
share.
Dewey emphasized the gross loss in energy, time, and 
accomplishment when the individual's attention was focused 
upon something other than present conditions. He stated:
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It is impossible to overestimate the loss which 
results from the deflection of attention from the 
strategic point to a comparatively unproductive point.
It fails most just where it thinks it is succeeding—  
in getting a preparation for the future.80
Similar to the question of growth, Horne's position con­
cerning the future tended to be prescriptive. For education, 
this meant a normative function must be adopted for it was 
the method best suited to direct the educational enterprise.
Relative to education, Dewey did not believe the future 
should be ignored. Certainly, he recognized that in the dis­
tance a future was to come and that intervening time would 
cause that future to become the present— a reality. Again, 
emphasis probably accounted for the divergent opinions noted. 
Growth, being a key concept, offered an explanation of Dewey's 
views. From his point of view, it was not a question of 
whether education should or should not prepare for the future. 
He stated:
If education is growth, it must progressively 
realize present possibilities, and thus make indi­
viduals better fitted to cope with later requirements. 
Growing is not something which is completed in odd 
moments;, it is a continuous leading into the future.
The mistake is not in attaching importance to prep­
aration for future need, but in making it the main­
spring of present effort. Because the need of 
preparation for a continually developing life is 
great, it is imperative that every energy should be 
bent to making the present experience as rich and 
significant as possible. Then as the present merges 
Insensibly into the future, the future is taken care 
of .81
80Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 64.
Gllbid.. p. 65.
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2. Education as Unfolding
Differences as to basic concepts of education and the 
idea of development constituted the main portion of Horne's 
criticism in this discussion. True to the idealistic philos­
ophy, Horne reflected upon Dewey's rejection of transcenden­
talism, the a, priori, and modern idealistic philosophy in 
general.82
Horne could not view human life in all its fullness and 
goodness without ascribing to an infinite goal. Like the 
doctrine of preparation, the goal inherent in Horne's devel­
opmental doctrine was directed toward and away from the 
present and transcended the experienced. While the indi­
vidual was in preparation for duties of the future, the 
developmental doctrine was at work directing toward the ideal 
and spiritual qualities of the principle which was unfolding. 
In its philosophical context, such a system represented a 
transitional operation as opposed to a transactional opera­
tion, the latter representing the posture held by Dewey.
A system of non-perceptual reality was for Horne 
logically necessary if any consideration was to be given to 
the ideal and spiritual attributes of man. Horne made no 
attempt to prove or disprove his claim to a supernatural 
order. Nevertheless, Dewey's rejection of such a position 
was viewed by Horne as an injustice to man and all that he is
82Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 69.
59
or aspires to become. The following statement represented 
Horne's affirmation in this connection:
The rejection of an infinite goal of human life, 
of a supersensible world whose reality is not directly 
'perceived,' does violence to the experience of the 
mystics, subordinates the conceptual order to the 
perceptual, and it would revolutionize the practices 
of the religions of the world in so far as they involve 
the recognition of a supersensible or spiritual order 
in prayer and praise.83
Two sources were likely responsible for Horne's adherence 
to a non-temporal order of reality. First, the influence of 
Plato and his doctrine of ideas; by the traditional doctrine 
of a priori forms; and by Kant's non-experienced thing-in- 
itself.84 Second, Horne affirmed his position by declaring 
it need not be proved since it could not be disproved.
Acceptance became the rationale. This was clearly borne out 
when he asserted: "Our philosophy. . . involves an intellec­
tual venture akin to faith."85 The nature of goals as pre­
sented by Horne was rejected by Dewey. This Dewey did primarily 
because such goals were advanced toward complete, finished 
unfoldedness.
The rejection by Dewey of these goals basically stemmed 
from the dualism which he saw as inherent in Horne's inter­
pretation. Furthermore, the nature of these goals must be
®^Ibid.
84°^Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
G^Ibid., p. 70.
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viewed as apart from and removed from the present context of 
the individual's growth and development. Dewey further 
elaborated when he stated:
The perfect or complete ideal is not a mere 
ideal; it is operative here and now. But it is 
present only implicitly, 'potentially,' or in an 
enfolded condition. What is termed development 
is the gradual making explicit and outward of what 
is thus wrapped up.86
This being the case, substitutes must then be advanced 
in order to complete the principle, and substitutes for Dewey 
are just that: they remain inadequate in terms of real mean­
ing. It is as though we must deal with a phantom or, at 
best, an abstraction void of meaning— a contradiction of 
perceptual reality.
In terms of education, Dewey's objection to such a scheme 
possessed validity. Strong opposition to the Idealist's posi­
tion was noted when he stated:
An abstract and indefinite future is in control 
with all which that connotes in depreciation of pres­
ent power and opportunity. Since the goal of perfec­
tion, the standard of development, is very far away, 
it is so beyond us that, strictly speaking, it is 
unattainable. Consequently, in order to be available 
for present guidance it must be translated into some­
thing which stands for it.°'
Both the historical institutions relied upon by Hegel as 
well as the symbolic presentation of Froebel was rejected in 
Dewey's philosophy. Horne, as well as Dewey, did recognize
86Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 67.
fi7Ibid., p. 66.
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and applaud Froebel for his acknowledgment and influence in 
more properly viewing the child and his potential. The 
importance attached to Froebel’s contribution was noted by 
Dewey:
Froebel's recognition of the significance of 
the native capacities of children, his loving atten­
tion to them, and his influence in inducing others 
to study them, represent perhaps the most effective 
single force in modern educational theory. In effect­
ing widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth 
. . . [however] Froebel's love of abstract symbolism 
often got the better of his sympathetic insight; and 
there was substituted for development as arbitrary 
and externally imposed a scheme of dictation as the 
history of instruction has ever seen.8°
As a consequence of the condition described in the above 
analysis of Froebel, education, too, must focus attention upon 
the whole or complete "unfoldedness"— the finished product.
In method, product, not process, became the focal point of 
attention and concern. Again, the a priori formula was 
rejected by Dewey.
Conversely, almost complete acceptance of the idealis­
tic philosophy of both Hegel and Froebel was made by Horne.
He believed that both the symbolism of Froebel and the themes 
found in Hegel's series of historical institutions were nec­
essary forms for consideration if an adequate concept of edu­
cation was to be achieved. Acceptance of these concepts by 
Horne and their rejection by Dewey could be traced essentially 
to the same source. Both institutional and symbolic forms 
represented or embodied those traits of the Absolute. Horne
88Ibid., pp. 67-68.
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properly identified Dewey's reason for rejection of these traits 
when he stated:
Having rejected any infinite goal of life, it is 
logical to reject the symbols of Froebel, and the 
institutions of Hegel as representing that goal, or 
manifesting its nature in time.89
The basic tension between Horne and Dewey was in the area 
of the concept of growth and goals. It was a matter of knowing 
by way of perception— the pragmatic position— or believing that 
man . . is a potential image of the divine, and that this 
image should unfold in accordance with the model of perfect 
manhood. This view may be rejected; it has not been dis- 
proven."90
Horne, true to the idealistic philosophy accepted the 
premise that growth and social progress were a matter of 
organic change. Being organic in nature, Horne concluded that 
Dewey's criticism which denounced this philosophy as static 
was mistaken. Horne further emphasized the organic concept 
of the idealistic philosophy when he asserted, "The whole 
system of reality is organic. Human society is becoming so. 
Progress toward the infinite goal is without limit and no 
'arrest of growth' is implied."9l in other words, Horne saw 
this philosophy as one which was neither static nor exclusively




dynamic, it was dynamic.^2 on the contrary, Horne believed 
the absolute and the individual could be viewed as harmonious 
counterparts, not antithetical one to the other. Theoreti­
cally, this would be a desirable arrangement if in the results 
there could be found a degree of concreteness.
A significant limitation of the idealistic theory was 
recognized by Dewey. Inherent in the organistic philosophy 
was the attendant analogy between society and the body. It 
was in this area that Dewey projected an objection since such 
a system had the tendency to restrict the individual, stifle 
his growth, and limit him by place and function in society. 
Projecting this theory further, Dewey identified a philosoph­
ical strain which ultimately produced an arrangement which 
permitted class distinction. Aware of this theoretical frame­
work, Dewey concluded that ultimately such a system became a 
contradiction to the conditions of a democratic society. When 
this occurred, educational theory and practice was subsequently 
steered away from the democratic concept of education. Dewey 
issued a caution concerning the organistic of human society. 
Since the traits of a dynamic, democratic process were restric­
ted and class distinctions were promoted, his final conclusion 
and warning was:
As one portion of the bodily tissue is differ­
entiated so that it can be the hand and the hand only, 
another, the eye, and so on, all taken together making
92 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
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the organism, so one individual is supposed to be 
differentiated for the exercise of the mechanical 
operations of society, another for those of a states­
man, another for those of a scholar, and so on. The 
notion of 'organism' is thus used to give a philosophic 
sanction to class distinctions in social organization—  
a notion which in its educational application again 
means external dictation instead of growth.
The social progress which Dewey spoke about must be based 
upon experimental selection and choice. He insisted that 
choices in decision and application must not be allowed to 
be mandated by arbitrary and prescriptive methods. Exter­
nal dictation which ultimately led to a static condition was 
rejected.
3. Education as Training of Faculties
The doctrine of formal discipline as expressed by Locke 
was identified by Horne as one which continued to attract the 
attention of students of educational theory.94 practice, 
the theory held that by training certain inherent mental fac­
ulties the learner may in the end be a trained person, one 
whose powers had been refined through exercise. The acqui­
sition of certain habits thus became the product of education, 
without giving consideration to the view of education as a 
process. Indeed, the focus was upon the result of identi­
fiable aims in education rather than upon a plurality of 
outcomes when growth was viewed as a continuous process.
Horne's interpretation of the traditional training of 
faculties was not consistent with that of either Locke or
93oewey, Democracy and Education, p. 70.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 80.
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Dewey. A shift in psychological emphasis was noted. Like 
Dewey, Horne identified inconsistencies when he analyzed 
Locke's theoretical base. Horne believed that Bacon, rather 
than Locke, better illustrated the theory of mental discipline 
and faculty psychology. Horne's reference to Locke and formal 
discipline appeared to be an attempt to further divide, if not 
shift, his attention to any attributes associated with this 
theory. This was indicated from the following statement:
There are theories held by Locke which are 
inconsistent with formal discipline. Locke himself 
rejected the 'discipline' he received. . . .  He 
rejected the faculty psychology upon which the theory 
rests, along with innate i d e a s . 95
To summarize his assessment, Horne concluded:
. . . that as to aim he [Locke] is a social 
realist, and as to means he is now a sense realist, 
now a naturalist, and now to a degree a disciplin­
arian. He is more disciplinary in his theories of 
physical and moral than of intellectual education.96
Although Horne rejected the historical interpretation of 
Locke, he did maintain that the value of transfer of training 
could not be ignored. Training as associated with method 
remained an essential element in Horne's psychological and 
philosophical posture. Deviating somewhat from the tradi­
tional view he wrote: "We are still permitted to speak of
education as training, only it must be training of the 





It was in method and outcome that a dispute between Horne 
and Dewey became evident. Exercise of essential powers, bio­
logically or intellectually, remained the key to Horne's method 
in learning. He would train the responses, but not the facul­
ties. Thus, he returned to the deductive method of learning.
Horne's primary analysis was aimed at Dewey's fundamental 
philosophical objection to all forms of dualism. The specific 
dualism favored by Horne and rejected by Dewey was that of 
training of impulses by exercises. Unity as to mind and matter 
as well as to individual and the world represented a key factor 
in Dewey's philosophical base. He consistently rejected all 
forms of dualism. Horne found the position maintained by 
Dewey unacceptable on the ground that such a view could not 
readily be understood. Furthermore, Horne concluded that 
Dewey's posture was vague and had not been proved, at least 
not by an acceptable criterion. If, indeed, such unity could 
be achieved for Horne, ". . .it would have to be a unity of 
experience, a known unity, a conscious unity, an all-embracing 
unity, and hence some form of idealism.
Dewey believed a psychological fallacy existed in the 
theory referred to as training of faculties. His critical 
analysis of such a concept was definite. He summarily dis­
missed such a theory when he stated:
Perhaps the most direct mode of attack consists 
in pointing out that the supposed original faculties
98Ibid., pp. 82-83.
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of observation, recollection, willing, thinking, 
etc., are purely mythological. There are no such 
ready-made powers waiting to be exercised and 
thereby trained.99
Dewey did acknowledge certain native tendencies or 
instinctive reactions. He believed that these were asso­
ciated with original connections of neurons in the central 
nervous s y s t e m . ^99 These tendencies, however, must not be 
viewed as isolated, each to be dealt with separately and 
trained individually. The recognition of and adherence to 
the biological impetus connected with changes in behavior 
was also important in Dewey's thought. Another important 
dimension in Dewey's theory was an organic accommodation 
whereby man was able to modify or change his environment.
The operation of these tendencies and the importance attached 
to them collectively were evident from the following state­
ment :
But these tendencies (a) instead of being a 
small number sharply marked off from one another, 
are of an indefinite variety, interweaving with one 
another in all kinds of subtle ways, (b) Instead 
of being latent intellectual powers, requiring only 
exercise for their perfecting, they are tendencies 
to respond in certain ways to changes in the envir­
onment so as to bring about other changes. It is by 
such specific changes of organic activities in 
response to specific changes in the medium that that 
control of the environment of which we have spoken
is effected.191




Horne made the following statement relative to Dewey's 
philosophy:
He is a monist, not of the idealistic, or 
agnostic, but of the naturalistic type. In this 
view awareness is not distinct from the stimulus 
or situation of which we are aware. The knower and 
the known are both inseparable constituents of the 
same naturalistic p r o c e s s . 102
Although viewed as vague and uncertain by Horne, Dewey's 
criterion for development in general and the role of educa­
tion in specific were repeated when he declared: " . . .  the
criterion here must be social. We want the person to note 
and recall and judge those things which make him an effective 
member of the group in which he is associated with others."103 
Idealistic thought dominated Horne's stance. The origin 
of mind and his central theme of reality attest to this fact: 
"Man is not simply an organism with flexible responses; he is 
a self originating in a S e l f . "1^4
When the full scope of Horne's interpretation of Dewey 
was analyzed, there was the recognition that each began by 
assuming a different premise. In assessing the arguments 
projected by each, it should be recalled that Horne and Dewey 
reasoned from a vastly different philosophical orientation..
102Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 82.
lO^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 78.
104Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 83.
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At times, an agreement with Dewey's thought was advanced by 
Horne. He stated;
We may bring this lengthy discussion to a close 
by remarking that on the individual side the important 
thing in Dr. Dewey's thought is the interaction of 
present organic activities with the present environ­
ment, and on the social side is the sharing of group 
activities. This is the height and the depth of his 
educational thinking.105
Education as Conservative and Progressive
1. Education as Formation
In this chapter Dewey reviewed and assessed traditional 
philosophical views. Horne's interpretation concluded that 
Dewey had rejected or at least minimized emphasis upon the 
past. The fact that such an interpretation was made by com­
paring the idealistic and pragmatic philosophies accounted 
for Horne's conclusion. In the area of consideration of sub­
ject matter this was especially true. Dewey had rejected 
education as conservative. By comparison, he presented edu­
cation in a progressive framework for this posture was funda­
mental to the pragmatic philosophy of education.
Horne also noted a striking contrast between Herbert's 
position and that held by Dewey. While Herbert's powers of 
the mind received impetus by the soul's reaction to realities 
that acted upon it, Dewey viewed these same powers of mind as 





Horne's overview of the variations between the two points 
of view relative to mind were seen from the following statement:
The two differences are that Herbart is more 
psychological and intellectualistic and Dewey more 
physiological and voluntaristic. According to Herbart 
the soul is passive until acted upon and then it is 
reactive; according to Dewey the organism in its 
environment is active as well as passive.10?
Such an analogy was not found objectionable. But to ana­
lyze and attribute to Herbert's method meaning and educational 
significance similar to that of Dewey's represented a far- 
reaching search for Horne. Nevertheless, Horne saw this 
endeavor as the best method for interpreting Dewey since the 
similarities in method remained.
Although not in total agreement with Herbart, Horne 
believed that some of Herbert's fundamentals were psychol­
ogically sound. Horne contended that:
. . .  it is still true that knowledge of certain 
subject matter is important, that Herbert's method 
is one efficient way of securing such knowledge, that 
knowledge is one of the sources of interest. . . 
whatever his method, the teacher's influence is g r e a t . 108
Both Horne and Dewey recognized Herbart's contribution 
to educational Theory. Dewey, however, found it necessary to 
modify Herbert's theory of interest. Interest, viewed singu­
larly, did not necessarily signify intelligent action. When 
isolated from interaction with the present environment, inter­
est becomes a distracting element and possibly a barrier to
lO^Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
^^^Ibid.. p. 88.
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learning. In an attempt to overcome this inadequacy, Dewey 
proposed the additional components of need and purpose. As 
a result, he believed the individual was more likely to see 
a given task through to its successful conclusion. His serv­
ice to sound pedagogy lay basically in his identifying spe­
cific tasks for education thereby rejecting former tasks which 
were random, routine, and often vague. As a result of Herbart, 
Dewey believed teaching was brought into the realm of con­
scious method with a definite aim and procedure.109 Dewey 
acknowledged the great contribution made by Herbart and 
recognized him as a forerunner to progressive educational 
philosophy;
Herbart undoubtedly has had a greater influence 
in bringing to the front questions connected with 
the material of study than any other educational 
philosopher.HO
While Horne saw Herbert's method as one efficient method 
of securing knowledge, Dewey's elaboration was more relevant;
He stated problems of method from the stand­
point of their connection with the subject matter: 
method of having to do with the manner and sequence 
of presenting new subject matter to insure its 
proper interaction with old.Ill
Dewey's appreciation for Herbert's method as well as his 
keen insight into Herbert's theory possessed greater depth 
than that implied by Horne. The long-range implications of 
Herbert's theory were recognized and applied by Dewey. Yet,




For Horne, evidence of such recognition in terms of applica­
tion into educational practice was not found.
Horne rejected Herbert's pluralistic realism, his intel- 
lectualism, and his determinism; yet, he failed to assess any 
theoretical w e a k n e s s . T h e  fact that Herbert's theory of 
formation was dependent upon external operations for direc­
tion was not evaluated by Horne.
Dewey identified another fundamental weakness in that 
Herbart overemphasized the influence of intellectual envir­
onment upon the mind at the expense of learning associated 
with personal sharing of common experiences— the learner's 
privilege of learning which was free from external coercion. 
According to Dewey, reconstruction and reorganization resulted 
in formation. Differentiating his position, Dewey stated:
All education forms character, mental and moral, 
but formation consists in the selection and coordina­
tion of native capacities so that they may utilize the 
subject matter of the social environment.
2. Education as Recapitulation and Retrospection
Both Horne and Dewey recognized heredity and environment 
as factors to be taken into account when analyzing growth and 
development in the young. For Horne, heredity was the greater 
contributing factor. Although he agreed with Dewey that the 
two were cooperative elements, Horne maintained, " . . .  that
112Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 88.
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 84.
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our heredity contributes more to our making than does our 
environment. The precise meaning of the phrase "to our
making" was not clear. Since strong emphasis had been placed 
upon the relationship between heredity and the intelligence 
quotient, the assumption could be made that Horne portrayed 
a fixed, predetermined organism. It was obvious from Horne's 
tneory that there existed a depreciation and neglect for the 
efficacy of the present environment and the role of environ­
ment concerning the individual. Relying heavily upon the fixed 
determinant of the intelligence quotient, Horne's position 
promoted intellectual selectivity which allowed little regard 
for other significant factors in the growth process of all 
individuals.
A more consistent theory was advanced by Dewey. Both 
heredity and environmental factors were taken into account, 
yet a broader perspective was maintained by Dewey. Dewey's 
view was significant because it projected far-reaching pos­
sibilities for the development of individual capacities when 
the individual was furnished an environment conducive to the 
fullest development of his potential.
Dewey believed a serious implication was inherent in the 
theory of recapitulation and retrospection in that education 
was thus conceived to be a process of ". . . accommodating 
the future to the past. . . [it] finds its standards and
114Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 93.
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patterns in what has gone b e f o r e . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Dewey 
recognized a distortion in the regressive approach which 
resulted in a serious misconception of heredity and sub­
sequent implications for education. In the first place,
Dewey identified a biological fallacy. Concerning this mis­
conception, he stated;
Embryonic growth of the human infant preserves, 
without doubt, some of the traits of lower forms of 
life. But in no respect is it a strict traversing 
of past stages. If there were any strict 'law' of 
repetition, evolutionary development would clearly 
not have taken place. Each new generation would simply 
have repeated its predecessors' existence. To ignore 
the directive influence upon the young is simply to 
abdicate the educational function.116
Clearly, Dewey believed that far too great an influence 
had been credited to heredity at the expense of a sound 
recognition of the present environment. Educationally, a 
distinction was crucial. The extreme emphasis upon heredity 
had the effect of fixing and stifling development of the indi­
vidual. The other position recognized original endowment but 
did not allow this basic fact to determine or limit the devel­
opment of the individual's unique capacities. The latter 
position suggested that what the young might become was not 
wholly dependent on the limiting factor of heredity. The sig­
nificance of this condition was readily recognized by Dewey:
Education must take the being as he is; that a 
particular individual has just such and such equipment 
of native activities is a basic fact. That they were 
produced in such and such a way, or that they are
ll^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 92-93.
ll^Ibid.. p. 85.
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derived from one's ancestry, is not especially 
important for the educator. . . .11?
Dewey recognized that heredity served as a limiting factor in 
education, but it did not predetermine future use of present 
capacities. Disregarding the trait of heredity as a limiting 
factor would, indeed, be an error. Recognition of this fact 
was necessary in order to conserve time and energy by provid­
ing profitable experiences for the young instead of hampered 
attempts toward guiding the individual in a non-productive 
direction. '
Going beyond emphasis each theorist held closely to his 
view as the result of a different orientation given to life 
and the life processes.
In this connection, a striking contrast between personal 
idealism and pragmatism was noted. In speaking of cultural 
study, especially the literary products of man's history as 
the main material of education, Dewey wrote;
Isolated from their connection with the present 
environment in which individuals have to act, they 
become a kind of rival and distracting environment.
Their value lies in their use to increase the meaning 
of the things with which we have actively to do at 
the present time.118
Relative to specific subject matter, the present, for Dewey,
had been reduced to a more or less futile imitation of the past
especially when the literary products of man's history were
^^^Ibid., pp. 85-87. 
^^®Ibid., p. 93.
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overemphasized. Dewey's justification for the study of man's 
history was clearly for its practical utility. The purpose of 
such study was pragmatic. Since the individual lives in the 
present and is constantly influenced by his present environ­
ment, the study of history, from Dewey's point of view, may 
possess value. When subject matter, such as history, provides 
connections between the past and present conditions of life, 
a worthy dimension has been added to the educative process.
From the pragmatist's point of view, knowledge of the past 
becomes significant only as it further assists in producing 
a better understanding and enrichment of the present. To the 
extent such a contribution is not attained, then the study is 
of little value.
In opposition to the pragmatist, Horne stated;
Knowledge of any kind may be a good on its own 
account. The fact that some individuals are interested 
in acquiring impractical knowledge and enjoy the pos­
session of it may be an adequate justification for it. ^ ^
Horne also found equal justification for such study when 
tne purpose was for intellectual satisfaction or as a means 
of furthering the cause of complete or whole living. Ascribing 
to the idealist's position, Horne alluded to the Hegelian 
doctrine of Selbst-Entfremdung. Such a doctrine afforded the 
self of man further development toward one's larger s e l f . 1^0 
Embracing this doctrine, Horne declared:
119Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 94.
120Ibid., p. 95.
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By going far afield, the self leaves its limited 
quarters behind, becomes at home in the big foreign 
world, finds itself there too, and then returns a 
larger self to its native place. Only by estranging 
oneself from one's little self can one find one’s 
larger self. By compassing the past one may better
realize oneself.121
While Horne believed such an adventure constituted proper 
philosophic reflection, Dewey saw such an endeavor as a simple 
idealization for the sake of emotional satisfaction. If and 
when emotional satisfaction can be achieved as the result of 
such reflection, then to that extent a worthwhile accrual has 
been achieved. Throughout the text of Dewey, there appeared 
to be a neglect in this realm of acquiring knowledge which 
might prove to be relevant. Viewed from the democratic per­
spective and the ideas to which such a society is committed, 
Dewey might have furthered his theme by admitting a more 
thorough approach to a more genuine democratic philosophy of 
history; one which would lend assistance in clarifying ideas 
to which our society is committed as well as one which would 
serve to guide us to fruitful and productive alternatives for 
the future. The psychological benefits alone might well justify 
this dimension of thought.
However, since no practical influence upon human action 
was likely to be presented from ideas attained from this 
endeavor, Dewey concluded that such thinking constituted a 
kind of philosophic wandering. The irrelevancy of any tran- 
cendent orientation was clearly seen when he stated;
IZllbid.
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Men escape from the crudities of the present
to live in its imagined refinements, instead of
using what the past offers as an agency for ripening
these crudities.
Dewey further dismissed this notion by asserting that " . . .  
an individual can live only in the p r e s e n t . "^23 the
literal sense, there is truth to the statement that man could 
live only in the present. But, at the same time, is it not 
possible that he can enjoy and appreciate products of the 
past? It was probably true that Dewey had projected an over 
reaction to the subject of literature since this had so long 
dominated and been made the mainstay of the curriculum.
The value of history as a "discipline" was depreciated 
by Dewey. In part, this was due to his rejection of the idea 
that cultural history, especially the literary aspects of 
man's history, had been held by many to possess some unique 
power which could liberate man.^^^ Dewey was especially 
cognizant of this influence in higher education. A careful 
assessment of Dewey's pragmatic view of history revealed he 
believed there had been a degree of neglect to the intrinsic 
value which such study might hold for the serious historical 
inquirer.
Nevertheless, Dewey's final word on this subject warrants 
further consideration in light of the two areas of neglect




mentioned above. "A knowledge of the past and its heritage 
is of great significance when it enters into the present,
but not otherwise."125
Dewey believed that to focus attention upon materials of
the past represented a neglect to the demands of the present.
Such an orientation, he believed, tended to sever that vital
connection between the past and its products from the present
and its unique problems and frustrations;
The present, in short, generates the problems 
which lead us to search the past for suggestion, and 
which supplies meaning to what we find when we search.
The past is the past precisely because it does not 
include what is characteristic in the present. The 
moving present includes the past on condition that it 
uses the past to direct its own movement.126
3. Education as Reconstruction
Horne recognized the depth and scope of Dewey's educa­
tional philosophy as well as the valuable contributions found 
in his theory of reconstruction or reorganization of expe­
rience. He also believed the subject of growth as well as 
Dewey's more general theses concerning a philosophy of edu­
cation could be best understood in terms of this discussion. 
Horne pointed out little in the way of objection to Dewey's 
projected theory at this point. The weakness, for Horne, 
was found in certain qualities omitted by Dewey. His comments, 
therefore, were directed toward observations he found in Dewey's 




Dewey had pointed out that reconstruction of experience 
was both social and personal. The limiting factor observed 
by Horne was that Dewey had overemphasized the objective expe­
rience and had neglected the subjective self. While Dewey 
spoke of the participants as the "young," the "immature," or 
the "individual," Horne visualized a more identifiable self 
as the personal being involved in the experience and sharing 
in the meaning produced as the result of such an experience.
For Horne, it was the self having the experience. Again, 
emphasis accounted for the differing opinions in this discus­
sion. Each recognized in his own way the existence of both 
experience and the imperative factor of the individual expe­
riencing. Dewey concentrated on the quality of experience, 
while Horne preferred to concentrate on the "self" who was 
involved in the experience. The concept of structure also 
provided the basis upon which Horne proposed a different con­
cept from that explained by Dewey. As a result of this posture, 
Horne focused on the outcome; that is, the reconstructed self. 
Like Horne, Dewey was aware of the growing and developing indi­
vidual but he preferred to place the greater emphasis and 
significance upon the experience and its personal counterpart 
in the social matrix. Upon examination more similarities were 
found than significant differences.
Horne's attitude relative to the social and personal 
aspects of experience revealed a shift in emphasis from the 
external environmental factors to the personal side of the
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subjective self. Indicative of this position in Horne's phi­
losophy was the following statement regarding the person and 
experience;
The self has the experience. In the recon­
struction of experience it is really the self 
that is being reconstructed, the self in relation 
to other selves and the intervening world.
Although Horne's point was a salient one, he believed a closer 
view of self in the process of reconstruction would yield a 
far greater dimension to a more comprehensive philosophy of 
education.
The pragmatist has placed far greater importance to the 
term "reconstruction of experience." The idealist insists 
that what is reconstructed was not experience at all but 
rather an ideal pattern of social and individual development 
antecedent to it. As such, man possesses a free personality 
and the function of education remains to cultivate that per­
sonality.
Horne objected to Dewey's belief in maximum utilization 
of active adaptation to a dynamic environment at the expense 
of passive adaptation to a static environment. The implica­
tion in Horne's interpretation was that lack of attention to 
the latter might well result in a decrease of active adapta­
tion since the one was viewed by Horne as complementing the 
other. Essentially, Horne called for increased reflection 
upon the constant, unchanging elements of s o c i e t y . His
^2?Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 99.
IZGibid,
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appeal to these constant static elements represented far more 
than an appeal for mere assistance to the process of active 
adaptation;
. . . certain principles are changeless even 
in a changing world. Toward these education may very 
well take a passive, an absorptive attitude, which 
. . . will modify the active conduct and character.
It was apparent that Horne looked to these static elements 
as controls even to those elements characteristic of a 
dynamic society.
Certainly, experiences such as would be projected upon 
the self do contain both static and dynamic qualities or 
characteristics. However, Horne viewed these as separate 
accounts each making its contribution to the process of 
environmental adaptation. By contrast, Dewey viewed both 
the active and passive elements as ones where adaptation was 
concerned. Mere adherence to the static elements constituted 
a passive adventure for Dewey. Furthermore, such an endeavor 
whether connected with historical products of present involve­
ment tends to disengage the individual from personal meaning. 
Only as active adaptation to a dynamic environment is effected 
in society would there be the likelihood of meaningful recon­
struction and reorganization of experience. Thus, Dewey's 
technical definition of education; "It is that reconstruction 
or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of
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experience, and which increases ability to direct the course 
of subsequent experience."130
Horne concluded that passive adaptation to a static envir­
onment had been rejected.^^l However, a study of Dewey's text 
reveals the fact that Horne has not modified Dewey but has 
supplanted his theory with tenets of the idealistic philoso­
phy. Neither implication nor neglect served as sufficient 
grounds for the conclusion that Dewey had rejected Horne's 
thesis. Such was not the subject of Dewey's discussion.
A third weakness was identified by Horne relative to 
Dewey's discussion of education as reconstruction. He stated:
The result and the process of the educative 
experience are held to be identical. Horne further 
assessed this theory as a probable contradiction 
and contended this arrangement was both 'vague and 
incomplete.'132
Viewing his own theory of education as continuous reconstruc­
tion, Dewey admitted to a verbal contradiction. Yet, he 
insisted the contradiction existed only at the verbal level*.
It means that experience as an active process 
occupies time and that its later period completes 
its earlier portion; it brings to li^ht connections
involved but hitherto u n p e r c e i v e d . 133
130Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 89-90. 
l^lRorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 99. 
132ibid., p. 100.
133Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 92.
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Horne's adherence to words and word meaning was evident 
from the following statement;
It is vague because the configuration of fact 
and the corresponding pattern of our language dis­
tinguish between process and product, purpose and 
result, means and end.l^^
From Horne's philosophical stance, he detected a serious 
limitation, if not a defect, in Dewey's theory. The central 
element missing, according to Horne, was due to the fact Dewey's 
"process" lacked direction and control. Horne believed the 
question he raised represented a serious one. How can the 
means leading to a result be efficient and good if the outcome 
or end has not been clearly identified? Horne rejected Dewey's 
concept which held the result and the process of the educative 
experience to be identical. "Without some such conceived end, 
the conception of result-process remains vague, and its guid­
ance difficult."135 Horne believed Dewey's concept of a process 
as identical with the product was further incomplete because 
of a second deficiency. Specifically, it lacked absolutes and 
eternal values. Horne believed that when all reality was 
viewed as temporal in character the wholeness of reality could 
not be realized. His primary objection dealt with the incom­
plete nature of Dewey's means-ends theory. Expressing his con­
cern on this point, Horne declared: "It assumes that the process
is all the reality there is, and that all reality is temporal 
in character."136 Therefore, in order to come to a realization




of the sum of reality recognition must be given to the non­
temporal and the eternal aspect of experience.
For education, recognition of this dualistic character 
of experience bears with it a different connotation and task 
from that suggested by Dewey. Nevertheless, Horne believed 
a new dimension would be added as a consequence and man's 
completeness would be the outcome of this educational theory. 
Directing the implications of his theory to education Horne 
summarized;
And our education, to be complete, must con­
sequently adjust us to the whole of reality of which 
we are a part. Our education would then be viewed 
as progress in the consciousness of our relation to 
the whole of reality of which the process is indis­
putably a part. Our definition might run: Education
is the increasing realization of the temporal and 
eternal values of lifel ^̂ 31
The task of accommodating the temporal with the non­
temporal aspects of experience was but one facet of the tran­
scendental-metaphysical posture to which Horne alluded. For 
education it meant the further awakening of self to the change­
less, sublime realities. Much like Plato, Horne placed great 
stress and emphasis upon unchanging concepts for only in these 
was man afforded a reliable frame of reference from which he 
could engage in change. Substantiating this claim and its 
importance, Horne stated: "We ourselves have an unchanging
centre of reference in ourselves; in a sense, though changing, 




the task of education is quite different from that in contrast 
with the technical definition provided earlier by Dewey. The 
concept that education is a constant, sequential process of 
reorganizing and reconstructing experience was central to 
Dewey's theme in connection with his philosophy of growth and 
knowledge.
Dewey's ideal of growth was consistent with the concept 
that education was a constant reorganization and reconstruc­
tion of experience. The nature of this attitude was clearly 
identified by Dewey. "It has all the time an immediate end, 
and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—  
the direct transformation of the quality of experience.
Based upon this premise, if the activity of experience is to 
be truly educative, it is its own end. The value of a given 
experience rests wholly upon what is actually learned at any 
and every stage. From this point of view ". . . it is the 
chief business of life at every point to make living thus 
contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible m e a n i n g .
Horne identified a source of power which provided direc­
tion to the educative experience. Dewey believed that when 
education was viewed as a plan providing for reconstruction 
of experience, the added power of direction had been achieved.
139Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 89.
140lbid.
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Such a scheme provided that needed direction to the whole 
educative process. This direction further enabled the indi­
vidual to anticipate consequences of actions with a much 
higher degree of accuracy than was the case in random, aim­
less kinds of activity or activity resulting from external 
dictation. Thus, the course of direction in the educative 
process accounts for the major difference in emphasis between 
the two philosophies of Horne and Dewey.
The role of perception in learning also assumed a major 
role in Dewey's theory. When attributed to the learner, the 
role of perception elevated the individual's role in the proc­
ess of his learning. "The increment of meaning corresponds 
to the increased perception of the connections and continuities 
of the activities in which we are e n g a g e d . "141
Dewey further elaborated upon the pragmatic condition 
when he stated;
The essential contrast of the idea of education 
as continuous reconstruction with the other one-sided 
conceptions. . . is that it identifies the end (the 
result) and the process. It means that experience 
as an active process occupies time and that its later 
period completes its earlier portion; it brings to 
light connections involved, but hitherto u n p e r c e i v e d . 142
Further;
The latter outcome thus reveals the meaning of 
the earlier, while the experience as a whole estab­
lishes a bent or disposition toward the things
141Ibid., p. 90.
142 Ibid.. pp. 91-92.
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possessing this meaning. Every such continuous 
experience or activity is educative, and all 
education resides in having such experiences.143
In contrast with Horne's philosophical posture, Dewey 
rejected external stimuli to action. All prearranged, desig­
nated outcomes-ends which serve to control or direct the means 
pursuant to such ends have been rejected. For Dewey, this 
must be the case since such ends are remote and isolated and 
lacking in a disposition formed as the result of intelligent 
action. The missing factor for Dewey was a recognition of the 
connection between the act and the result. The outcome of the 
traditionalist's view was that learning had been lessened since 
perception and personal understanding did not accompany the 
action. This is not to suggest that no learning could take 
place as the result of routine activity. It does suggest, 
however, that learning leading to further learning and under­
standing has been minimized.
The educational significance of perceiving connections 
between actions and subsequent results was further emphasized 
by Dewey. He stated; "But we learn only because after the 
act is performed we note results which we had not noted 
before."144
In spite of Dewey's appeal to the aforementioned condition, 




designate the manner in which pupils are to act; but, after 
having so acted, they are not led to see the connection 
between the result and the method pursued in performing the 
particular act. Such routine action may increase skill to 
do a particular thing, but it is prone to lead to habits of 
action resulting in little, if any, significant educative 
q u a l i t y . 145 . it does not lead to new perceptions of
bearings and connections; it limits rather than widens the 
m e a n i n g - h o r i z o n . "146 The condition described by Dewey prob­
ably accounts for (1) minimal effectiveness in learning; and 
(2) disruptive behavior of students in the classroom or school 
environment.
As presented by Horne, a dichotomy between means and ends 
has been effected. For Dewey, this represents one of the most 
obnoxious dualisms because of the artificial separation char­
acteristic of such a posture, Dewey viewed means-ends as 
representative of a continuum with emphasis upon the dynamic 
nature of the end-in-view. Such a view not only affects the 
character of means but also brings out selectivity as to the 
method chosen. Ends for Dewey were in fact not ends at all, 
but rather means leading to additional means. They were never 
fixed and final. Instead, they stood as tentative solutions 




Ideal, fixed, immutable ends such as those purported by Horne 
must be rejected by Dewey. As such, they stand in opposition 
to the dynamic process of learning— the concept of learning 
as adjustment for continuous growth. In the philosophy of 
Dewey, an admission of ideal ends as postulated by the ideal­
ist would tend to subordinate the importance of experience 
itself. Instead, emphasis would be allotted to the mysterious 
and supernatural, thereby negating free inquiry into causes, 
consequences, and other natural relationships.
From Horne's interpretation of Dewey's means-ends rela­
tionship, it was made to appear Dewey had produced a view of 
education which was both vague and incomplete. Horne con­
cluded that Dewey's theory had failed to produce objective 
criteria upon which to base validity to the process of the 
educative process.
Upon careful examination of Dewey's text, it was found 
that actions and activity must be evaluated in terms of their 
consequences rather than with reference to other external 
criteria. Dewey's philosophy demanded careful and complete 
observation of all factors involved with an activity. In 
addition, attention must be given to discernible consequences 
of that activity so that the proper method for an objective 
evaluation could then be made. Education in a democratic 
society demands and deserves no less.
CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION
The Democratic Conception in Education 
? • The Triplications of Human Association
Horne has identified in Dewey's philosophy three kinds 
of democracy. These he has described as political, industrial 
and social. It is true that Dewey has, by implication, viewed 
these as segments of society in order to clarify the ideal of 
democracy. For Dewey, both the negative and positive attri­
butes of these must be examined in order to fully understand 
his concept of democracy and a society which possesses quali­
ties worthy of a democratic description.
Horne concluded that a disparity existed as the result of 
Dewey's text which traces the origin of democracy to industry 
while at the same time finding no democracy in the industrial 
complex.
Dewey conceived democracy in terms of the intelligent 
social intercourse of men. Any social action which is limited 
to the special interests of any section of society is injurious 
to his basic conception of democracy. The essential content 
of democracy consisted of the sharing of interests within groups 
and between groups, thus leading to progressive change. Dewey
9l!
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recognized that democracy was not produced by deliberate effort 
but that it was sustained and extended by it.
Dewey recognized two elements as essential criteria to 
democracy;
The first signifies not only more numerous and 
more varied points of shared common interest, but 
greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual inter­
ests as a factor in social control. The second means 
not only freer interaction between social groups. . . 
but change in social habit— its continuous readjust­
ment through meeting the new situation produced by 
varied intercourse. . . . These two traits are 
precisely what characterize the democratically 
constituted society.^
It is true that Dewey viewed industry as an association 
which gave impetus to the development of democracy. In indus­
try, however, democracy may flourish or it may serve in the 
end as a debilitating force where democratic advancements are 
made. Since the two elements which characterized democracy 
were not the product of deliberation and effort, a more defin­
itive course had to be identified. Science and industry came 
into play at this point. A clearer perspective concerning 
the role of industry and its relationship to democratic ideal 
may be seen from the following. Dewey stated:
. . . they were caused by the development of 
modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migration 
and intercommunication which flowed from the command 
of science over natural e n e r g y . ^
Having achieved a broader community of interest and greater
^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 100.
^Ibid., p. 101.
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individualization, then it becomes a matter of deliberate 
effort to sustain and extend them. The extent to which we 
are successful at this deliberate attempt will determine the 
success or failure of a democracy.
The task of education is to provide situations in which 
the student has opportunities to encounter the experience of 
the ages in the shortest possible time with a view toward 
being an effective, intelligent citizen— one who is capable 
of meeting his own personal problems and also be effective in 
the larger problems of social life. Such a life would require 
that the individual be free to make intelligent choices 
between alternatives without external directives.
Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of 
external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary 
disposition and interest; these can be created only by edu­
cation. Further:
A democracy is more than a form of government; 
it is primarily a mode of associated living, of 
conjoint communicated experience. A society which 
is mobile, which is full of channels for the dis­
tribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see 
to it that its members are educated to personal 
initiative and adaptability.^
Dewey recognized the danger of class stratification in a
democracy. Communication of interest and a free exchange of
varying modes of life experiences between members of society
are imperatives and serve as prerequisites to the maintenance
^Ibid., pp. 101-102.
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of a society free from a privileged class. To prevent this 
and to insure the continuance of the democratic results applied 
to industry, intellectual opportunities must be kept accessi­
ble to all on equable terms. A major concern of Dewey was a 
condition which prohibited the sharing of interests between 
members of a group. In order for intellectual stimulation to 
remain in balance, a variety of shared interests which chal­
lenged thought must be maintained and promoted. His concern 
with the division of labor often necessitated by efficiency 
in production was closely associated with his concept of 
democracy. For Dewey, diversity, rather than restriction of 
stimulation, was the best means of providing challenge to 
thought. Consequently;
The more activity is restricted to a few 
definite lines— as it is when there are rigid class 
lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences—  
the more action tends to become routine on the part 
of the class at a disadvantage, and capricious, aim­
less, and explosive on the part of the class having 
the materially fortunate position.**
A sincere and intense social consciousness character­
ized Dewey. The condition as described above might, if 
permitted, result in a slave-master relationship "even 
where there is no slavery in the legal s e n s e . U n d e r ­
standing, interest and a personal interest in the work 




not to be the outcome. The significance of science which 
promotes greater efficiency in work may also be the factor 
serving to reduce " . . .  efficiency of operation to movement 
of the m u s c l e s . " G  A more positive assignment for science 
must be found, according to Dewey:
The chief opportunity for science is the dis­
covery of the relations of a man to his work—  
including his relation to others who take part—  
which will enlist his intelligent interest in 
what he is doing. Efficiency in production often 
demands division of labor. But it is reduced to 
a mechanical routine unless workers see the technical, 
intellectual, and social relationships involved in 
what they do, and engage in their work because of 
the motivations furnished by such perceptions. [The 
result is that] intelligence is narrowed to the 
factors concerned with technical production and 
marketing of goods.?
For education, Dewey's philosophy called attention to 
the need for the existence of a form of education which 
would be deliberate and systematic. In order for the traits 
of democracy to be most effective, a deliberate effort must 
be made in order to sustain and extend them operationally.
It is, in effect, a community mobilized for learning.
Horne challenged the term "democracy" as perceived by 
Dewey. He further questioned the possibility of accomplish­
ment under the terms of a political government called a 




democracy while Dewey preferred the term "ideal." Horne 
overlooked Dewey's concept that democracy was something 
more than a form of government. For Dewey, Democracy repre­
sented a way of life or ". . . a mode of associated living, 
of conjoint communicated experience. . . ."® Dewey conceived 
of democracy in terms of the intelligent social intercourse 
of men. A further separation in the two philosophies may be 
found in the contest between naturalism and supernatural 
authority. Dewey proposed the philosophy of naturalism 
because it promised to liberate man from all external or 
supernatural authorities. On the other hand, Horne viewed 
the democratic society as analogous to the religious concept 
of the "Kingdom of Heaven" on earth.9 Horne emphasized his 
position when he stated:
In content the two are similar; in inspiration 
and motive they are different. The inspiration to 
the one is human, to the other is divine. The 
motive to the one is humanitarian, to the other is 
theistic. The central conception of the one is man, 
of the other is God.lO
For Horne, man alone, as social man, could never completely 
realize the benefits of the democratic ideal in the fullest
GIbid., p. 101.
^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 113. 
^°Ibid.
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sense. The completion of such fulfillment could only be 
realized by way of . the dynamic belief in God who works
with man. " Ü
Dewey's philosophy having freed man of external influence 
places the control of all social institutions and practices 
into the hands of man. Man's responsibility is but to direct 
his energies and interests to the solution of his social prob­
lems. Dewey's identification of democracy with naturalism 
resulted in a depreciation of the social value found in the 
idealistic philosophy of Horne. The transition made in Dewey's 
philosophy naturally became the target of criticism for Horne.
Basic to Dewey's theory of a democratic society was the 
demand for a pluralistic orientation, one uniquely equipped 
to sustain and perpetuate the ideals of democracy. Unlike 
a class-structured society, a society which is mobile, and a 
society in which change is taking place must provide deliber­
ate attention to the education of its members. Such a posi­
tion must be taken if those members are to acquire the capa­
bility to adapt and understand changes which are taking place. 
The element of change is vital because it is this character­
istic which provides the possibility of improvement. When 
such an awareness is not effected, the result will be confusion 




2. The Platonic Educational Philosophy
An examination of the Platonic philosophy by both Horne 
and Dewey shows each asserting Plato's concept of democracy 
lacked adequate criteria.
Horne, however, contended that Plato's lack of consider­
ation of progress was due not to philosophical reasons, but 
rather for social reasons. The adequacy of Plato's social 
history was sufficient, as viewed by Horne. Plato's frame 
of reference in this context depended upon " . . .  the sta­
bility of states which he admired, or their decline, which 
he deplored."12 Horne's interpretation was not inconsistent 
with the Platonic idea, since he believed social progress 
might be realized even though lacking an adequate criterion 
for progress and growth. Indicative of this belief was the 
following statement: " . . .  social progress may be made
gradually, even in zigzag fashion, toward a goal that is 
fixed, 'eternal in the heavens'."13 ^he emphasis here becomes 
one focused upon progress toward a fixed goal. Democracy in 
this context thus becomes the permanent ideal or goal toward 
which a society aspires, yet realizing the attainment of such 




Such an arrangement was unacceptable in Dewey's philos­
ophical scheme. This was true primarily because Plato's 
organization of society was ultimately dependent upon the 
character and knowledge concerning the end of existence. In 
reality, Horne, like Plato, recognized that the certainty of 
such knowledge was doubtful. Without knowledge, the individ­
ual and his unique capabilities were likely to be overshadowed 
and in bondage to ideals which remain static. Philosophically, 
the structure of social arrangements and progress which might 
be effected through change was left to chance or left in the 
hands of a supreme being with little encouragement for man's 
active participation as an instrument of social progress 
through change.
Dewey questioned these conditions and doubted that any 
consistency of mind was possible in this philosophy. He stated:
A society which rests upon the supremacy of some 
factor over another irrespective of its rational or 
proportionate claims, inevitably leads thought astray 
. . . [we are therefore left] . . .  at the mercy of 
accident and caprice.14
Summarily, Dewey identified the breakdown of Plato's 
idealistic philosophy by the fact that he could not trust 
progressive improvements in education to bring about a better 
society. An ideal state, fixed and unchanging necessarily 
became characteristic of Plato's philosophy. From such a 
posture, the aims and purposes of education became minimal.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 102-103.
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Dewey stated;
Correct education could not come into 
existence until an ideal state existed, and 
then education would be devoted simply to its 
conservation.15
Consequently, the class, rather than the individual, became 
the primary social unit.
Horne found a synthesis in his idealistic conception by
combining " . . .  the static and the dynamic in what we have
called the o r g a n i c . H e  referred to the term "organic" as 
a synthetic view similar to that held by Hegel which suggested 
a dual concept of society. Hence, Horne furthered adherence 
to another dualism that is consistently found in the idealis­
tic philosophy.
3. The "Individualistic" Ideal of the Eighteenth Century 
Horne recognized that the theory purported by Rousseau 
lacked the conditions for an education centered in life 
sharing. This was true because there was no group by which 
either intra- or inter-group relations could function. The 
paradox of this situation was reflected when Horne stated:
The early years of life were necessarily spent in 
preparation for a society that did not exist. His 
freedom was a freedom from not im, society, and his
individual was apart from, not a part of, society.
^^Ibid., p. 106.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 117.
l^Ibid., pp. 120-121.
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For Dewey, the eighteenth century philosophy represented 
a set of ideas unique to the period. Nature remained unrecon­
ciled and separate from systems of social organization. Plato 
held a distrust for gradual change in education as an avenue 
for effecting a better society. Rousseau distrusted existing 
social institutions and viewed them as factors impeding edu­
cation. The more stable society as described in Rousseau's 
theory held that nature was the key and only an education in 
perfect harmony with nature was worthy of existence in a liber­
ated society. His concept held that society encompassed the 
entire spectrum of humanity— a humanity whose progress was 
dependent upon the individual. Thus, a basic agreement existed 
between Horne and Dewey when each considered the philosophy of 
Rousseau and others who supported claims of the "individual­
istic" ideal. Dewey concluded this when he stated: ". . . i t
lacked any agency for securing the development of its ideal 
as was evidenced in its falling back upon Nature."18
As a result of this philosophy, a new role of education 
emerged; yet, the concept of learning remained ambiguous, left 
to drift aimlessly and void of direction and deliberate intent. 
Both Dewey and Horne recognized in Rousseau's philosophy a 
neglect of the individual, making him subservient to the citi­
zen. Even though both recognized attempts made by Rousseau 
in favor of man, evidence in his Émile pointed to the forma­
tion of the citizen as the aim of education.
18Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 116.
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Supportive of agreement in this area, Horne stated;
The suggestion of Dr. Dewey that there is a 
neglected strain in Rousseau favoring the citizen 
rather than the man is valuable and worthy of 
special investigation.19
4. Education as National and Social
Horne raised the question of the application of Dewey's 
criteria to the social, while not making the same application 
to education in regard to national motives. It was clear 
that the proper stance for Dewey was to view education as a 
social process. It therefore followed that the application 
of Dewey's two criteria of democracy were concerned with the 
societal, not the national aim. In earlier discussion, Dewey 
demonstrated his theory relative to nationalism, especially in 
its extreme forms. He cited the example of the nationalistic 
style demonstrated by the German states during the nineteenth 
century. An adequate interpretation of social efficiency was 
practically impossible. With clarity and conciseness, Dewey 
elaborated the state of affairs under such an arrangement.
The implications for the individual, and subsequently for edu­
cation, were clearly stated by Dewey:
Since the maintenance of a particular sovereignty 
required subordination of individuals to the superior 
interests of the state, . . social efficiency was 
understood to imply like subordination. The educa­
tional process was taken to be one of disciplinary 
training rather than of personal development.^0
19Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 121.
20Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 109-110.
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Dewey's criteria for educational criticism were found 
in the following two points: " . . .  the extent in which the
interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the
fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other
groups."21 Similarly, Horne stated: "A nationalistic state
in as far as it fails to share interests within and beyond
the group is not democratic."22 a  second criterion made by
Horne was found in the form of a question: Can a national
state conduct a system of education which embodies and fur­
thers the concept of increased realization of social aims?23 
Horne suggested that Dewey gave serious consideration to this 
question, yet failed to prescribe adequately a course of 
action which guaranteed the attainment of a course which would 
ultimately assure human progress in this direction. In con­
nection with this assessment of Dewey's position, Horne con­
cluded that Dewey's course merely produced a dilemma and a 
predicament. Seeking absolutes, Horne saw no way out as he 
viewed the theory presented by Dewey. At least three concerns 
were projected by Horne in this connection: (1) failure to
follow this course is not democratic; (2) doubt as to whether 
such a course would be followed; and (3) failure to affix pre­
determination upon man in order to assure the following of such
21lbid., p. 115.
22Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 127.
23lbid., p. 128.
104
a course. In summary, Horne believed that Dewey simply had 
. .no faith in the universe or its ground. . . ."24
This, he believed to be the case especially since predeter­
mination for man had been eliminated in the course of human 
events.
Dewey gave much attention to the seriousness of question 
and the attendant implications implicit in alternative pat­
terns chosen by man. He gave no guarantees for the realization 
of an educational system equipped to meet social aims to the 
fullest. Evidence, however, of Dewey's consideration of this 
problem was found in the following statement:
One of the fundamental problems of education in 
and for a democratic society is set by the conflict 
of a nationalistic and wider social aim.25
The solution to this problem must not be left to chance. 
Neither must the philosophy of determinism be relied upon.
From Dewey's frame of reference, man must provide for and con­
tinue to make allowance for the conditions whereby a state 
can conduct an educational process which conveys the full 
social meaning of democracy. Democratic education is not 
narrowly nationalistic. According to Dewey, the idea of 
national sovereignty as a basis to political practice his­
torically has impeded progress toward an accommodation and a 
mutual sharing between the nation and its interest with the 
realization of social efficiency.
24ibid.
25j3ewey, Democracy and Education, p. 113.
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The interdependence of man necessarily must be recognized. 
In a broader sense, the interdependence of nations must be 
more fully realized. Although a prerequisite for the realiza­
tion of a democratic system of education, such an arrangement 
had not yet been fully understood nor achieved. Dewey stated:
Each [nation] is supposed to be the supreme judge 
of its own interests, and it is assumed as a matter 
of course that each has interests which are exclu­
sively its own.26
In addition to a division of society into races, Dewey 
recognized a second dimension overlooked by most in a demo­
cratic society, namely, that of economic equality. It was not 
sufficient to eliminate class exploitation. Schools in a 
democratic education must further permit:
Modification of traditional ideas of culture, 
traditional subjects of study and traditional methods 
of teaching and discipline as will retain all the 
youth under educational influence until they are 
equipped to be masters of their own economic and . 
social careers.27
The question raised by Horne as to whether a national 
state could or could not conduct an educational process 
consistent with the full social meaning of democracy was not 
necessarily the question. Dewey showed that such an arrange­
ment was possible if deliberate attention and effort were 




Not only must schools strive to promote economic and 
social understanding, but also nations must do the same.
Dewey, commenting on this need, stated;
The emphasis must be put upon whatever binds 
people together in cooperative human pursuits and 
results, apart from geographical limitations.28
Democratic education, according to Dewey, must be as 
broad in the area of opportunity as in the pluralistic society 
in which it thrives. Democratic education should use the 
resources of the past but add to these the resources of the 
present. On the basis of a dynamic interaction between indi­
viduals in society new problems and their solutions may be 
discovered. Without this dynamic interaction between indi­
viduals in society we have less than a democracy. Prescrip­
tive and arbitrary methods of disseminating information is 
not proper communications, nor educative; it is propaganda.
Dewey believed that democratic education could not be 
viewed as narrowly nationalistic. To be vital in the sense 
that it is a process, it must be based on meaning shared and 
communicated between relatively small groups. Dewey consist­
ently called for a return to smaller units of social life.
For a better understanding of this point, one should study 
the character of the community as the smaller organization 
about which Dewey speaks. This posture is basic not only to
28Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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his understanding of democracy but also to his concept of edu­
cation and life in general. As a deterrent to further conflict, 
these shared or common understandings must be projected into 
the larger sphere of international concern through a "world 
community." Earlier, Dewey identified as a major problem con­
fronting education the conflict existing between nationalistic 
aims and social aims affecting the individual:
The secondary and provisional character of 
national sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, 
and more fruitful association and intercourse of all 
human beings with one another must be instilled as a 
working disposition of mind.29
In other words, the close association and intercourse 
which characterize the family unit must also come to play a 
significant role both nationally and internationally. The 
above seems to reenforce the statement with which Dewey began 
this discussion. In summary, Dewey stated:
The conception of education as a social process 
and function has no definite meaning until we define 
the kind of society we have in mind.20
Aims in Education 
1. The Nature of an Aim
In this appraisal, Horne again appealed to some form of 
an absolute in solving the problem of aims, especially as 




primary objection to Dewey's concept of education aims was 
that the aim was within the educative process. Further 
criticism was found in Dewey's association of aims with 
growth since growth was identified with democracy. "How," 
asked Horne, "can this framework hold validity if democracy 
has not yet been fully attained?"Relative to Home's 
concern was the spatial or time factor as it relates to aims 
and their fulfillment, or the end. His emphasis on the end 
or completion of an aim may be clearly seen in the following 
statement:
Being without in part, and yet being the aim, 
it is clear the aim is not wholly within the process 
except in an ideal sense or with reference to some 
future fact. This is important as it lengthens the 
time enormously between the beginning and the com­
pletion of proper fulfillment of the activity. . . ,
Thus the end, though foreseen, may be remote, and 
does not have to be immediate or near at h a n d . 32
Horne failed to suggest that the result effected by the 
aim was of utmost importance. For Dewey, the quality or the 
effectiveness of the result should also receive prime consid­
eration. In effect, a result may be profitable and worthy 
of being designated an end. In another instance, depending 
on the quality of the outcome, it may not be an end at all. 
For Dewey, there must be something in the outcome which com­
pletes or fulfills what went before. Dewey recognized that 
democracy stood as an ideal. He further recognized that- the
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 132,
32ibid., pp. 132-133.
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richness to be realized as the result of the experiential con­
duct of individuals involved in the ever-evolving process 
made possible the democratic framework. For Dewey, the con­
dition of an aim was not finality. Aims, the educative process, 
growth, and even democracy could best be understood in Dewey's 
theory when viewed as products of a process involving human 
interests and desires. There cannot be the finality of aims 
which Horne attempted to project in his philosophy while, at 
the same time, maintaining the democratic framework.
Horne's doctrine of aims negated the value of the present 
since it failed to incorporate into it what Dewey designated 
as intrinsic continuity. Without serious consideration of 
this factor, random activity would likely be pursued or the 
activity would follow a course dictated by some external 
influence. In either case, less than desirable results would 
be the outcome in terms of fulfilling desires or of attaining 
satisfactory solutions to human problems.
Aims, when related to results, widen the perspective of 
aims and enhance the possibility of their providing a base 
for future successful solutions to problems. For this reason, 
Dewey was explicit. He said, "The first thing to look to 
when it is a question of aims, is whether the work assigned 
possesses intrinsic c o n t i n u i t y . T h e  element of present
33Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 118.
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activity is thus connected with aims when the criterion sug­
gested above is applied. For Dewey, not all activity ful­
filled an assignment as designated by an aim. Furthermore, 
the validity of the activity would be determined by the con­
tribution it made to continued growth. Applying Dewey's 
principle of continuity, it was suggested that only those 
activities which promote future successful solutions to prob­
lems and which lead the individual to continued growth were 
desirable. Continuing his description of the nature of activity, 
Dewey stated: "An aim implies an orderly and ordered activity,
one in which the order consists in the progressive completing
of a process."34
Satisfactory aims for Dewey, then, can be identified 
only as they are viewed in terms of satisfactory results, not 
by the fact that an aim has merely accomplished an end.
For Dewey, aims-goals were valuable and continued to be 
valuable, not because they were prearranged or dictated by 
the supernatural or from "feeling," but because they continued 
to satisfactorily fulfill a particular interest or desire.
Aims must always take into account the intervening process 
between the original condition and the final result. That 
is, the achievement of an aim must be viewed as directly 
connected to the means by which it is to be achieved. The 
nature of the activity, i.e., orderly and ordered, provides
^^Ibid., p. 119.
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the added dimension of foresight, the ingredient which serves 
as a facilitator toward the completion of an aim within the 
process.
2. The Criteria of Good Aims
Beginning his criticism of Dewey's analysis of good aims, 
Horne asserted: One thing we miss in this account of the
criteria of good aims is the setting up of a worthy standard."^5 
Horne's interpretation suggested a need for the establishment 
of another absolute or at least some standard of perfection.
In Dewey's philosophy neither was available nor desirable since 
to exact such a condition could be to establish an aim set up 
outside of existing conditions, thus giving rise to external 
priorities. External standards, for Dewey, led to conformity. 
Conformity, subsequently becomes an aim in and of itself void 
of attachment to present activities; consequently, an absence 
of flexibility would be noted. Activity so directed and 
imposed necessarily becomes static in character. Dewey empha­
sized this point when he stated: "It is always conceived of
as fixed; it is something to be attained and possessed.
While Horne called for some "worthy standard" by which 
we might identify an aim as good or bad, Dewey spoke of these 
in terms of desired or desirable. In other words, Dewey
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 137.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 123.
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believed the process of selection or choice played an important 
role relative to those aims which are to receive contingent 
approval. A fixed standard as described by Horne must be 
viewed as antithetical to the democratic ideal to which both 
Horne and Dewey supposedly subscribed. Horne recognized 
Dewey's three criteria regarding the nature of an aim. The 
aim must be (1) " outgrowth of existing conditions, (2) flex­
ible, and (3) it must lead to a freeing of activities."3? He 
then raised the question regarding the thief who gets a thrill 
out of each new accomplishment. His aim was a bad one, accord­
ing to Horne, because "it shows no respect to human rights."3® 
Yet, such an aim met the criteria set forth by Dewey, according 
to Horne's interpretation.
Dewey's position in this consideration was that such an 
activity was undesirable because it did not take into account 
adequate sharing of interests and it projected a restriction 
of freedom for interaction with others within the society.
In the case of the thief's action, Dewey further rejected" 
the thief's aim on the ground that it led to action which would 
not be conducive to growth in a general way. The benefits 
accrued from such action were designed to meet the selfish 
interests of the one individual.
37Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 134.
3Gibid.. p. 137.
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Dewey conceived democracy in terms of the intelligent 
social interaction of men. When social action is limited to 
the special interests of any group or individual, an injus­
tice has been done to his basic concept of democracy.
The criterion of an aim— educational value or end-in- 
view— was that it provided the capacity or ability for fur­
ther growth. Growth, for Dewey, could not be defined as a 
specific content which was universally the same for every 
person. To be sure, there are general aims which education 
must provide as challenges, but growth is a personal quality 
set in the framework of individual series of fulfillments each 
of which leads to a broader understanding and development.
Horne suggested another criterion for correctly establish­
ing an aim. He stated: ". . . a good aim is democratizing.
It may even be conceived as being in harmony with absolute 
good."39 The intelligent consensus of men was inadequate for 
Horne. Without an absolute or a concept of something harmo­
nious with the absolute, the philosophy was inadequate for 
man and for the education of men.
Dewey made a distinction between the democratic commu­
nity and society. This distinction was very important in its 
bearings on the pragmatic philosophy of life. For him, the 
smaller unit of social life provided a unity often found 
lacking in society. Only by identifying the characteristics
3*Ibid.
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of the latter, can the fruits of democracy be fully realized. 
It was here that sharing within the group could best be real­
ized. In a pluralistic society there exist special interest 
groups which do not meet the criteria of democratic social 
life, i.e., sharing within the group and the freedom to share 
and interact with other groups. Thus, the aims and purposes 
of the thief illustrated by Horne must be rejected since the 
thief represented a segment of society which fell short of the 
democratic ideal as projected by Dewey.
A strain was noted concerning means and ends. For Horne, 
a separation between an end and the means for achieving that 
distinctive end must not be left to mere convenience or be 
considered a matter of temporal reference. Essentially, he 
rejected the theory that means are ends and ends are means. 
Again, the distinction made by Horne in this connection was 
a significant one because it had a direct bearing on the 
conflict between the idealistic and pragmatic philosophy.
He further contended that;
Unwelcome and uninteresting means may be used 
to attain welcome and interesting ends. It is nec­
essary . . .  to separate wanted ends from unwantedmeans.40
A merger of ends and means taken from Dewey's arrangement 
of means-ends "would logically give us only means and no ends, 




Horne's concern with the philosophy of Lawey in this 
context was primarily the fact that his posture suggested 
change and flux. In the philosophy of Horne, the ends may 
well justify the means; the ends may well determine the 
means; the ends may well demand that the individual tolerate 
the means all for the sake of the end. From this account, 
interest and the richness found in the means was sacrificed.
Dewey's dismissal of the dualism existing between means 
and ends was important in this respect. While Horne would 
allow an external nature of the aim to lead to a separation 
of means from ends, Dewey preferred:
. . .  an end which grows up within an activity 
as plan for its direction. . . . Every means is a 
temporary end until we have attained it. Every end 
becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon 
as it is achieved.42
To the extent that an end is divorced from means, the 
significance of activity has been reduced, according to Dewey. 
As a result of this condition, the activity has been reduced 
to the dull, the routine, to that which easily becomes "drudg­
ery from which one would escape if he could."43 in contrast 
with the position assumed by Horne, Dewey believed that while 
the democratic ideals are being pursued, the end becomes a 
means and serves as an impetus toward the achievement. The
42Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 124,
*^Ibid.
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aim of democracy, from Dewey’s point of view, was to serve 
as a means of action. If attainments in democracy are to be 
realized by means other than externally imposed forms of 
activity, then the means-ends relationship must be subscribed 
to. Democracy was not viewed by Dewey as an absolute in it­
self.
Contrary to the position taken by Dewey, Horne stated;
. . . "until it [democracy] is realized, the end is different 
from the means."44 until and unless man's efforts culminate 
in a complete realization of democracy, ". . . i t  remains an 
end different from the means, and itself becomes one of the 
absolutes."45 Democracy as an end was Horne's final consider­
ation. He contended that Dewey's theory placed democracy as 
its highest category. Since democracy was never fully achieved 
or realized, how, then, could the aim be a part of the means 
existing as it does with a remote end? It becomes apparent 
that Horne's philosophy gives lesser attention to the concept 
of value or values than did that of Dewey. When Dewey moved 
from a consideration of what was or had been "good," into a 
consideration of what might be "good" his emphasis shifted to 
the term "value." One major significance of Dewey's democratic 
concept was that through means we achieve value. According 
to Dewey, one criterion of good aims was to be found in the




phrase "freeing of activities."46 is our activity in con­
junction with the object, or, as Dewey phrased it, it is the 
"doing with the thing, not the thing in isolation, which is 
his end."47 The end, democracy, and its attainment can only 
be realized fully as it has developed as a concomitant with 
the activity. Failure to recognize the ends-means relationship 
as purported by Dewey leaves the alternative of establishing 
means in order to achieve an external, prescribed end. If the 
value of such a process is to be achieved through the means, 
then Horne's theory reduces the accrual of values to a minimum 
since the end remains an end which is imposed outside activity. 
Attacking this traditional posture, Dewey stated;
It is always conceived of as fixed; it is 
something to be attained and possessed. When one 
has such a notion, activity is a mere unavoidable 
means to something else; it is not significant 
or important on its own account.48
Thus, activity, as viewed from the idealistic philos­
ophical framework, was reduced to a necessary evil, something 
which must be tolerated before one could reach the end. It 
was this attained object which alone stood as worthwhile and 
valuable. Man's involvement and intelligent disposition in 
striving for an ideal such as democracy is of lesser consequence 
when we ally our theory of aims with that of Horne.




Horne concluded that the attainment and full realization 
of democracy was unlikely. At best, it is but an ideal only 
partially realized. As such, democracy "remains an end dif­
ferent from the means."49
It is at this point that Dewey's philosophy stands in 
opposition with the traditional views as projected by Horne. 
Ideal, fixed ends were not admissible in Dewey's analysis 
because these were directly opposed to his interpretation of 
learning as adjustment for continuous growth. Dewey believed 
static ends to be both naive and dangerous. When ideal ends 
which are incapable of human attainment become the focal 
point of our industry and energies, at least two undesirable 
consequences are likely to be the result: (1) the individual
in his search for a real solution to practical problems, will 
become constantly frustrated, if not maladjusted, because of 
the ineffectiveness of such a goal as a directing force; or 
(2) the unreal end will continue as a representative symbol 
to which lip-service is given, but no real commitment is 
actually given. Operating within such a philosophical scheme, 
the artificial ends tend to arrest the process of growth by 
appealing to a previous concept of truth and value, or result 
in misdirected growth by failing to set a true course for 
the adjustment process.
49Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 139.
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Furthermore, ideal ends, as purported by Horne, depre­
ciated the significance of experience itself while at the 
same time it emphasized the mysterious and the supernatural. 
When the importance of experience was so neglected, little 
appeal would be made to reflective thinking, free and open 
inquiry into causes and consequences, and the pursuit of 
other natural relationships.
The logical intent of Dewey's philosophy was an attempt 
to merge ends and means. Critical of this condition, Horne 
concluded that such a philosophy yielded "only means and no 
ends, or means as the only ends."50 The concern in this 
connection for Horne was that we are left with no "final 
values, [and] no absolute. Man himself is not an end, only 
a means, an agent of change."51 Again, the strain presented 
in this context may be traced to Dewey's philosophy of natural­
ism and Horne's philosophy of supernatural authority. Horne's 
interpretation of Dewey's position relative to means and ends 
was quite accurate, e.g., means but not ends. A thorough 
analysis of Dewey's theory reveals means are means to other 
means, which in turn are means, and so on.
An essential implication in Dewey's theory must be recog­
nized as this point. Dewey's philosophy of naturalism repre­




as the dominant agent with the freedom to control social 
institutions and practices. By directing his energies and 
interests to the solution of his social problems, external 
agents held a significantly lesser role in directing the 
affairs of man. This identification of democracy with nat­
uralism led to a depreciation of the social value which had 
before been associated with the philosophy of idealism and 
other traditional philosophical thought.
Aims for Dewey must be an outgrowth of existing condi­
tions and should be built around problems and difficulties 
arising out of problematic situations. Rather than directing 
attention toward ends lying outside experience, aims ought to 
receive impetus from problematic conditions which are close 
at hand. It was Dewey's belief that such a posture was more 
likely to produce aims which would be flexible, more consist­
ent with present needs, and certainly more meaningful in terms 
of making use of intelligence. Dewey believed that ready­
made aims which served as the directing force from without 
tended to impede progress in growth as well as the total 
process of learning.
Although Dewey spoke of formulating aims, it should be 
noted that aims, as such, were worthy only as man attempted 
to realize them. From this point of view, the emerging aim 
was always a tentative one serving as an agent of transaction 
in the progress toward growth. The possibility of revising 
an original aim should always be realized and utilized when 
such is deemed appropriate, based upon its success, or the
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degree of success which has been realized in directing one's 
activity. Only when aims were so developed could we hope to 
utilize an aim as a means of altering or changing undesirable 
conditions. Flexibility, rather than rigidity, was the sig­
nificant trait in regard to legitimate aims for Dewey. Dewey's 
aims were experimental, tentative, and constantly growing.
Natural Development, Social Efficiency 
and Culture as Aims
1. Nature as Supplying the Aim
Horne first pointed to an inconsistency in Dewey's edu­
cational aims when he commented; "It is said that education 
has aims but no aim."52 Horne's primary concern was with 
growth and democracy as these related to aims. He believed 
aims could not be separated from an aim. The attainment of 
suitable means could be achieved in the educative process 
only as general aims are identified within the context of an 
intended aim. His view was that growth pointed toward the 
accomplishment of democracy rather than growth in a general 
direction of democracy. Horne saw the ideal of democracy as 
that which merely served as the impetus for direction in the 
growth process.
For Dewey, the establishment of aims in education suggested 
one final aim subsequently subordinating all others to the 
primary aim. Furthermore, there existed an inherent danger in
^^Ibid., p. 151.
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effecting a hierarchial arrangement of aims. Ultimately,
Dewey saw the individual subordinated to a fixed aim, if not 
subservient to external models or patterns of living.
That there are and should be general aims each supporting 
the other was a conclusion made by Dewey in this consideration 
as well as in other discussions. However, in order for there 
to be meaning and understanding on the part of the participant, 
these general aims must stem from a plurality of views, the 
value of each dependent upon its possible value in terms of 
making a contribution to a particular endeavor. Dewey called 
for a survey of existing conditions in an attempt to estimate 
relative value. Concluding this summary, Dewey declared;
As a matter of fact a large number [of aims] have 
been stated at different times, all having great local 
value. For the statement of aim is a matter of 
emphasis at a given time.53
In a democratic society the position taken by Dewey relative 
to aims versus aim, presented a theory far more compatible 
with democracy and the educative process within such a society.
Horne's second criticism was aimed at Dewey's considera­
tion of Rousseau. From Rousseau's theory, both Horne and 
Dewey analyzed education as a process of development in accord­
ance with nature. The central theme projected by both theorists 
was that of nature and its function relative to growth, develop­
ment, and aims. The role of nature as presented by Dewey was
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 130.
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one which must be recognized, but the limitations of the 
function of nature was also important to Dewey. Where learn­
ing was concerned, nature both initiated as well as limited. 
Evidence of Dewey's position may be seen in the following 
statement:
The natural, or native powers furnish the 
initiating and limiting forces in all education; 
they do not furnish its ends or aims. There is no 
learning except from a beginning in unlearned powers, 
but learning is not a matter of the spontaneous over­
flow of the unlearned powers.54
Dewey recognized that native powers played a significant 
role in learning, especially in the attitude of interest, 
physical mobility, as well as the recognition and regard for 
individual difference among the young. According to Dewey, 
the fallacy of Rousseau's view was his concept that nature 
was totally good. Ultimately nature subordinated social 
activities and dictated a negative restraint upon the posi­
tive uses of an individual's native capacities. Rousseau's 
emphasis upon the intrinsic goodness of all the furnishings 
of nature was attributable to the fact that for him nature was 
identified with God, and, therefore, wholly good.55 Social 
efficiency was not a matter of concern nor a topic of discus­
sion for Rousseau, except as he recognized that social arrange­
ments could only interfere with the divine plan. Thus, it 




and natural impulses was the excessive value man ascribes to 
them. When such forces are left alone to serve as the exclu­
sive stimulus, an improper employment has been made. Trans­
lated into aims, such original endowments are neither viewed 
as good or bad, nor can they provide an absolute standard 
where their utilization is concerned. To do this would sub­
ordinate man's activity and a necessary restraint would be 
placed upon man's selections, especially in activities bearing 
a social context. Recognition of original impulses was neces­
sary, Dewey believed, but the use to which they were put was 
the important consideration. In addition, such recognition, 
for Dewey, while not wholly supplying the aims does point 
toward the means of accomplishing desirable, educational prac­
tices. Dewey's pragmatic posture in this consideration was 
evident when he stated;
But it is hardly necessary to say that primitive 
impulses are of themselves good nor evil, but become 
one or the other according to the objects for which 
they are employed. That neglect, suppression, and 
premature forcing of some instincts at the expense 
of others, are responsible for many avoidable ills, 
there can be no doubt. But the moral is not to 
leave them alone to follow their own 'spontaneous 
development,' but to provide an environment which 
shall organize t h e m . 5°
For Rousseau, nature not only supplied the initial and 
limiting forces in all education but also furnished the ends 
and aims; thus social intervention could only interfere with
S^Ibid.
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the divine plan. Stemming from a wise creator, original 
powers ought to be left alone, according to Rousseau. That 
Dewey should note Rousseau's association of God and nature 
was perplexing to Horne. The objection raised by Horne in 
this connection appeared irrelevant to the discussion of 
Dewey concerning nature as supplying aims.
Dewey's text was an attempt to assess properly the char­
acter of nature and subsequently project man's involvement 
relative to these native powers.
Horne would have preferred that Dewey had taken a dif­
ferent approach to such a discussion on nature, but he did not 
do so. Therefore, Horne's interpretation of Dewey's exposi­
tion may properly be termed incongruent and inconsistent when 
viewed in light of Dewey's text. In a sense, Horne did not 
address himself to Dewey's discussion, but instead attempted 
to interpret Rousseau. The result was that Horne's analysis 
became largely a theological question. Horne stated:
Though expressing an opinion on the other 
views of Rousseau, Dr. Dewey does not comment on 
the view that Rousseau 'identified God with nature.'"5?
Since Dewey did not elaborate on this view, it is strongly 
suggested that he believed such an elaboration was irrelevant 
to the salient points selected for his philosophical consider­
ation. Furthermore, the fact that Dewey has not made the kind
57Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 152.
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of theological assessments preferred by Horne, raises the 
question as to Dewey's interpreting Rousseau at all. It 
would appear that Dewey adequately summarized Rousseau's 
theory of nature and that he gave proper attention to Rousseau 
when he attempted to identify that which was right and that 
which was wrong in Rousseau's principles. Dewey's considera­
tion of Rousseau and of natural development may be summarized 
in the following statement:
. . . Rousseau was right, introducing a much- 
needed reform into education, in holding that the 
structure and activities of the organs furnish the 
conditions of all teaching of the use of the organs;
But profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not 
only the conditions but also the ends of their develop­
ment. As matter of fact, the native activities develop, 
in contrast with random and capricious exercise, 
through the uses to which they are put. And the office 
of the social medium is, as we have seen, to direct 
growth through putting powers to the best possibleuse.58
While Horne preferred theological speculations, Dewey 
preferred to address his inquiry into nature and man and the 
significant relationship which existed between the two.
2. Social Efficiency as Aims
Social efficiency as a concept in Dewey's philosophy may 
be translated into two specific aims. One of these Dewey has 
identified as economic power or "industrial competency."59
^®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 133.
S*Ibid., p. 139.
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Life is dependent upon some means of subsistence. The signif­
icance of this statement is to be found in the means employed 
in achieving such subsistence. Dewey noted that these "have 
a profound influence upon all the relationships of persons to 
one another."60 implicit in Dewey's theory was the economic 
as well as the sociological significance. Injury to others 
may be the outgrowth of both extremes. The economic parasite 
who must be dependent upon the activities of others for sur­
vival " . . .  misses for himself one of the most educative 
experiences of life."61 Dewey further addressed himself to 
the seriousness of this condition;
If he is not trained in the right use of the 
products of industry, there is grave danger that he 
may deprave himself and injure others in his possession 
of wealth. No scheme of education can afford to neglect
such basic considerations.
The economic component in Dewey's theory was a significant 
one. That such should be a concern for education becomes 
apparent when the focus of attention moves away from a form 
of government by the few to a democratic society. Dewey 
believed there was also a danger in an arrangement whereby 
the end becomes formulated as the result of an education which 





danger was the concept of social efficiency as an end in and 
of itself. The result of such a view, if not democratically 
maintained, could be that the individual and his personal 
identity might be sacrificed. Dewey elaborated by making the 
following statement;
There is. . . grave danger that in insisting 
upon this end, existing economic conditions and 
standards will be accepted as final. A democratic 
criterion requires us to develop capacity to the 
point of competency to choose and make its own career.
This principle is violated when the attempt is made to 
fit individuals in advance for definite industrial 
callings, selected not on the basis of trained original 
capacities, but on that of wealth or social status of 
parents.63
Dewey concluded that efficiency meant simply that pro­
vision should be made for the individual to share in a give 
and take experience. "In the broadest sense, social efficiency 
is nothing less than that socialization of mind which is 
actively concerned in making experiences more communicable."®^ 
Dewey suggested a social doctrine based on a commonality of 
experience for both individual and society. From Dewey's 
point of view, this concept was most in harmony with breaking 
down the social barriers of social stratification which he 
believed made individuals unconcerned with the interests of 
others,
Horne's interpretation regarding the assumptions presented 




to identifying efficiency with the development of power, Horne 
added another dimension to the term "efficiency." To Dewey's 
concept Horne added the element of "economy in the application 
of power. The term refers to machines as well as to persons."65 
Thus, efficiency was given increased meaning when viewed with 
its counterpart, economy. To some extent the degree of effi­
ciency may be determined by the ease which accompanies how one 
does things or gets things done. Although the element of econ­
omy was implicit in Dewey's theory, Horne's further considera­
tion enhanced rather than diminished Dewey's interpretation of 
social efficiency as aims. The human quality in efficiency was 
also recognized and promoted by Horne. Alluding to Dewey's 
suggestions, Horne stated; " . . .  there must be much of human­
ity in efficiency to save it from being m e c h a n i c a l . I n  
applauding Dewey for his interpreation of social efficiency as 
an education aim, Horne concluded: " . . .  here is indeed social
efficiency, humanism at its best."67
3. Culture as Aim
The chief criticism made by Horne in this discussion was 
of Dewey's analysis which concluded that culture and social 
efficiency could best be understood when viewed as synonymous.




Again, tension between Horne and Dewey was the result of 
Dewey's insistence that a dualism must be overthrown. The 
dualism which Dewey rejected was the dualism of life in 
which two ideals have been projected as antagonists, one 
against the other. The question raised by Horne related to 
the extent to which the individual self is capable of sharing 
in an experience within the context of society. Dewey's 
position strongly suggested that a person should give all he 
can to society since he will necessarily receive from society. 
Horne contended that such a condition of give and take was 
impossible because of the unique and unsharable traits char­
acteristic of the individual. His disagreement with Dewey 
may be seen from the following interpretation;
. . . [the individual] can not give all he is to 
society; and. . . he can not get all he is from society. 
He can not give all he is to society, for that centre 
of consciousness known as the ego, the self, is an 
unshareable experience. . . . Another can not feel 
your feeling, think your thinking, see your seeing.68
For Horne, the close relationship between the individual and 
experience had not been as clearly realized as it had for 
Dewey. The relationship between the individual and society 
was adequately understood by Horne in terms of Dewey's per­
ception. For Horne, the individual may well have contact with 
things about him, but this is not to suggest a necessary or 
possible interaction with those things.
68Ibid., p. 160.
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It is at this point that the dualism to which Dewey 
addressed himself may be identified. If the self is an 
unshareable self, as described by Horne, then the missing 
link between the two is mainly that of communications; that 
full and free intercourse which is an indispensable element 
in Dewey's philosophy. A personal inner holding conceived as 
something exclusive and known only by one man was rejected 
by Dewey since such a condition limited communications between 
individuals :
A free give and take of intercourse. . . 
transcends both the efficiency which consists in 
supplying products to others and the culture which 
is an exclusive refinement and polish.
Furthermore, the conflicting theory, as presented by 
Horne, presumed that reciprocity between the individual and 
society was unnecessary. For Dewey, however, a democratic 
society was impossible when culture and efficiency were viewed 
separately, neither relying on the other for its justification. 
Horne's concept of activity as related to efficiency presented 
culture in opposition to efficiency and the individual was left 
less an individual because of a depreciation of his uniqueness. 
Until a condition has been exacted whereby culture and effi­
ciency have attained a harmonious relationship, each productive 
in terms of the other, the true elements of democracy were yet 
to be achieved when viewed from the philosophy of Dewey.
69Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 143.
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Dewey warned against placing a premium upon social effi­
ciency without due regard for the worth of personality. A 
division of values was viewed by Dewey as a "product of feud­
ally organized society with its rigid division of inferior 
and superior."70 The opportunity for full development in 
broad human interests was thus limited for the inferior class 
while the favored segment of society was left to develop fully 
as human beings. The inferior were further limited to provid­
ing external products which inevitably became fixed by-products 
in a culture where the individual had been subordinated.
The essential criteria for a democratic society, as viewed 
by Dewey, were eliminated in Horne's interpretation since free 
and full communication of shared interests were violated in 
favor of an external aim associated with "the false conception 
of culture which identifies it with something purely ' i n n e r . ' " 7 1  
Horne's discussion of the inner personality which questioned 
sharing with society was descriptive of the condition which 
Dewey argued against. To Horne's theory, there appeared to 
exist a projection of a social division which eventually led 
to class stratification. Dewey rejected that exclusive aspect 
of Horne's theory which led to a dualism of aims in education.
He stated:
The separation of the two aims in education is 




of efficiency deprives it of its essential justifi­
cation. When social efficiency as measured by product 
or output is urged as an ideal in a would-be democratic 
society, it means that the depreciatory estimate of 
the masses characteristic of an aristocratic com­
munity is accepted and carried over. The aim of 
efficiency (like an educational aim) must be included 
within the process of experience.
Further analysis of Horne's comments revealed that he 
was not, in fact, rejecting the concept of culture and 
efficiency as being synonymous. From his point of view 
they were closely related terms. A relevant consideration 
of each generally was to be made at different times, each 
associated with a separate set of conditions.
Activity which included a broad range of acts was the 
major criterion for Dewey in establishing aims as an outgrowth 
of culture. Culture and efficiency were harmonious counter­
parts when conceived with the spirit and meaning of activity. 
Although Dewey was criticized by Horne for his neglect of the 
individual and his unique, distinct qualities, it was evi­
dent that a genuine concern had been expressed in this context 
as well as in other considerations pertinent to Dewey's general 
philosophy. Especially was this true when viewed in terms of 





1. The Meaning of the Terms
In this discussion Horne turned his attention to the 
contrast drawn by Dewey concerning the role of spectator and 
participant. Horne's primary concern was that Dewey had 
needlessly over-emphasized the role of each when he viewed 
the spectator as passive leaving only the participant as the 
active, involved individual.
According to Horne, the spectator was properly seen as 
active to the extent that he was interested in what he was 
observing. In this context Horne suggested the possibility 
of something more than a passive spectator. Man may be a 
spectator, but he may well be an active spectator, especially 
if interest and attention are strong. The element of interest 
and its attachment to the individual became a focal point for 
Horne. His analysis of Dewey's discussion regarding the matter 
led Horne to conclude that only the participant could truly 
be viewed as an interested agent. Logically, Horne concluded 
"that being a spectator means feeling no i n t e r e s t . H i s  
rejection of Dewey's theory, as stated above, was unmistak­
able and was worthy of close examination. He stated: "One
may be a participant without immediate interest, and one may 
be a spectator without immediate interest.
70Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 166.
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The immediacy of interest associated with an act was not 
so important for Horne as the possibility of interest as an 
ideal. For Horne such a distinction was necessary since it 
held significant educational value.
Surely, as a spectator one may possess interest in what 
one observes to be going on about him. By comparison, when 
Dewey asserted that the spectator was indifferent to what is 
going on about him, he did not suggest that some degree of 
interest would not be present. The fact is that as a spectator 
one is not involved in a course of action or activity intent 
upon altering or influencing the probable outcome of the event. 
He remains indifferent only to the extent that, as spectator, 
the interest associated with his observing does not create an 
involvement so that probable consequences will be seriously 
affected. Even if thinking was a part of the element of inter­
est, as suggested by Horne, it was not that variety of interest 
which concerned itself with the intent of changing courses of 
action by projecting into consequences. From Dewey's point of 
view, the defect of Horne's interpretation was found in the 
variety of interest and the intent associated with that interest. 
At best, the spectator can only be viewed as a "restrained par- 




In Dewey's theory, the concept of active process must be 
recalled in order to understand the significance of his con­
trast between spectator and participant. While Horne's dis­
cussion was best described as a general analysis of the two 
terms, Dewey designated a more specific differentiation. For 
Dewey, the involvement of the emotions alone does not suffi­
ciently suffice as an effective criterion for causing things 
to be different. Dewey viewed the mere spectator as he stood 
in the distance, and possibly in time, too far removed from 
the action. The essential difference between spectator and 
participant was that of attitude. The attitude, according to 
Dewey, must be connected in some way with personal interest 
and concern. His concern relative to the outcome of events 
was especially significant to him. He took note, therefore, 
not only of the immediate outcome or results, but also pro­
jected a consideration of long-range consequences and how 
these might affect the individual. The individual engages 
himself in the activity in an attempt to direct conditions. 
Interest combined with concern consequently serves to motivate 
the participant.
The significance of Dewey's analysis of this subject was 
clearly stated;
Such words as interest, affection, concern, moti­
vation, emphasize the bearing of what is foreseen upon 
the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to 
act to secure a possible result. But for an active 
being, a being who partakes of the consequences instead
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of standing aloof from them, there is at the same
time a personal response.76
The second observation noted by Horne was Dewey's close 
identification of interest with effort. Although interest 
and effort may accompany the other, this was not necessarily 
the case in Horne's interpretation. Horne stated that "effort 
is an effect of an ultimate as well as an immediate interest."77 
As in earlier considerations, Horne divorced the two elements 
and thereby provided a kind of dualism characteristic of his 
theory and practice in education. He readily admitted into 
his theory two kinds of interest; namely, the immediate and 
the remote. For Horne, effort attained and sustained by
remote interest may be equally as effective as that effected 
by immediate interest or interest associated with and found 
within the activity itself. Where immediate interest has 
produced effort, well and good. Where it has not or when 
effort lags, the remote interest must be relied upon even 
though externally imposed. If necessary, even forced interest 
must be solicited in order to accomplish a given task or ful­
fill an assumed obligation. While Horne perferred that inter­
est result from effort, the absence of such interest did not 
negate the obligation even though effort must be forced.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 147.
77Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 166.
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Obviously, Dewey finds a much greater validity in immed­
iate interest. Dewey believed forced interest had a tendency 
to negate relatedness and connections between present condi­
tions and that which the learner perceived. The element of 
perception was an element of learning which must be present 
at all times, according to Dewey.
The difficulty with forced interest, Dewey contended, was 
that there was no such thing:
Interest, concern, mean that self and world are 
engaged with each other in a developing situation.
To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, 
carried away by, some object. To take an interest 
is to be on the alert, to care about, to be atten­
tive.
Etymologically, interest denotes "what is between. E d u ­
cationally, what is between covers the difference between 
the student's present powers and the teacher's aims. When 
emphasis is placed upon the aims of the teacher, the focus 
becomes that which represents the remote limits, a condition 
destined to reduce the benefits to be realized from the intrin­
sic interest of the learner. The fact that such interest is 
remote naturally decreases perception. Between the present 
powers of the learner and the remote limits of the teacher 
was to be found the means, e.g., the conditions by which the 
"initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation."80




When interest is forced, these intermediate conditions 
fail to connect with that which the learner perceives. Dewey 
stated:
To make it interesting by leading one to 
realize the connection that exists is simply good 
sense; to make it interesting by extraneous and 
artificial inducements deserves all the bad names 
which have been applied to the doctrine of interest 
in education.81
Not only in learning was the concept of interest worthy 
of serious consideration for Dewey, but also in the total 
school situation the student must be viewed as a living, grow­
ing, active participating person. A school which takes this 
living growing person out of his natural environment and 
forces him into another's mold without showing any necessary 
connections runs the risk of establishing the basis for one 
of the school's major problems, the disciplinary problem.
To the participant the results of any activity do make a 
difference to him. He is never content to remain indiffer­
ent to that which is going on about him. He must be an 
involved organism if learning and perception are to be the 
outgrowth of instruction.
2. The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education
Horne acknowledged with Dewey that interest and disci­
pline were connected. However, Horne was not so concerned 
with how these were connected. If discipline must attach
81Ibid., p. 150.
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itself to a negative characteristic in order to effect a 
particular result, then well and good. Horne believed that 
even then, "effort 'through the acknowledgment of duty' may 
be worthwhile in itself and even lead eventually to interest."82 
It was with alarm that Horne viewed modern educational theory 
which purported to make learning a pleasant experience for 
the student. His position suggested a certain preference for 
the negative aspect of discipline and learning. The doing of 
something not of particular interest to the individual some­
how presupposed the establishment of good habits of learning. 
Horne stated: "Fowls thrive best when they have to scratch
for their food, and the law applies to human beings in search 
of mental refreshment."^^
Horne noted that wise men of all ages have found habits 
of learning, regardless of their source, invaluable. Habit­
uation of this variety, Horne believed, could only be achieved 
as the result of often doing that which you would rather not 
be doing. It should be noted that Dewey acknowledged the 
desirability, if not the necessity, for the development of a 
bent or disposition towards good habits. The essential dif­
ference between Horne and Dewey in this connection was the 
method employed in the attainment of habits. For Horne,
82
Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 174.
®^Ibid.
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discipline with or without accompanying interest was per­
missible. Central to Dewey's theory was a close relation­
ship of the two.
Contrasted with Horne's position, Dewey viewed discipline 
as something positive. He stated;
To cow the spirit, to subdue inclination, to 
compel obedience. . . to make a subordinate perform 
an uncongenial task— these things are or are not 
disciplinary according as they do or do not tend 
to the development of power to recognize what one 
is about and to persistence in accomplishment.84
Thus, interest and discipline were seen as connected for
Dewey; they were not opposed one to the other. In addition,
the element of intelligence had meaning in Dewey's theory
of discipline;
A person who is trained to consider his actions 
to undertake them deliberately, is in so far forth 
disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure 
in an intelligently chosen course in face of dis­
traction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have 
the essence of discipline.85
In other words, Dewey viewed discipline as but a direc­
tive force whereby the individual pursued a particular course 
of action with full realization of his undertaking.
In the traditional views held by Horne there was a dis­
agreement with Dewey concerning discipline. Historically, a 
certain safeguard had protected educators from intelligent 
criticism or inquiry pertaining to traditional methods and
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 151-152.
85Ibid., p. 151.
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practice in learning. If a body of knowledge had the approved 
classification of "discipline," it efficiently resisted ques­
tions and "removed the subject from the realm of rational 
discussion.
Such a theory placed a serious impediment to views which 
encouraged serious inquiry into any realm of subject matter. 
Cultivation and growth of the self received little attention 
and neither did subject matter which had little or no value to 
life itself. The process of experience from which all educa­
tional aims should stem continued to be viewed as extraneous 
and thus separated from the learner. Dewey expressed disdain 
for this condition since he saw the damage produced by such a 
theory;
Even when discipline did not accrue as a matter of 
fact, when the pupil grew in laxity of application 
and lost power of intelligent self-direction, the 
fault lay with him, not with the study or the methods 
of teaching. His failure was but proof that he needed 
more discipline, and thus afforded a reason for 
retaining the old methods. It was designed to discipline 
in general, and if it failed, it was because the indi­
vidual was unwilling to be disciplined.®^
Thus, responsibility was transferred from the teacher to
the student in the traditionalist's philosophy. If failure
or indifference to the task at hand resulted, the fault




Further evidence of the negative concept of discipline 
in Horne's discussion was found in his repeated demand for 
greater "conscious mental effort"®® whether or not such effort 
was designed to promote growth as a constructive power of 
achievement. He implied that this factor perhaps surpassed 
all others in accounting for past progress. The consequences 
of Dewey's more modern view was not a subject of Horne's dis­
cussion.
Again, Dewey believed that an unnecessary diffusion of 
effort was the likely outcome of the theory represented by 
Horne. Separation of subject matter from the concerns of the 
individual, Dewey believed, served only to divert personal 
attention and interest and thereby diminished the educational 
returns from effort:
The more indifferent the subject matter, the 
less concern it has for the habits and preferences 
of the individual. . . and hence the more discipline 
of will. To attend to material because there is 
something to be done in which the person is concerned 
is not disciplinary in this view. Application just 
for the sake of application, for the sake of training, 
is alone disciplinary.®®
No significant criticism was made by Horne concerning the 
attitude held by Dewey relative to subject matter. Horne did 
not share the same concern in his analysis as did Dewey. In 
fact, it would appear that Horne doubted the significance of
O p Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 174.
®^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 157.
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Dewey's deep concern in this matter. The fact that subjects 
exist as separate branches of study was not a major topic of 
discussion for Horne. The fact that these separations were 
often formulated as the result of classical divisions, like­
wise, was not particularly appraised by him. In fact, such a 
classification appears to be the logical formula for Horne in 
view of increased specialization. While admitting to a gen­
eral view of wholeness to knowledge, an elimination of sepa­
rate branches of knowledge would not be wise, nor practical, 
according to Horne. He stated:
It is, of course, true that ideally speaking 
all knowledge is part of a single system, that all 
parts of knowledge are interrelated, . . . but none 
of this means that the unity of knowledge excludes 
various classes of knowledge.90
Both better and newer classifications of knowledge were fore­
seen in Horne's analysis of subject-matter. Nevertheless, an 
elimination of prior, traditional classifications did not 
need to be eliminated.
Dewey's analysis projected a theory of subject-matter 
which held far more serious implications than that described 
by Horne. This disagreement was far more than a matter of 
semantics for Dewey. In Dewey's analysis such divisions and 
sharply marked-off disciplines provided yet another dualism 
similar to that of isolation of mind from activities. Isola­
tion of subject matter represented an educational scheme
90Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 173.
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whereby the accomplishment of ends became the major focus and 
emphasis in that direction provided the warranted means to 
such an achievement. Regarding this, Dewey stated: "In the
traditional schemes of education, subject matter means so 
much material to be studied."51 The situation thus became 
one whereby the teacher was charged with the responsibility 
of covering so much ground, much like the activity of the 
farmer whose goal is to make ready the necessary conditions 
for planting his crop. Such a ready-made curriculum and 
arrangement of subject matter were totally rejected by Dewey 
since it presupposed that the subject matter arrangement 
possessed completeness and independence in and of itself. 
Essentially, Dewey's rejection was based on the notion that 
adherence to external arrangements was not only possible but 
that such was desirable. Sound educational purposes were 
seriously hampered by such a theory. According to Dewey:
Having a ready-made existence on their own 
account, their relation to mind is exhausted in 
what they furnish it to acquire. This idea corres­
ponds to the conventional practice in which the 
program of school work. . . consists of 'studies' 
all marked off from one another, and each supposed 
to be complete by i t s e l f . 52
Such a completion of a series of events merely in order to 
complete a course of study seriously affected the outcome of 
learning and subsequently provided a depreciatory effect. In
91Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 157,
*2lbid., pp. 157-158.
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addition, the possibility of increased intrinsic motivation 
was vastly diminished. Dewey concluded by stating:
. . .  it means that the act of learning or 
studying is artificial and ineffective in the 
degree in which pupils are merely presented with 
a lesson to be learned.93
Although varying degrees of criticism were aimed at 
Dewey's theory of interest by Horne, one in particular may 
be identified. The nature of activity as related to interest 
marks a particular variable in the philosophy of the idealist 
as compared with that of the pragmatist. Indicative of the 
idealist's position is the following assertion:
The basic difficulty with Dr. Dewey's theory of 
interest is that the activity is by implication always 
physical. . . activity is conceived of either as play 
or as useful occupation. Perhaps interests are not 
something the self but something the self has.
Our author's views on interest fit children better 
than adolescents and adults.94
Such a concept of mind as suggested in this philosophy repre­
sented a serious detriment to effective educational theory and 
practice, Dewey maintained. For Dewey, isolation again made 
this condition an impairment to implementation in instruction. 
Mind, thus conceived, becomes preeminent over things and facts 
to be known. Such traditional notions of interest were termed 
as "mythical" by Dewey when he stated:
Mind appears in experience as ability to respond 
to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of
*3ibid., p. 158.
94Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 174-175,
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future possible consequences, and with a view to 
controlling the kind of consequences that are to 
take place. Action that does not involve such a 
forecast of results and such an examination of 
means and hindrances is either a matter of habit 
or else is blind. In neither case is it intelli­
gent.
Horne's perception of Dewey's theory of interest implied that 
by activity Dewey meant physical activity in the literal 
sense. Such was not the case.
Dewey never accepted the notion that physical activity 
was a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of educa­
tional aims and objectives. He rejected the dualistic attri­
bute of self as portrayed by Horne. Interests represented 
neither something the self is nor something the self has. 
Dewey's theory of interest demanded unity. Purely mental 
exercises pursuant to an accumulation of knowledge was also 
rejected since such activity did not engage the individual 
and his thinking and personal judgments in the selection of 
directed activities. While Horne's theory of interest ulti­
mately resulted in an interest-effort dilemma, Dewey con­
sistently denied that educational aims and ends were external 
to the self. The key to Dewey's proposal was unity. He 
believed that interest was initiated and sustained only when 
the self and the proposed course of action became united; 
the two, the self and the activity must merge into one. For 
the self, all ready-made aims and ends were rejected by Dewey.
95Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 153-154.
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The two were, therefore, in the process of becoming. He 
found no ready-made, fixed self existing behind activities. 
Dewey did not suggest that there existed no sense of unity 
where the self was concerned. However, unity had been 
achieved only when a consistency or balance was effected as 
an outgrowth of movement or experience. Until the individual 
was confronted with a problem there was a relatively stable 
balance. Confronted by a disturbance, interest would then 
be aroused and effort became the vehicle by which interest was 
sustained until the disturbing element had been successfully 
removed. Horne's traditional view on this subject tended to 
make interest a mere product of effort for it was effort which 
called it into being. The end, therefore, became the final 
step of the activity, thereby subordinating interest to that 
position which merely denoted the process by which the end 
was achieved.
The task of education, when viewed from Dewey's perspec­
tive, necessitated a greater personal responsibility than that 
stemming from Horne's frame of reference. The role played by 
educators becomes a unique one since subject matter and its 
attendant activities are now closely associated with the indi­
vidual learner and his perceptions rather than a body of knowl­
edge to be learned from an imposed, external force. Subject 
matter had to be organized in such a manner as would cause the 
learner to recognize the connections between the content of 
subject matter and the subsequent end or object.
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Isolation of means from ends, Dewey believed, had a dimin­
ishing effect upon interest and its intrinsic value for the 
learner. Increased interest in the means could be expected 
only as the learner was enabled to see a close relationship 
between means and ends in the subject. Furthermore, Dewey 
felt that interest in the means would be more meaninfgul when 
a balance was maintained between the simple or emotional quali­
ties, and the intellectual qualities of interest. Emotional 
qualities as depicted by Dewey were merely immediate reactions 
to a problematic condition, while intellectual qualities devel­
oped out of the problem itself.
In his discussion, Horne was especially critical of Dewey's 
theory of interest as it related to learning. In viewing the 
educational task, Horne found the intrinsic interests on the 
part of the learner generally unreliable, if not invalid. When 
placed in this context, Horne and other traditional thinkers 
subscribed to extrinsic means to motivation and learning. The 
result of such a philosophy was a projection of a pseudo-type 
of interest having a depreciatory effect upon personal meaning 
and perception.
Dewey readily rejected transitory interests as valid edu­
cational criteria. Present interests of the learner serve 
well as initiators, he believed, but they were to be viewed as 
starting points and not ends in themselves. As long as the 
learner came to view the problem as his own, Dewey found little 
objection to exerting strong means in an attempt to get the
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individual learner in consecutively directed activity of an 
intellectual nature.
Divergent views were presented by Horne and Dewey rela­
tive to interest and discipline. The implications of each 
should be studied seriously when formulating a philosophy of 
education in a democratic society. In Dewey's doctrine a 
theory of education was devised whereby prime consideration 
was given to the individual. The task of education assumed 
a unique function. The teacher necessarily must strive to 
provide a variety of experiences and must provide an environ­
ment conducive to the diversity represented in the classroom. 
Dewey summarized his theory and at least two relevant impli­
cations :
Interest and discipline are correlative aspects 
of activity having an aim. On the one hand [this 
doctrine] protects us from the notions that mind and 
mental states are something complete in themselves, 
which then have to be applied to some ready-made 
objects and topics so that knowledge results. It 
shows that mind and intelligent or purposeful engage­
ment in a course of action into which things enter 
are identical. . . .  It shows that subject matter 
of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas, 
and principles which enter as resources or obstacles 
into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course 
of action.9G
The task of education was clearly identified by Dewey. 
Provisions must be made for an environment which allowed for 
a course of action to be developed whereby:
. . . ends and conditions are perceived. (This 
is] . . . the unity which holds together what are
SGlbid.. pp. 161-162.
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often divided into an independent mind on one side
and an independent world of objects and facts on
the other.9'
Horne's theory concluded with a strong emphasis upon 
discipline, externally imposed when necessary. Little atten­
tion was given to self-discipline nor to increased effort 
resulting from sustained interest. If a particular occupa­
tion or duty called for work accompanied by drudgery, then
the social implications might well dictate the nature of the
action and activity. He stated:
There will remain in life an element of 
discipline without interest. Our conclusion is 
that life, and education as a phase of life, may be 
interesting if they can, but disciplinary if theymust.98
Experience and Thinking 
1. The Nature of Experience
From Dewey's analysis of experience, Horne by way of 
interpretation, cited at least three weaknesses. He con­
tended that in placing so great an emphsis upon the "inter­
active relation of the individual to his environment,"99 the 
concept of experience was one-sided. This was due to Dewey's 
neglect of the interaction between the individual and other 
individuals. Horne's primary objection to such a theory was
*?Ibid.. p. 162.
98Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 178.
*9lbid.. p. 184.
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that Dewey failed to acknowledge the social aspect of learning 
by experience. While Horne generally slighted the social 
condition of learning, at this point he called for a return 
to such as a prerequisite to learning. In evidence of his 
belief that the social consideration had been omitted, Horne 
stated;
And lio educative process is adequate that does 
not profit by this distinction [between experience 
and intercourse] and recognize that the pupil learns 
from the teacher as well as from his own bodily 
activities and manipulations. In other connections 
Dr. Dewey emphasizes the social environment and 
virtues; it should not be omitted from this analysis 
of experience.100
Horne attempted to ascribe a keen interest in the benefits 
derived from societal involvements or from the interaction of 
individuals with other individuals. It is evident from his 
discussion that he had not in actuality called into play a 
plurality of experiences one with the other. His position 
was somewhat restricted and narrow. His discussion in this 
context does not directly concern the individual's learning 
through experience. Rather, Horne strongly suggested that 
the social matrix might afford opportunity for learning from 
one another. In the traditional sense, he viewed the learner 
as gaining much by way of imitation and emulation of the 
teacher. This theory as projected by Horne demanded little 
intelligent thought, interest, or concern on the part of the 
learner. As cited before, Horne continued to project a dualism
l°°Ibid.
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between social conditions and physical activities. Negating 
the notion that a unity between the two existed, Horne sum­
marily dismissed'further observation:
From his teacher he may learn kindness, gentle­
ness, sympathy, love, honesty, self-respect, and 
reliability, which are characteristic of social 
situations in distinction from physical activities.^^l
Dewey repeatedly demonstrated that the entire social 
matrix was a significant element in the environment. He 
consistently generated the importance of the environment to 
the life and growth of the individual, indeed of all indi­
viduals. The two could not be separated. When viewed in 
isolation, the benefits possible from the physical-social 
activities were vastly diminished.
In experience, as in other theoretical considerations, 
Dewey rejected all forms of dualism. He repeatedly singled 
out the evils resulting from the dualism of mind and body.
When bodily activity has been subordinated to mental activity, 
the "obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activ­
ities which have to be employed more or l e s s . "1^2 Dewey 
believed that experience was primarily an active-passive 
affair and not primarily nor necessarily cognitive. The 
relationship of the two constituents were combined in order 
to form a unique combination. He stated:
lOllbid.
TO 2Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 166.
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On the active hand, experience is trying— a 
meaning which is made explicit in the connected 
term experiment. On the passive, it is undergoing.
When we experience something we act upon it, we do 
something with it; then we suffer or undergo the 
consequences. We do something to the thing and then 
it does something to us in return; such is the 
peculiar combination.103
In order to understand Dewey's concept of experience 
adequately, the term "consequences" needs to be considered. 
Horne criticized Dewey's analysis of experience as being one­
sided. He cautioned that too great a stress was placed upon 
the physical at the expense of the social and mental set.
As viewed by Horne, physical activity constituted experience, 
according to Dewey. Upon examination of Dewey's discussion, 
ample evidence is available to question the interpretation 
made by Horne. Indicative of his posture, Dewey declared:
Mere activity does not constitute experience. 
Experience as trying involves change, but change is 
meaningless transition unless it is consciously 
connected with the return wave of consequences which 
flow from it.104
From Dewey's point of view, not all activity was produc­
tive, nor did all experiences constitute perpetual growth. 
Only when one reflected from the activity into subsequent 
consequences was there potential significance for learning. 
Only when changes made in the individual were noted as a 




While noting Horne's interpretation, understanding of Dewey's 
theory could best be achieved by a return to his fundamental 
principle, namely, "continuity of experience." As previously 
noted, the basis for discriminating among experiences could 
be ascertained only when attention was given to the different 
forms in which continuity of experience operates. It is in 
this setting that Dewey saw the close relationship between 
experience and growth. On the basis of his "principle of 
continuity," Dewey suggested that only those activities which 
condition future successful solutions to problems would lead 
the individual to continued growth.
Horne's discussion contained a division between physical 
and intellectual pursuits, thereby subordinating the natural 
impulses of physical action to the higher order of mental 
activity. In its application such a theory eventually sub­
ordinated the pupil to the teacher. The attendant condition 
was that learning would be prescribed and dictated by the 
teacher. An adherence to external, super-imposed aims and 
objectives must necessarily be dealt with by the learner for 
these directed him and his activities.
Responsibility and the opportunity for responsible decisions 
relative to learning was of little significance in Horne's scheme. 
Another negative aspect of his position was that the likeli­
hood of continued growth in the educative sense would be dimin­
ished. Education so construed was therefore relegated to some­
thing which took place inside school. At a given stage in his
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intellectual pursuit, education somehow came to an abrupt end. 
Thus, the concept of education as a life-long experience for 
the individual was further decreased in terms of meaning.
The consequences of this abbreviated educational theory is 
that application to life and life experience is held to a 
minimum. The ability for individual thinking will probably 
not be initiated. Although the "what" and the "how much" of 
Horne's philosophy was recognizable, the "why" and "what for" 
was neglected.
Throughout Horne's analysis of Dewey's theory relative 
to experience and thinking, considerable attention was given 
to that which Horne believed was a serious neglect of the 
intellectual function. A careful study of Dewey's discussions 
revealed his sincere concern for the type of intellectual 
inquiry which brought about an educational bearing upon the 
occupation of the individual. Dewey believed and taught that 
bodily activities must not be allowed to become mechanistic 
or mechanical in their use. He believed that the senses were 
to be viewed as avenues to knowledge, not because external 
facts were somehow transmitted to the brain, but because they 
were to be used in connection with doing something with a pur­
pose. According to Dewey, it was precisely when an act was 
permitted to become isolated from a purpose that it became 
mechanical and consequently non-productive in terms of learn­
ing.
Horne further suggested that Dewey's concept of thinking 
was entirely a function of experience, void of ideas and
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"intellectual perception."105 Again, Horne did not present 
a comprehensive statement of Dewey's philosophy. Certainly, 
Dewey objected to any view which separated mind from expe­
rience with things. Such a condition tended to place emphasis 
on things rather than upon relationships and connections.
The matter of emphasis at this point was most significant for 
Dewey.
In order to assure that perception accounted for more 
than mere sensory excitation, Dewey believed and taught that 
perception must not be separated from judgmental activity on 
the part of the learner. Judgments necessitating thought 
must be employed if the function of perception was to be 
fully realized. To illustrate the importance of the kind of 
mental activity he believed would produce maximum meaning,
Dewey stated;
Words. . . are easily taken for ideas. And 
in just the degree in which mental activity is 
separated from active concern with the world, from 
doing something and connecting the doing with what 
is undergone, words, symbols, come to take the place 
of ideas. The substitution is the more subtle because 
some meaning is recognized. But we are very easily 
trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, 
and to fail to note how restricted is our perception 
of the relations which confer our significance.^®®
It was apparent that Horne was basically in agreement with 
Dewey in that a discernment of relationships was the genuine
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 186.
^®®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 168,
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intellectual endeavor and consequently a major educative task. 
However, Dewey recognized that to stop at this point was to 
stop short of acquiring maximum learning benefits. Dewey 
clearly distinguished his position from that described by 
Horne;
The failure arises in supposing that relation­
ships can become perceptible without experience—  
without that conjoint trying and undergoing. . . .
Stressing the important role of experience as associated 
with perception and subsequent learning, Dewey stated a re­
enforcement of his position:
An ounce of experience is better than a ton of 
theory simply because it is only in experience that 
any theory has vital and verifiable significance. . . 
a theory apart from an experience cannot be definitely 
grasped even as theory. It tends to become a mere 
verbal formula. . . used to render thinking. . . 
unnecessary and impossible.108
Similar to earlier interpretations, Horne believed an 
additional imperative was necessary which he had not found in 
Dewey's critique of experience and thinking. Even Dewey's 
concept of reflective thinking was inadequate for Horne since 
such an activity of thought must be appraised as resting in 
the realm of the physical. Therefore, it was viewed as lack­
ing a sufficient degree of intellectual exercise. For Horne, 
certain problematic conditions, due to their nature, cannot 




still continue to think the problem and fully realize that no 
solution is available— it remains beyond experience.
The central feature in Horne's interpretation of thinking 
may be best understood by a recognition of his attitude rela­
tive to projected thought or hypotheses. He emphasized that 
many of these were incapable of testing. Therefore, as such, 
the solution of these could not be placed within the realm of 
actual experience. Viewed from his standpoint, mind was 
engaged in a passive occupation. Horne's concept of thought, 
when contrasted with that of Dewey's, assumed a greater char­
acter of transcendentalism, intellectualism, and eventually 
found its posture anchored in a more philosophical adventure.
The passive characteristic of mind as identified in Horne's 
point of view, was evident in his discussion of this aspect of 
thinking:
And so the last step of testing can not be taken.
But we can and do think this problem, though the 
solution is beyond our actual experience. Here then 
thinking transcends experience, though growing out of 
it. Without such thinking the speculative element 
would be eliminated. . . .109
Although aware of a certain inherent weakness associated 
with this type of thinking, Horne continued to maintain its 
value. Apart from experience and remaining speculative and 
philosophical, Horne maintained that such,thinking was "regu­
lative of much human conduct and action."HO
lO^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 192.
H O lbid., p. 193.
160
Horne accepted Dewey's concept of reflection in expe­
rience. However, in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
philosophy, another step must be taken beyond the experiential. 
Only by advancing to this stage of thought can we hope to 
promote an adequate philosophy of education. Convinced of 
the value of forming intellectual constructs accompanied by 
transcendental reflection, Horne stated:
For education this conclusion opens for use 
in addition to experience the realms of the unex­
perienced and the, as yet at least, unexperiencable.
Incomplete though it was, thinking of the variety 
described by Horne found its justification as a warranted 
activity purely on the grounds of what might be its outcome.
The accuracy of the outcome or conduct of behavior imperative 
in Dewey's tested hypotheses was not found to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the value of Horne's speculative-philosophical 
thinking. Apart from experience, it still remained a viable 
endeavor so long as we are led to some form of action as the 
result of belief, disbelief, or even indifference in any
given situation.112
Further rejecting Dewey's concept of experience and 
thinking, Horne concluded: "We do not. . . need with Dewey






Operating within such a framework as was purported by 
Horne, the elements of quality and validity in thinking assumed 
a lesser degree of significance than that formulated by Dewey.
It was suggested by Horne that Dewey had, in fact, reduced, 
narrowed and minimized thought by insisting that it be a part 
of the model problem-solving method— a method which adhered to 
reflective t h i n k i n g . 114 Dewey rejected thinking which produced 
metaphysical constructs for two reasons; (1) metaphysics 
often leads us into transcendentalism; and (2) because such 
thinking was not prompted by problematic conditions. However, 
Dewey recognized that in some instances such thought might 
indeed lead to further inquiry and eventually revert to the 
problem-solving, scientific method for eventual solutions.
Even when this impromptu occasion presented itself as a 
possibility in Horne's scheme, it was inadequate because it 
reduced the problem-solving approach to triviality. At best, 
in Horne's philosophy, the problem-solving method was not 
viewed as intentional; rather, it came about as haphazard 
thought not necessarily arising out of a genuine intellectual 
problem.
In terms of Dewey's philosophy thinking or thought could 
never be viewed as passive. Reflective thinking placed in the 
context of Dewey's philosophy was an active process. Thinking, 
for Dewey, "is thus equivalent to an explicit rendering of the 
intelligent element in our experience. It makes it possible
ll^Ibid., p. 192.
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to act with an end in view. It is the condition of our having 
aims."115
Essentially, Dewey believed it was necessary that reflec­
tive thinking be bound up with intelligence and on the basis 
of intelligent action the individual would then see new con­
nections between that which he had done and its subsequent 
consequence:
A separation of the active doing phase from the 
passive undergoing phase destroys the vital meaning 
of an experience. Thinking is the accurate and 
deliberate instituting of connections between what 
is done and its consequences.116
For Dewey, the situation as it presently presented itself 
was either a fact or it was a theory yet to be tested before 
a valid acceptance could be made. For Horne, an acceptance 
of an image construct without a prior percept might be justi­
fiable. This he believed to be true and warranted on the 
grounds of intellectual necessity. The process of specula­
tive thought necessarily became significant when the solution 
to any existing problem was beyond actual experience.
Horne believed such an intellectual concern must be main­
tained even though an assured conclusion appeared to be impos­
sible at present or at any time in the future. In the mean­
time, it was sufficient that the individual acted as though
115Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 171.
llllbid., p. 177.
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 192.
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his thinking were true or false, or even a matter of indif­
ference.
Dewey found little satisfaction in the speculative 
thought because as such it rendered little in the way of new 
knowledge which would be dependable; therefore, the educative 
value of Horne's posture was doubtful in light of Dewey's 
theory of thought and its role in the educative scheme.
Problematic conditions of which solutions were possible 
existed in abundance in Dewey's outlook. Thinking, therefore, 
ought to be directed toward these situations. Only when so 
conceived could thought be projected as an active process 
whereby connections could be noted between that which is done 
and its resulting consequences. Without the possibility of 
reaching a conclusion or solution to a problem, of what bene­
fit was thought except for its intellectual quality and content 
which was the view held by Horne.
Dewey insisted that a reason for thinking must exist if 
thought was to produce a projection of possible conclusion 
or termination of the original problematic condition. He 
stated:
Only what is finished, completed, is wholly 
assured. The object of thinking is to help reach 
a conclusion, to project a possible termination on 
the basis of what is already given.118
118Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 173.
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Horne maintained an identity with the traditionalists' 
point of view. This was especially true relative to thinking 
associated with speculative, transcendent "natural" science. 
Dewey rejected the a priori knowledge supposedly disclosed 
from this realm of thought. Such knowledge prior to and 
independent of knowing held little validity. Thinking, there­
fore, associated with such a condition held little educative 
value. Dewey insisted that productive thinking must originate 
within the context of a problem and that consequences of 
reflection must be observed in the process. Finally, Dewey 
sought knowledge which served to function in life situations. 
The quest for certainty in a problematic situation remained 
a central theme in Dewey's philosophy of active thought.
Dewey did not argue that valid thought was primarily 
intellectual or primarily physical. Such a differentiation 
was, however, made by Horne in his interpretation. In summary, 
Dewey placed his concept of thinking in proper perspective:
While all thinking results in knowledge, 
ultimately the value of knowledge is subordinate 
to its use in thinking. . . and all knowledge as 
distinct from thought is retrospect.119
Properly interpreted, reflective thinking for Dewey
amounted to thought with a purpose. Such thought must not
be random or haphazard thinking. This latter may produce
some knowledge, but at best these were the products of the
119Ibid., pp. 177-178.
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trial and error method. Knowledge, while associated with 
thinking, must not be equated with thinking or inquiry. The 
process of inquiry, for Dewey, was but the instrument used to 
create objects of knowledge. Knowledge, on the other hand, 
was the end product of the process of reflective thinking 
which has been critically tested and verified by experimental 
procedures. Therefore, that which leads to knowledge vali­
dated experimentally was characteristic of the process of 
reflective thinking or inquiry, but the process must not be 
confused with the conclusion. Dewey believed that those con­
ditions which presently could not be verified must realist­
ically be held in suspension until such time as the experi­
mental method could be applied. Only then could problems 
requiring critical inquiry be solved or concluded. Apart 
from this framework, knowledge having instrumental value was 
not likely to be achieved.
Inquiry and thinking viewed from Dewey's perspective must 
have a more significant role to play than simply to function 
in the context of a philosophy which disconnects, rather than 
connects thought from verification.
Thinking in Education 
1. The Essentials of Method
Horne recognized in Dewey's discussion of thinking as 
related to educational method, a parallel between his essen­
tials of method and those formulated by Herbert. Rather
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than concentrate on the educational significance and that 
which Dewey suggested for the improvement of learning and 
the school environment, Horne chose to concentrate upon a 
narrow theme. This he did by contrasting the methodology 
of Herbart and Dewey. He failed to analyze adequately the 
essentials in the method of projected thinking as proposed 
by Dewey. Horne wrote an interpretation of Herbart rather 
than of Dewey. Far too much attention was given to the 
Herbartian "method" at the expense of Dewey's concept of 
thinking in education and its attendant conclusions for 
present and future learning. Horne's rationale for provid­
ing such a comparison was his belief that "the contrast
1 90between Herbart and Dewey is fundamental.'
The emphasis of Horne's interpretation may be seen when 
he stated;
Herbart is an intellectualist and Dewey is a 
pragmatist. Herbart believes the idea is primary 
and Dewey believes the act is primary. . . . Finally 
Herbart seeks an application of a truth already found, 
Dewey seeks the testing of the validity of the hypoth­
esis by a trial application.1^1
Dewey did not see the necessity for making a choice 
between the idea as primary and the act as application. His 
theory did not call for a strong emphasis upon one at the 
expense of the other. Certainly he believed ideas served as
120Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 206.
IZljbid.. pp. 206-207.
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adjuncts in thinking, but ideas alone could not supply 
valid answers to questions;
They define, clarify, and locate the question: 
they cannot supply its answer. Projection, invention, 
ingenuity, devising come in for that p u r p o s e . 1^2
In this sense, ideas in Dewey's scheme provided that ele­
ment which was the prerequisite for the leap from the unknown 
to the possibility of a known. Ideas continued to serve as 
the vehicle to projection, inventiveness and on into the 
creative realm. Ideas formulated between acts were viewed 
by Dewey to be important intermediaries in the learning 
process; yet, they were never final. The traditional con­
cept which held certain ideas to be fixed, final, and fact 
was the concept Dewey believed responsible for the passive 
view of mind and learning. As a result of this condition, 
the mind was considered static, a kind of receptacle waiting 
to be filled from without:
Activity, even self-activity, is too easily 
thought of as something merely mental, cooped up 
within the head, or finding expression only through
the vocal o r g a n s . 123
Dewey did not object to the essential of application of 
ideas. He did find objectionable the misuse of application 
when it led to finality. Dewey's views may be seen from the 
following:
While need of application of ideas gained in 
study is acknowledged. . . the exercises in applica­
tion are sometimes treated as devices for fixing
l^Zgewey, Democracy and Education, p. 186.
123ibid.. p. 189.
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what has already been learned and for getting 
greater practical skill in its manipulation. But 
practice in applying what has been gained in study 
ought primarily to have an intellectual quality.
Dewey believed that ideas were tentative and incomplete. 
Their best function was to serve as intermediaries in order 
to secure "methods for dealing with situations of e x p e r i e n c e . "125 
In other words, until an idea has secured an identity in an 
experienced condition the thought diminishes in reality and 
meaning. It is the application of the idea which serves to 
test it and only by way of testing can full meaning be 
attained. "Short of use made of them, they tend to segregate 
into a peculiar world of their o w n . " 1 2 6
Dewey again suggested that such a condition tended to 
isolate mind, the consequences being that a select group 
consisting primarily of the theoretical-minded class had 
developed. This class often found itself formulating ideas 
which social conditions did not allow the group to test. As 
a result, thoughts as ends-in-themselves emerged and formed 
a philosophy which resulted in a drastic reduction of learn­
ing.l^?
Dewey expressed concern regarding this position because 






Excessive reliance upon others for data 
(whether from reading or listening) is to be 
depreciated. Most objectionable of all is the 
probability that others, the book or the teacher, 
will supply solutions ready-made, instead of 
giving material that the student has to adapt 
and apply to the question in hand for h i m s e l f . 128
The essence of Dewey's concern in this matter, as 
reflected from the above, was that of further exposing the 
passive nature of traditional education. In addition, this 
observation was made by Dewey to exemplify a central theme 
in his educational philosophy.
At best, ideas remained tentative; they served well the 
function of providing a suggestion. Possibly they indicated 
a specific course of action which eventually would lead to 
full meaning as found only in an experential situation.
The terms experimentalism and scientific method, as 
interpreted by Horne, suggested a limited educational method. 
Indicative of Horne's view is the following statement:
It is just the scientific method used by all 
experimentalists alike from the days of Galileo to 
Darwin. His real novelty and originality is in 
limiting the essentials of educational method to the 
essentials of scientific method. It is strong where 
education is scientific and weak where education is 
literary, historical, aesthetic, and s p i r i t u a l . 129
Horne emphasized specific disciplines and focused upon 
these in his attempt to analyze and interpret the scientific
IZGibid., p. 185.
1 ?QHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 209
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method. As a result, the significance of "method" as Dewey 
described it lost the broad implications intended by him in 
his theory of thinking as related to a sound educational 
method. Dewey believed that thinking as a process represented 
a method of educative experience. Relating this concept to 
instruction, Dewey believed thinking was productive to the 
extent that good habits were employed in the process. "The 
essentials of method are therefore identical with the essen­
tials of reflection."130
Although Horne attempted to interpret Dewey's analysis 
of thinking and its relationship to education, he has, for 
the most part failed to come to grips with the subject. No 
discernible conclusions were reached, nor were any signifi­
cant educational implications projected. He failed to assess 
adequately scientific method and reflective thinking. He 
concluded that scientific thinking was valuable only in the 
realm of scientific investigation and failed to recognize the 
significance of the scientific method as "method" which con­
stituted an approach to verifiable knowledge.
The Nature of Method 
1, The Unity of Subject matter and method
Dewey's emphasis on unity took into account (1) subject 
matter; (2) methods; and (3) administration.131 central to
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 192,
131ibid., p. 193.
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his theme in a consideration of these topics was relatedness. 
This was especially true relative to the close connection 
between subject matter and the attendant method.
Horne took into account these same topics. He recognized 
them as related, yet considered them in a vastly different 
light from that formulated by Dewey. Horne suggested an 
addition to the above list which included "the pupils and the 
teachers."13^ Failure to include the latter in the study 
amounted to "the impersonality of this system."133
Dewey was concerned for the individual as well as for 
all people in the environment in which learning was to take 
place. Basic to Dewey's theory was;
. . . the connection of subject matter and 
method with each other. The [traditional] idea 
that mind and the world of things and persons are 
two separate and independent realms— a theory 
which philosophically is known as dualism— carried 
with it the conclusion that method and subject 
matter of instruction are separate affairs.1^^
Again, Dewey declared that any such division was false. 
His concern was not only that of promoting pedagogical sound­
ness. Equally imperative was his firm belief that neither 
the student nor the teacher should be subjugated or subord­
inated to a higher, predetermined order. Yet, when subject 
matter was set in the framework of the traditionalist's view.
132Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 215.
133lbid.
134Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 193,
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such was likely to be the outcome. Dewey believed that when 
mind and the world of things and persons were two separate 
realms then method and subject matter were separate entities.
As such, subject matter assumed the characteristics of a rigid, 
systematized set of facts and principles. Viewed in this con­
text, method necessarily assumed the role of how best to 
impress upon the mind a set of facts. Little or no concern 
was allowed for the involvement of the person who was to learn. 
Thus, an external approach to learning had been demonstrated, 
the effects of which have continued to present a persistent 
problem in education.
Horne's charge of impersonality in this discussion seemed 
unjustifiable. If method and subject matter were to be viewed 
as synonymous and subsequently implemented efficiently, the 
missing link necessarily became the individual learner.
The role of the individual may best be seen by Dewey's 
definition of method:
Method means that arrangement of subject 
matter which makes it most effective in use. Never 
is method something outside of the m a t e r i a l .
From the above statement as well as further elaboration 
on the subject, Dewey seemed fully cognizant of the individual. 
From the standpoint of method, the individual himself mani­
pulates the material of subject matter. Again, it is not 
something foreign being imposed upon the learner. Rather:
135Ibid., p. 194.
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It is simply an effective treatment of material 
. . . with a minimum of waste of time and energy.
Method is not antithetical to subject matter; it is 
the effective direction of subject matter to desired 
results. It is antithetical to random and ill- 
considered action,— ill-considered signifying ill- 
adapted.
Any treatment of subject matter which applied an external 
impetus to learning was rejected by Dewey. The student's role 
where material is concerned was simply to utilize the material 
in such a way as to effect a purpose. To be efficient the 
student must accomplish this by eliminating wasted motion and 
energy. Thus, perception could not be accomplished apart from 
the perceived; likewise, the act must not be divided from the 
acting. As for method, this was viewed as that element arising 
out of the individual's experience. Furthermore: it gave
meaning and purpose to present and future actions so that the 
product of such deliberate action would be most productive in 
terms of desirable results.
Dewey expressed equal concern for both student and teacher 
in connection with methods and materials as these were related 
to the conditions of learning. He abandoned the notion of 
sameness and uniformity in his pedagogical theory. When inade­
quate opportunities are afforded the learner to experiment and 
observe outcomes, both the teacher and student are denied the 
full measure of benefit possible from direct experience.
l^^ibid.
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Teachers as the result of this condition are then thrown back 
upon other sources in search of adequate methods. Referring 
to this problem, Dewey stated:
Experiences are had under conditions of such 
constraint that they throw little or no light upon 
the normal course of an experience to its fruition.
'Methods' have then to be authoritatively recom­
mended to teachers, instead of being an expression 
of their own intelligent observations. Under such 
circumstances, they have a mechanical uniformity, 
assumed to be alike for all m i n d s . ^37
The serious nature of Dewey's previous discussion regard­
ing method, as well as the false assumption often made by 
others relative to learning was evident when he stated:
Instead of being encouraged to attack their 
topics directly, experimenting by the consequences 
that accrue, it is assumed that there is one fixed 
method to be followed. . . . Nothing has brought 
pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the 
belief that it is identified with handing out to 
teachers recipes and models to be followed inteaching.138
While Horne agreed that such a theory is sometimes valid, 
there are instances when separation of method and activity 
must logically be made. Horne seemingly recognized the evils 
of a mechanistic approach void of creativity and flexibility. 
Nevertheless, he contended that "much good teaching has been 
done on the basis of the five Herbartian steps. They are the 
classic illustration of method separated from subject matter."139
IS^Ibid., p. 198.
138ibid., p. 199.
1 OÛHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 216.
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From the above discussion, it was evident that the pre­
scriptive approach possessed value for Horne. As illustrated 
earlier in this analysis, Horne believed learning was intrin­
sically good in and of itself. He often focused attention 
upon learning as a direct end in itself irrespective of other 
social factors and meaning for the one learning.
That "good teaching" resulted from following the five 
Herbartian steps raised many questions. At best, the impli­
cation was that emphasis was to be upon quantity, not quality 
of instruction. To assert that good teaching had taken place 
necessarily carried the implication of effective learning. To 
hold to the former without due consideration of the latter 
posed a contradiction of terms. Obviously, learning for its 
own sake was a familiar expression and was frequently used by 
Horne.
Dewey understood the traditional approach to learning as 
outlined by Horne. Admittedly, some learning might well be 
the outgrowth of an adherence to the formal, systematized 
method such as formulated by the Herbartians. Horne's favor­
able recognition of this method, however, overlooked many of 
the dangers inherent in such a system. Such a theory neglected 
individuality and focused emphasis on the ways children are 
alike. As a result, an acknowledgment of variety in methods 
as determined by the personal experiences of the learner was 
likely to be overlooked. Subsequently, the value to be gained 
from intelligent observation by both teacher and learner was
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likely to be lost. Perhaps even more damage would result 
from the inevitable decrease of meaning for the learner when 
subject matter became just something to be learned. In making 
an assessment of these two views pertaining to the nature of 
method and subsequent implications, it would appear that the 
starting point and the point of consummation in learning had 
become confused. Indeed, they may well become reversed if 
careful thought is not attributed to the process. When such 
becomes the case, strict adherence to a single method or the 
following of specific steps identified in a method, may lead 
to a condition whereby the method actually becomes a deter­
rent and stands in the way of effective teaching and learning. 
Diversity, rather than singleness, ought to be the guide if, 
indeed, meaning for the individual is to be achieved. Diver­
sity, uniqueness, and variation were identified as terms best 
suited to Dewey's philosophy.
Conscious of the concept which isolates methods from sub­
ject matter, Dewey recalled another false notion implicit in 
such an idea. Specifically, the two elements of dicipline and 
interest now assumed a new meaning and their combined function 
became less effective. Dewey believed that isolation of sub­
ject matter from method generally tended to minimize the ele­
ment of interest in learning. Under such a condition, the 
alternative was to subscribe to other means in an attempt to 
motivate the learner. Whatever form these means assumed, the 
long-term educative value was vastly diminished. Dewey
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determined that there were basically three ways in which to 
establish a relationship between the participant and that 
activity in which he was engaged in the process of learning:
One is to utilize excitement, shock of pleasure, 
tickling the palate. Another is to make the conse­
quences of not attending painful; we may use the 
menace of harm to motivate concern with alien subject 
matter. Or a direct appeal may be made to the person 
to put forth effort without any r e a s o n .
It should be noted that each of these alternative measures 
assumed a negative, rather than a positive posture. Each sug­
gested displeasure, rather than pleasure where learning was 
concerned. Each favored a preoccupation with the subject to 
be learned at the expense of meaningful participation and 
involvement on the part of the learner. Ultimately, Dewey 
saw that subscribing to these measures resulted in fixed 
attention upon the mere fact that something has to be learned, 
a condition leading to a self-conscious attitude resulting in 
a constrained, mechanistic approach to learning. Both the 
elements of meaning and personality likely would be neglected, 
a condition which tended to decrease the engagement of the 
word "process" in educational p r a c t i c e . 1 4 1
A firm conclusion was drawn by Dewey from his comments 
on this subject:
But when the subject matter is not used in 
carrying forward impulses and habits to significant 
results, it is just something to be learned. The
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 198.
141lbid.
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pupil's attitude to it is just that of having to 
learn it. Conditions more unfavorable to an alert 
and concentrated response would be hard to d e v i s e . ^^2
Throughout Dewey's elaborations, cause and effect played
an important role in determining the best method to be employed
in learning. From his point of view, when one has selected
and arranged causes into an order best suited to productive
outcomes, he then has a method of procedures or a tentative
procedure. Method, for Dewey, must be viewed as a relative
procedure as well as something which recognized and welcomed
the ingredient of variety. Only in this way could methods
best be defined and then implemented by individuals. Only
in this way would the personal involvement and experiencing
of the individual provide the kind of method characteristic
of intellectual observation and "activity motivated by a
purpose."143
2. Method as General and as Individual
The interpretation of Dewey in this discussion again led 
Horne to the conclusion that Dewey's views had upset tradi­
tional Herbartianism. In this connection, Horne projected 
an objection to Dewey's concept of method which held method 
to be both general and individual at the same time. Also 




is the art of uniting the mind and the subject matter, which 
presupposes a dualistic p o s i t i o n . "^44
Horne believed Dewey neglected a warranted consideration 
of "special method" as applied "to a single field, like 
history, English or s c i e n c e . Referring to the concept 
of method as both general and individual at the same time,
". . . Dr. Dewey would have the individual teacher or pupil 
work out his individual modifications of general method for
himself."146
Another criticism was identified by Horne concerning 
Dewey's concept of general principles and their application 
to individual subjects:
. . . to Dr. Dewey there is no such set of gen­
eral principles; no method is general without being 
individual, and no set of principles is applicable 
equally to all subjects. . . 'special method' is the 
application of 'general method' to a single field, 
like history, English, or science. . . .147
From Horne's point of view, Dewey's views were disturb­
ing because they violated those commonly held concepts per­
taining to method. Methods which were held to be general and 
individual at the same time form the basis for the chief 
criticism found in Horne's interpretation of Dewey's dis­
cussion.





The tension existing between Horne's analysis and that 
of Dewey again stemmed from the respective points of view 
taken and the emphasis allotted to specific principles.
Horne held to a universality of general principles designed 
to promote general methods. Dewey abandoned universal prin­
ciples in favor of general methods from which the application 
of individual method was accomplished.
Dewey recognized the existence and significance of gen­
eral methods. He did not, however, believe in the existence 
of a comprehensive set of principles, the accumulation of 
which provided the basis for reliable methods applicable 
equally to all subjects. The general methods recognized by 
Dewey stemmed from the fact that "there exists a cumulative 
body of fairly stable methods for reaching results, a body 
authorized by past experience and by intellectual analysis, 
which an individual ignores at his p e r i l .
But there was a vast difference between strict adherence 
to fixed principles as described by Horne and the intelligent 
application of general methods for use in teaching specific 
subject matter. The intelligent use of method was paramount 
to Dewey. Method must be viewed as intellectual by Dewey if 
it was to be an effective means of regulating learning pro­
cedures. In order for an intelligence to function, the 
teacher should always adapt, not adopt, particular procedures.
^^®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 200.
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For Dewey, unity in the concept of method as related to 
the general and the specific was imperative. Without such 
unity, Dewey quickly pointed out that "there is always a 
danger that these methods will become mechanized and rigid, 
mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his 
own ends^"149
Dewey not only recognized the existence of classic forms 
of method, but he also viewed these as complementary to 
individual or specific methods. His intent was not to de­
nounce these, but rather to place them in proper perspective 
for effective utilization in the classroom. Simply put, "he 
[the innovator] devotes them to new uses, and in so far 
transforms them."150
Rather than opposing general methods, Dewey believed 
individual initiative and originality to be enhanced as a 
result of their existence. In summary, he declared:
On the contrary they are reinforcements of them.
For there is radical difference between even the most 
general method and a prescribed rule. The latter is a 
direct guide to action; the former operates indirectly 
through the enlightenment it supplies as to ends and 
means. It operates. . . through intelligence, and not 
through conformity to orders externally imposed.151
Since situations were not all alike, Dewey believed that the





upon the specific case or problem with which the teacher and 
pupil were confronted. In other words, Dewey believed and 
taught that specific methods emerged out of the general. The 
two methods in reality were not two, but one.
This distinction made by Dewey was a significant one for 
it served to clarify his theory of method as well as his 
view of learning. Dewey repeatedly emphasized that it was 
folly to suppose that any school, any teacher, or any stud­
ent could be handed a model or method which could be viewed 
as profitable for all in all cases.
The value of general methods acquired from the past, 
likewise, was not overlooked by Dewey. These may prove bene­
ficial to the teacher or they may be damaging:
When they get in the way of his own common 
sense, when they come between him and the situa­
tion in which he has to act, they are worse thanuseless.152
In other words, when these were acquired intellectually 
and later used in the profitable solution to problems unique 
to the individual case, then they had constructive value.
The extent to which methods formulated by experts prove 
to be harmful or beneficial largely depended upon the personal
IS^Ibid., p. 202.
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use made of them. If they reduced intelligent reaction, to 
this extent they must be viewed as impeding effectiveness.
To the extent that personal judgment had been increased, 
methods of this type were held to be worthwhile. Such was 
the position held by Dewey.
Still another matter of concern was raised by Horne. 
Specifically, it concerned testing on a quantitiative basis. 
According to Horne, "the text would easily be interpreted 
to mean that Dr. Dewey is against it."153
As a result of analyzing Horne's discourse on this sub­
ject, it becomes evident that he has gone far beyond Dewey's 
treatment of the subject in Democracy and Education. He has 
left much to conjecture. Horne attempted to compare present 
findings with those supposedly projected by Dewey. This 
Horne set forth to do in order that he might identify a dis­
cernible contradiction in Dewey's position relative to Intel­
ligence Quotient reports and their implications for schools, 
teachers, and the student.
It was difficult to determine where in Dewey's text 
Horne found reason to believe that Dewey was opposed to 
intelligence testing. This was not the intent of his dis­
cussion per se. Without doubt, Dewey indicated concern as 
to the use made of intelligence scores, especially as these
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 220,
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had been utilized both by the classroom teacher and the school. 
In addition, there was ample evidence which suggested Dewey's 
disdain for homogeneous grouping as practiced by many schools. 
In his later writing, Dewey did make reference to this prac­
t i c e . ^54 In effect, his opinion was that homogeneous group­
ing without due inquiry and consideration ran the risk of 
transforming a theoretical finding into a rule of action.
Even this additional projection would hardly seem to be suf­
ficient evidence to constitute a contradiction of his earlier 
writing. Dewey aimed at disclaiming any practice which 
placed great emphasis on the quantity of mind. Such a regard 
for the individual, Dewey believed, served primarily to abort 
originality and to fix capacities for growth.
Dewey's most vigorous concern in this matter was best 
seen in terms of his insistence upon the application of demo­
cratic principles to the individual. For Dewey, the question 
of intelligence scores was more than a rhetorical one. Nor 
was it to be considered in terms of mere academic conjecture.
Dewey held a far different view of intelligence than that 
held by Horne and tradition. Dewey did not believe the Intel­
ligence Quotient score represented a fixed trait capable of 
determining the individual's possibilities for growth. Admit­
tedly, the individual's capacity for growth and his potential 
for increased growth were factors worthy of consideration.
154Ibid., p. 221,
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Even these, however, served only to discover limits and limi­
tations attributable to a given individual.
Dewey resisted the concept which portrayed individuals 
as differing in the quantity of mind;
Ordinary persons are then expected to be 
ordinary. Only the exceptional are allowed to have 
originality. The measure of difference between 
the average student and the genius is a measure 
of the absence of originality in the f o r m e r . 155
A democratic accommodation and provision for development 
of the individual's fullest capacity was clearly the aim of 
Dewey. It was obvious that Dewey had broken with classical, 
traditional views on this subject. He had denounced any edu­
cational scheme whereby the elite would be given prime atten­
tion. The task of the school and of the teacher was simply 
to provide an environment which welcomed all regardless of 
any fictitious notion of the mind such as that held by some 
traditionalists. Operating within this framework, the base 
was a quantitative comparison and represented a false notion. 
Dewey viewed this concept as doomed to failure. Certainly, 
it represented the antithesis of his democratic framework:
How one person's abilities compare in quality 
with those of another is none of the teacher's busi­
ness. It is irrelevant to his work. What is required 
is that every individual shall have opportunities to 
employ his own powers in activities that have meaning. 
Mind, individual method, originality signify the 
quality of purposive or directed action.156
155jjewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.
ISGibid.
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Any procedure differing drastically from the one 
described above, Dewey believed was an invitation to impose 
uniform methods for all. The result of such a condition 
inevitably produced mediocrity in all except the few. Addi­
tional adverse outcomes resulting from quantitative arrange­
ments were noted by Dewey. He stated;
And measuring originality by deviation from the 
mass breeds eccentricity in them. Thus we stifle 
the distinctive quality of the many, . . . and 
infect the rare geniuses with an unwholesomequality.15/
Horne's interpretation of this portion of Dewey's text 
and the alleged contradiction relative to intelligence test­
ing, was bent in a direction not intended by Dewey nor 
detected in the text. While it was evident that Dewey 
intentionally projected a departure from classical lines of 
thought, any further interpretation or elaboration would seem 
unjustifiable. Statistics cited by Horne relative to testing 
procedures in many cities failed to add clarity to his inter­
pretation of Dewey's discussion. It was quite clear that 
Horne would not discard testing of this nature, nor would he 
abandon homogeneous grouping of students. According to Horne, 
"they are a notable and distinctive contribution to educa­
tional science."158
IS^Ibid., p. 203.
15®Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 223.
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Horne provided a strong argument for his position; never­
theless, his arguments in the final analysis proved to be 
incongruous in interpreting Dewey's discussion of this subject.
From Dewey's point of view, it remained that good method­
ology operated and flowed from, or was an outgrowth of contact 
with experience and observation.
3. Traits of Individual Method
Specific traits of individual method were selected by 
Dewey. These have not been cast as separate and distinct 
from general method, but rather as traits variable with the 
individual and the conditions in which he finds himself.
General methods continued to constitute the general fea­
tures of the method of knowing. As outlined by Dewey previ­
ously, the features of general method which stood as applic­
able to all were; (1) problem; (2) collection and analysis 
of data; (3) projection and elaboration of suggestions or 
ideas; (4) experimental application and testing; and (5) the 
resulting conclusion or judgment.159
The specific traits of individual method, not designed 
to oppose general method, were identified by Dewey as the 
following: "(1) directness; (2) open-mindedness; (3) single-
mindedness; and (4) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "1^0
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.
IGOlbid., p. 204.
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While recognizing the adequacy of method, both general 
and individual, Horne found objectionable any attempt to dif­
ferentiate between the two. Essentially, he called for a 
merger of the two since he viewed each as stemming from the 
same source;
Really, it would seem that the steps of general 
method are also individual, and the traits of indi­
vidual method are also general. Each individual in 
solving his problem should use the five steps of 
general method, and every individual in using the 
five steps of general method should exemplify the 
four traits of individual method.161
But the very strength of individual method as described 
by Dewey was dependent upon diversity. Individual judgment, 
individual habit, and individual interests all were viewed 
as prerequisites for originality. Originality and individual­
ity remained for Dewey the necessary ingredients for effective 
personal responses leading to greater efficiency in problem 
solving.
For the sake of uniformity, Horne would combine general 
method and individual method, thus effecting a merger of the 
two. "The general method becomes individual, and the individ­
ual traits become g e n e r a l . "162
The recognition of plurality in the application of indi­
vidual method was significant for Dewey. Within this frame­
work, tendencies unique to the individual personality were 
allowed maximum utilization;
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 229.
162ibid.
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The method of one will vary from that of another 
(and properly vary) as his original instinctive 
capacities vary, as his past experiences and prefer­
ences vary.lG3
Furthering the significance of the traits of individual 
method, Dewey declared;
But methods remain the personal concern, 
approach, and attack of an individual, and no 
catalogue can ever exhaust their diversity of 
form and t i n t . 164
A sound rationale was expressed by Dewey in that indi­
viduality and uniqueness of personality were recognized and 
encouraged to flourish. A third element relevant to Dewey's 
rationale was that of individual responsibility and his 
attack upon a problem. The allowance for, and recognition 
of, variability in individual method demanded that considera­
tion be given to projected consequences.
The view expressed by Horne which would combine general 
method with individual method might well be the simpler course 
where implementation is concerned. The tendency in the class­
room would be to foster methods and conditions which were not 
necessarily conducive to personal engagement of thought. 
External rewards likely would become a substitute for genuine 
intrinsic motivation. In general, a negative attitude toward 
discipline would become the rule, thereby diminishing freedom
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.
IG^Ibid., p. 204.
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of thought and creativity of action. Recalling this condi­
tion , Dewey warned:
What is sometimes called 'stern discipline,' 
i.e., external coercive pressure, has this tendency. 
Everything that makes schooling merely preparatory
works in this d i r e c t i o n . 165
Alluding to the necessity for consideration of traits 
and attitudes consistent with individual me^' od, Dewey con­
cluded:
Expressed in terms of the attitude of the 
individual the traits of good method are straight­
forwardness, flexible intellectual interest or 
open-minded will to learn, integrity of purpose, 
and acceptance of responsibility for the con­
sequences of one's activity including thought.166
Throughout this discussion, an implicit concern for a
democratic theory relative to this subject was maintained
by Dewey.
By comparison, Horne's comments for the purpose of 
interpretation have suggested a traditional, if not an aris­
tocratic notion when projected into application in the school 
environment.
The Nature of Subject Matter 
1, Subject Matter of Educator and of Learner
Although critical of the synonymous use of the terms 




terms. From the point of view of semantics, however, Horne 
differentiated the two. The slight difference in connotation 
has neither increased nor decreased the text of Dewey from the 
standpoint of meaning. The general nature of subject matter 
remained the primary theme of emphasis.
The second point of concern for Horne was the discus­
sion in which Dewey centered attention upon "school studies 
as standards of current c u l t u r e . A s  a result of such 
emphasis, Horne believed the school and the curriculum became 
one-sided when put into practice. The primary criticism made 
by Horne was concerned with the associated terras "progressive 
education," and "child-centered schools." Horne noted that 
such schools had radically departed from the teaching of Dewey 
and had in so doing, "neglected the racial deposit of relations 
with society and n a t u r e . "1^8 Horne was essentially accurate 
in making this observation relative to certain schools which 
supposedly had adopted practices purported by Dewey. It is 
interesting to note, however, that this subject of Horne's 
interpretation did not represent an analysis of the discussion 
found in the text of Dewey.
In another instance Horne presented a more realistic 
declaration subject to interpretation and possible criticism.
167Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 235.
^®®Ibid.
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Horne urged a far greater emphasis on past culture. He main­
tained a need existed for a set of principles to guide us in 
order to gain adequately from a study of past racial experi­
e n c e . ^^9 From Dewey's writing, Horne found a neglect of a 
proper study of cultural experience. Again, a philosophical 
strain may be seen in Horne's interpretation. The pragmatic 
concerns of current, experienced social interactions repre­
sented an inadequacy for Horne. Pertaining to this condition, 
he confirmed his belief:
We need the recognition of mental assimilation 
without a necessary practical application. We need 
too the recognition of the worth of knowledge con­
cerning social conditions that no longer exist.170
Even when knowledge was found lacking any present social
or practical use, Horne believed:
. . .  we also need the recognition of the worth 
of knowledge that satisfies individual desire and 
interest. . . .  In this sense, knowledge may justi­
fiably exist for its own sake, and truth be its own 
excuse for being.1^1
Horne contended that Dewey had stressed the practical, 
utilitarian aspect of knowledge, without the supplement of 
personal knowledge, based merely upon individual desire and 
interest. His view was not that of holding to one at the 





of intellectual knowledge held some validity and warranted 
serious consideration so long as this position was main­
tained in proper perspective. Horne emphasized the impor­
tance of projecting this view into subject matter when he 
stated:
It allows culture for its own sake, even 
hobbies in learning, and the social transmission 
of intellectual coinage no longer current for 
those whose fondness lies that way.l?^
The significance of Horne's posture in this considera­
tion pointed toward the enrichment of a person's life and an 
expanded appreciation in the realm of the aesthetics. Cer­
tainly study, whatever the nature, ought to allow for attain­
ments in these categories. From a study of Dewey's text, it 
appeared that ample consideration had not been given to these 
facets of knowledge.
Dewey recognized the necessity for combining into the 
context of human experience both the moral and aesthetic 
traits which Horne had described. At the same time, Dewey 
was again confronted with the task of reconciling another 
dualism, the dualism between culture on the one hand and 
everyday life on the other. Horne spoke of culture and the 
successful transmission of culture in a sense incompatible 
with that which was presented in Dewey's philosophy. Dewey 
defined culture as "the capacity for constantly expanding
l^^Ibid.. p. 236.
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the range and accuracy of one's perception of m e a n i n g s , "1^3 
and viewed the task of the educator as one whereby ordinary 
human experience was combined with intellectual, moral, and 
aesthetic qualities. In his view, cultural studies were not 
cultural because of their removal from life, but because they 
represented the systematized and refined wisdom of the race.^^^ 
Consistent with his theoretical discussions, Dewey 
placed great emphasis upon the social content and function 
of any course of study. The subject matter of the school and 
the ideals of the social group of necessity had to be con­
nected. He insisted;
The ties are so loosened that it often appears 
as if there were none; as if subject matter existed 
simply as knowledge on its own independent behoof, 
and as if study were the mere act of mastering it 
for its own sake, irrespective of any social values.
Both Horne and Dewey made significant contributions to
this discussion. In addition to emphasis and definition,
the more important contrast was noted when the stage of
development was taken into account. Horne's posture reflected
the condition and state of affairs designated for the mature
or the educator; Dewey's position took into account the
nature and experience of the young, the learner. Horne
focused his theory on results, while Dewey concentrated upon




the means by which the young accomplished that whole and 
harmonious life which Horne described.
The disparity which existed between the teacher and the 
student was of great concern to Dewey. Likewise, he viewed 
systematized bodies of knowledge held by the adult as a 
formidable accumulation, often impeding learning and growth 
of the young:
From the standpoint of the educator. . . the 
various studies represent working resources, avail­
able capital. Their remoteness from the experience 
of the young is not, however, seeming; it is real.
The subject matter of the learner is not, therefore,
. . . identical with the formulated and crystalized 
subject matter of the adult; the material as found 
in books and in works of art, etc. The latter repre­
sents the possibilities of the former; not its 
existing state.
Dewey recognized, further, that the attitude of the 
teacher to subject matter was vastly different from that of 
the student:
Failure to bear in mind the difference in sub­
ject matter from the respective standpoints of 
teacher and student is responsible for most of the 
mistakes made in the use of texts and other expres­
sions of preexistent knowledge.
The significance of the difference in attitude between 
the teacher and the student made knowledge in the concrete a 
prerequisite for sound teaching. The importance of such a 




The teacher presents in actuality what the 
pupil represents only in posse. That is, the 
teacher already knows the things which the stu­
dent is only learning.
For Dewey, the material of school studies ought to per­
petuate those meanings of current social life which were 
desirable to transmit. Further, it provided the teacher an 
organized form of the essential ingredients of the culture 
worthy of perpetuation. Dewey recognized the merits of 
scholarship yet insisted mastery of subject matter was not 
enough. The possibility of the adverse effects of this con­
dition were evident, when Dewey noted some features of schol­
arship might actually:
. . . get in the way of effective teaching 
unless the instructor's habitual attitude is one 
of concern with its interplay in the pupil's own 
experience. In the first place, his knowledge 
extends indefinitely beyond the range of the pupil's 
acquaintance. In the second place, the method of 
organization of the material of achieved scholarship 
differs from that of the beginner.1^9
The conclusion from the above discussion was that when 
mastered subject matter and the teacher became the focal 
points in the teacher-pupil relationship, at this point 
scholarship might indeed impede effective teaching. Herein 
was found the likelihood of allowing the two worlds of teacher 
versus pupil to exist whereby a false or assumed attitude 




Another concern for Horne was identified when he quoted 
Dewey; "'in the last analysis, all that the educator 
[teacher] can do is to modify stimuli. . , .'"180
Horne viewed the role of the teacher as depicted by Dewey 
as too impersonal, shallow, and i n c o m p l e t e . F r o m  the phi­
losophy of the idealist as distinct from that of the prag­
matic philosophy, Horne portrayed the role of the teacher as 
one responsible for far more than manipulating the environ­
ment. He stated:
. . . the teacher not only supplies environ­
ment but is environment, not only modifies stimuli 
but is a stimulus. His contacts with his pupils are 
not only indirect through a situation he is handling 
but direct with a person in whom he is i n t e r e s t e d .
Horne suggested that the pragmatic philosophy was both 
indirect and impersonal where the subject and the pupil were 
concerned. Greater insight would have been provided had 
Horne completed his original quotation of Dewey. In terms 
of the results of the educative enterprise, the concluding 
portions were both significant and enlightening:
In the last analysis, all that the educator 
can do is modify stimuli so that response will as 
surely as is possible result in the formation of 
desirable intellectual and emotional dispositions.^
^®®Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 236.
IGllbid.
IG Z i b i d .
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The social environment for Dewey represented a signif­
icant element if meaning was to be provided in the sense of 
effecting an identifiable linkage between the individual 
and his knowledge.
From Horne's discussion it was obvious that he made a 
distinction between informal and formal education. But for 
Dewey, it was informal education which provided the basis 
for understanding of the subject matter contained in formal 
instruction. "In what we have termed informal education, 
subject matter is carried directly in the matrix of social 
intercourse.
So long as knowledge remained justifiable for its own 
sake, Horne could accurately ascertain which knowledge should 
be in the forefront of the student's experience. The role of 
the teacher could then be viewed as director, rather than 
facilitator. The teacher could then be viewed as constituting 
both environment and stimulus. In this context, the teacher 
was in a position to manipulate the student, and in return 
the student's response to the teacher could be expected.
The result of Horne's position amounted to a teacher-dominated 
environment, while for Dewey, the learning environment was 
one supplied and structured by the teacher.
Personal concern for the one learning was expressed by 
Dewey when he made the following comment on subject matter:
IB^Ibid.
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The problem of teaching is to keep the expe­
rience of the student moving in the direction of 
what the expert already knows. Hence the need 
that the teacher know both subject matter and the 
characteristic needs and capacities of the student.
2. The Development of Subject Matter in the Learner
Dewey identified three stages in the growth of subject 
matter in the experience of the learner when he commented:
In the first estate, knowledge exists as the 
content of intelligent ability-power to do. This 
kind of subject matter. . . is expressed in familiar­
ity or acquaintance with things. [Second] this 
material gradually is surcharged and deepened through 
communicated knowledge or information. [Third] it 
is enlarged and worked over into rationally or 
logically organized material— that of the one who, 
relatively speaking, is expert in the subject.186
Horne was quick to note " . . .  the pragmatic emphasis
upon knowledge as control of a situation. This is the only
thing in the first stage, and the main thing in the other
two stages."187
All three stages of learning as presented by Dewey were
analyzed by Horne. He injected into this interpretation a
recognition of the usefulness of the pragmatic theory of
knowledge, especially since it connected knowledge with
action. As in earlier analyses, the pragmatic view was not
necessarily rejected. Horne simply believed such a view did
not go far enough where knowledge was concerned.
IBSlbid.. p. 216.
IGGibid.. pp. 216-217.
IG^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 245.
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For the most part, Horne believed the individual was 
restricted by the terms practical and experienced. He 
believed;
We know and enjoy much that we can not use.
We understand and appreciate much that we have not 
experienced, though something similar has been 
experienced. The point that pragmatism misses here 
is that we can know by reason the unexperienced and 
unexperienceable. And life is much richer because 
of our ability to transcend experience in some forms 
of knowledge.
Dewey's thought was basically intellectual and social; 
Horne, injecting a contrasting view, added a third dimension, 
namely, the appreciative. Transcending experience as a mode 
of increasing the appreciative capacity represented a valid 
and necessary exercise for Horne. Dewey rejected this form 
of information because it consisted of knowing about some­
thing without knowing it in a personal, meaningful way. 
Informational knowledge of the type described by Horne was 
viewed differently by Dewey. While both theorists recognized 
the potential for the appreciative, the value found in this 
form of knowledge was secondary for Dewey except when taken 
into account for its instrumental value. A similarity between 
the idealistic and pragmatic philosophies was again noted 
at this point :
Informational knowledge is the material which 
can be fallen back upon as given, settled, estab­
lished, assured in a doubtful situation. It is a
^®®Ibid.
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kind of bridge for mind in its passage from doubt 
to discovery. It has the office of an intellectual 
middleman.
Dewey's initial stage embodied the power to do or attain­
ment of knowledge of "how to do."^^0 The instrumental emphasis 
placed upon knowledge by Dewey was further confirmed when he 
stated:
When education. . . fails to recognize that 
primary or initial subject matter always exists as 
matter of an active doing. . . the subject matter of 
instruction is isolated from the needs and purposes 
of the learner, and so becomes just a something to 
be memorized and reproduced upon demand. . . the 
natural course of development, on the contrary, 
always sets out with situations which involve learn­
ing by doing. Arts and occupations form the initial 
stage of the curriculum, corresponding as they do to 
knowing how to go about the accomplishment of ends.191
The application of the scientific method to learning 
caused Horne to conclude that learning-knowledge was void of 
the emotional quality. In addition, the role of science in 
the development of subject matter made Dewey's theory essen­
tially an intellectual endeavor. This was especially true 
when Horne considered the third or technical phase of study 
as outlined by Dewey. Viewing this situation Horne called 
for another element as a supplement to Dewey's treatment:




Still, something essential is lacking. It 
is.the appreciative aspect of experience. Subject 
matter is more than knowledge, even if all three 
stages of knowledge are present. It is the 
emotional aspect of experience, always present, 
always giving a characteristic tone. . . .192
It may be concluded that an intentional, designed con­
sideration for the emotional and appreciative aspects of 
learning were not identified in Dewey's writing. If these 
were not provided for nor acknowledged by implication,
Horne's criticism was justified. Yet, meaning and personal 
experience were stressed throughout Dewey's analysis. Evi­
dence of the emotional and appreciative elements was found 
in Dewey's theory although these possessed a different con­
notation and were presented from a different frame of refer­
ence than that found in Horne:
Wisdom has never lost its association with the 
proper direction of life. Only in education. . . 
does knowledge mean primarily a store of information 
aloof from doing.1^3
Further stressing the personable and emotional attributes 
of the pragmatic posture, Dewey stated:
Knowledge of things in that intimate and 
emotional sense suggested by the word acquaintance 
is a precipitate from our employing them with a 
purpose. This attitude carries with it a sense of 
congeniality or friendliness, of ease and illumin­ation.194
192Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 218.
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In addition, Dewey's treatment of the social aspect of 
subject matter provided that needed supplement to the intel­
lectual experience. The place of communications continued 
to play a significant role in Dewey's theory. Within this 
context it was likely that both the appreciation aspects as 
well as the emotional ones came into existence for Dewey;
In so far as we are partners in common under­
takings, the things which others communicate to us 
as the consequences of their particular share in the 
enterprise blend at once into the experience resulting 
from our own special d o i n g .
Furthermore, Dewey provided a criterion for estimating 
the value of informational material found in school:
The place of communication in personal doing 
supplies us with a criterion for estimating the 
value of informational material in school. Does 
it grow naturally out of some question with which 
the student is concerned? Does it fit into his 
more direct acquaintance so as to increase its 
efficacy and deepen its meaning? If it meets these 
two requirements, it is educative. The amount heard 
or read is of no importance— the more the better, 
provided the student has a need for it and can apply 
it in some situation of his own.
Horne pointed out that all individuals know some things 
which he could never use in controlling a practical situation. 
This was well and good. That such a condition existed, Dewey 
did not disagree. The quality of knowledge and personal 
meaning were significant signals when Dewey discussed the 




knowledge about which Horne spoke was of lesser consequence 
for Dewey and therefore warranted the lesser consideration. 
Merely identifying with knowledge as the result of another's 
distributing it to the individual was a dangerous practice, 
Dewey warned. The legacy of knowledge could not be assumed 
immediately by the individual when merely acquired by verbal 
transmission from one person to another.
Dewey warned against what he considered a faulty view 
relative to quantitative k n o w l e d g e . H e  recognized that 
such material existed in tremendous volume, but cautioned 
that such must not be confused with the true nature of knowl­
edge itself. Dewey recognized there was a record of knowledge 
existing outside of inquiry, yet such knowledge was weak in 
furnishing us with resources for further inquiry. He ser­
iously doubted that information of this type should be con­
strued as knowledge. Dewey further suggested that as a 
result of this condition educators and learners alike have 
merely identified with knowledge void of understanding and 
meaning on the part of the individual to whom such knowledge 
has been communicated. Dewey believed that a very real danger 
existed when information of this variety came to dominate 
the process of institutions of learning at all levels and 




Probably the most conspicuous connotation 
of the word knowledge for most persons today is 
just the body of facts and truths ascertained 
by others; the material found in the rows and 
rows of atlases, cyclopedias, histories, biog­
raphies, books of travel, scientific treatises, 
on the shelves of libraries.198
Horne displayed little concern for this argument. In 
fact^ he believed these features might indeed provide the 
avenues to the possession of genuine knowledge:
We do not have to do anything else about it 
to make it knowledge for us. We can know what 
others tell us without testing it for ourselves.
Most of our knowledge is of this t y p e . ^
For Horne, no response to the raw material of infor­
mational knowledge was necessary. Because knowledge of 
this variety might or might not possess meaning for the 
receiver, Dewey viewed it as faulty. Also missing from 
this point of view was the power to promote added signif­
icance to future situations and to solutions of future 
problems.
Knowledge, for Dewey, presupposed a motive power to do, 
to perceive, to apprehend, and to move the recipient in a 
direction. Outside this framework, the quest for certainty 
would make little progress. Concerning the above discussion, 
it should be noted that Dewey differentiated between intel­
lectual certainty and our own certainty:
19Glbid.. p. 220.
1ÛQHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.
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In its honorable sense, knowledge is dis­
tinguished from opinion, guesswork, speculation, 
and mere tradition. In knowledge, things are 
ascertained; they are sô  and not dubiously other­
wise. The undisciplined mind is averse to. . . 
intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion.
It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats 
them as such without due warrant. Ignorance gives 
way to opinionated and current error,— a greater 
foe to learning than ignorance itself.200
Still a further contrast was identified by Dewey and
that was the personal, intrinsic nature of knowledge which
was the outgrowth of an internalized process of learning;
. . . one receives what is indeed knowl­
edge for others, but for him it is a stimulus to 
knowing. His acquisition of knowledge depends 
upon his response to what is communicated.201
As a safeguard against the accumulation of dubious
knowledge, Dewey projected the method of science as the most
valid approach to knowledge and learning. He stated:
Science is a name for knowledge in its 
most characteristic form. It represents in its 
degree, the perfected outcome of learning,— its 
consummation. What is known. . . is what is sure, 
certain, settled, disposed of; that which we think 
with rather than that which we think about.20^
Such a characterization served further to point out 
fundamental traits which differentiate the pragmatic philos­
ophy from the idealistic.




Dewey believed that the cultural heritage was but raw 
material which served to connect the child with the past, 
but this was not the end of the process. Out of the inter­
action of the child with the raw materials— the child, on 
the basis of intelligence— saw new connections and as a 
consequence new experiences resulted:
Science represents the safeguard of the 
race against these natural propensities and the 
evils which flow from them. Without initiation 
into the scientific spirit one is not in posses­
sion of the best tools which humanity has so far 
devised for effectively directed reflection. For 
he does not become acquainted with the traits that 
mark off opinion and assent from authorized con­viction. 203
Dewey emphasized the importance of a thorough study of 
subject matter materials. His view of subject matter, 
however, was different from that held by Horne. The chief 
difference was that Dewey believed subject matter was simply 
raw material which had to undergo certain transformations as 
it was internalized by the individual. Then and only then 
could it be described as having been a part of cognitive 
experience. Dewey also emphasized the instrumental character 
of objects of knowledge. Knowledge was never immediate. It 
always stood at the conclusion of a successful process of 
reflective inquiry.
203 ̂ -̂Ibid.. p. 223.
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The assignment of science was not, as intimated by 
Horne, an intellectual exercise in the pursuit of knowl­
edge :
Not organization but the kind of organ­
ization effected by adequate methods of tested 
discovery marks off science. It is organized 
on the basis of relation of means to ends—  
practically organized. Its organization as 
knowledge. . . is incidental to its organiza­
tion. But scientific subject matter is 
organized with specific reference to the 
successful conduct of the enterprise of dis­
covery, to knowing as a specialized u n d e r t a k i n g . 204
Summarizing, Dewey called for a carefully developed sub­
ject matter leading to sequential activities on the part of 
the learner. Content was determined by experience which 
took place interactively between; (1) the learner as he 
experiences,* and (2) the object or thing in the environment. 
"But experience makes us aware that there is a difference 
between intellectual certainty of subject matter and our 
certainty."205
In addition to the three phases of structure outlined 
by Dewey previously in this discussion, Horne identified 
another stage which he designated as the speculative or 
metaphys i c a 1 . 20 6
ZO^ibid.. pp. 223-224.
205lbid.. p. 222.
20GHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 245.
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Beyond the intellectual standpoint,
Man can think about what he does not know, may 
never know. Yet such thinking may be disciplined 
by the canons of self-consistency and consistency 
with the known. Such thinking, not being verifiable,is non-scientific.207
The "larger realities" interjected by Horne were to be 
disciplined by self-consistency and consistency with the known. 
As the result of examination, it appeared that a resemblance 
existed similar to the theory of Dewey relative to growth 
and continuity of experience. However, in the context of 
Horne's framework the intent of such thinking was quite dif­
ferent from that presented by Dewey as reflective thinking. 
Horne's thinking remained a passive condition of mind lacking 
in intelligent direction. Only in the philosophy of the 
idealist would this fourth stage in the development of sub­
ject matter be admissible. It remained speculative and meta­
physical. Further indicative of Horne's attempt to combine 
idealistic elements into the pragmatic position was his final 
summary of this discussion;
When the appreciative aspect of experience is joined 
with the speculative, one result may be a spiritual 
interpretation of the universe, leading to a religious 
attitude on the part of the learner. . . it too should 




In reality, Horne's interpretation of this segment of 
Dewey's text must be viewed as an enlargement of the philo­
sophical tenets found in pragmatism. The views presented by 
Dewey adequately recognized the intellectual, emotional, 
scientific as well as the social aspects. He omitted the 
speculative or metaphysical thought; the religious attitude 
was not discussed in his text because its treatment would have 
represented an inconsistency in his philosophy. The end result 
would have been to include Horne's fourth stage, the meta­
physical.
Dewey's resolution posed a serious problem. One was the 
difficulty of establishing curricular priorities; the other 
was the necessity of obtaining and maintaining teachers who 
were truly artists— well informed and imaginative. The effec­
tive implementation of Dewey's theory was more or less depend­
ent upon the latter.
Dewey concluded that teaching must be viewed in terms of 
art. It remained that science refined this process and served 
to effect successful conduct to the enterprise of discovery 
and subsequently to intellectually ascertained knowledge:
The positive principle is maintained when the 
young begin with active occupations having a social 
origin and use, and proceed to a scientific insight 
in the materials and laws involved, through assimilat­
ing into their more direct experience the ideas and 
facts communicated by others who have had a larger 
experience.209
^*^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 227.
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The implications of this theory were significant ones. 
They meant the teacher must possess sufficient ideas, mean­
ings, and concepts so that he could aid students in the pur­
suit of understanding. Furthermore, Dewey's theory provided 
the teacher with a sense of direction, yet this did not place 
him in the role of supreme director. Providing an environ­
ment which encouraged the student to gain greater insights 
on his own was a major objective of Dewey's scheme. The 
creative teacher would necessarily have to develop his own 
sense of the appropriate. At times he would endeavor to place 
the student in situations that would cause him to arrive at 
conclusions considered significant by the teacher; at other 
times, the student would be confronted with less structured 
conditions designed to lead him to original or novel consider­
ations and outcomes not necessarily anticipated by either the 
student or the teacher. In spite of traditional pedagogy, 
Dewey refused to present a systematized methodological formula 
which would serve as the deciding factor for the teacher in 
determining when and how to employ a particular emphasis.
3. Subject Matter as Social
Horne believed the rights of individuals were merely 
social rights as these were analyzed by Dewey. Horne's inter­
pretation was limited in terms of Dewey's theory of subject 
matter and social rights. Horne presented the view that 
Dewey projected only the rights of individuals as social 
rights, thereby casting individual rights in the shadow of
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the social element, "but they are the rights of common men 
and women."210 Horne believed disharmony could be found in 
Dewey's discussion of this subject and found himself unable 
to identify the elements which would have unified Dewey's 
theory;
. . . the activity element in his doctrine 
and the social element in his doctrine are not 
well unified. The activity element ties knowl­
edge down to occupation with, and manipulation of, 
material things; the social element drops the 
material and stresses social problems, respon­
sibility, insight, and interest.2H
In Horne's judgment, such disharmony "would disappear 
in case the theory of knowledge as exclusively intelligent 
control of a material situation were surrendered."2^2
Horne did not discuss a curriculum and a subject matter 
best suited for a democracy. Nevertheless, this subject was 
a major concern for Dewey. Set statements concerning appro­
priate subject matter for all individuals were rejected. He 
warned of the temptation for the educator "to conceive of his 
task in terms of the pupil's ability to appropriate and repro­
duce the subject matter. . . irrespective of its organization 
into his activities as a developing social member."213
210Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 249,
Zlllbid.
212ibid.
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Horne concluded that the disharmony in Dewey's writing 
was traceable to a theory of knowledge dependent upon intel­
lectual control of the material situation.
Contrary to the above interpretation, Dewey differentiated 
and expressed concern for both the intellectual and the social 
a. “cts as each related to subject matter. Relative to social 
control and subject matter Dewey confirmed his position;
. . . our prior remarks have been mainly con­
cerned with its intellectual aspect. A difference 
in breadth and depth exists even in vital knowledge; 
even in the data and ideas which are relevant to 
real problems. . . motivated by purposes. For there 
is a difference in the social scope of purposes and 
the social importance of problems. . . education 
should use a criterion of social w o r t h .
Dewey's social dimension of learning was best understood 
in terms of the biological emphasis of instrumentalism. It 
was the biological-social concept which Dewey promoted.
Viewed from this standpoint, man's capacity to think reflec­
tively in dealing with problems in his environment was largely 
dependent upon the use of language, meanings discovered, and 
other instruments of thought which were the product of human 
experience. Growth of individuals or of societies was depend­
ent upon an appropriation of knowledge and subsequently bring­
ing thought processes to bear on life situations. Such an 
adaptation of learning and thinking was consistent with Dewey's 
theory of evolutionary development. Dewey believed the social
p. 225,
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experience remained as the medium which transformed physical 
nature. Although physical stimuli were furnished by nature, 
the interpretation given to these by society determined their 
significance;
All information and systematized scientific sub­
ject matter have been worked out under the conditions 
of social life and have been transmitted by social 
means. The scheme of a curriculum must take account 
of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the 
existing community life; it must select with the 
intention of improving the life we live in common so 
that the future shall be better than the past.215
Dewey expressed the belief that it was necessary to estab­
lish a priority in the formulation of an effective curriculum. 
The curriculum must be planned making special reference to:
. . . placing essentials first, and refine­
ments second. The things which are socially most 
fundamental, that is, which have to do with the 
experiences in which the widest groups share, are 
the essentials. The things which represent the 
needs of specialized groups and technical pursuitsare secondary.216
Horne failed to note the two important attributes relat­
ing to subject matter and the real task of education. Implicit 
in Dewey's philosophical efforts were the elements of human­
ism and democracy. It was difficult to determine Horne's 
reason for this omission. Dewey viewed these two traits as 
uniquely related, one dependent upon the other. And learning 




"There is truth in the saying that education must first
2 1 7be human and only after that professional." It was clear
from Dewey's discussion that he had not alluded to "humanism" 
in terms of a specialized c l a s s . N o r  did he have in mind 
classical humanism in which men of leisure become preoccupied 
with the preservation of classic traditions. Aware of this 
traditional tendency frequently adhered to by many, Dewey 
warned: "They forget that material is humanized in the degree
in which it connects with the common interests of men as men."^^^ 
Furthermore, he urged:
Democratic society is peculiarly dependent for 
its maintenance upon the use in forming a course of 
study of criteria which are broadly human. Democ­
racy cannot flourish where the chief influences in 
selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitar­
ian ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and, for 
the higher education of the few. the traditions of a 
specialized cultivated class.^20
Dewey viewed the school as a planned agency which provided 
the opportunity for all to profit from education. The school 
and the curriculum were to be designed in such a way as to 
promote the concept of universal schooling whereby every indi­






Growth in terms of education was to be effected as the result 
of his pursuing a deeper meaning and refinement in every 
realm of experience.
Dewey believed that those subjects designated as liberal 
or illiberal should not form the basis of the essentials in 
the curriculum. These conditions, Dewey believed, infected 
education and were "based upon ignorance of the essentials 
needed for realization of democratic i d e a l s . "221
Concern for the establishment of a curriculum which was 
consistent with the problems of common humanity was also 
expressed by Dewey:
A curriculum which acknowledges the social 
responsibilities of education must present situa­
tions where problems are relevant to the problems 
of living together, and where observation and 
information are calculated to develop social
insight and interest.22
There is confusion in Horne's interpretation. This was 
especially evident when he attempted to identify the real task 
of the educator.
Concerning Dewey's theory of the social aspect of subject 
matter, Horne declared: " . . .  the activity element in his
doctrine and the social element in his doctrine are not well 
unified."223 Horne's interpretation strongly suggested 
neither the activity element nor the social had been fully
221ibid., p. 226.
222ibid.
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 249.
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expanded. The specific criticism made by Horne was found in 
that aspect of Dewey's theory which emphasized the activities 
of the individual when cast as a "developing member of a 
social g r o u p . "224 Horne stated that the individual's rights 
were merely social rights as portrayed by Dewey; inviolate 
rights common to every individual had not been given sufficient 
attention.
Dewey's concept of subject matter maintained strong psy­
chological implications. In order to resolve the traditional 
dualism which had existed between subject matter and the stu­
dent, psychology had to be applied to subject matter if it 
was to be effectively introduced into the student's experience. 
Dewey argued that mind and subject matter must not be viewed 
separately. Expressing this concern, he stated;
Especially is the educator exposed to the 
temptation to conceive his task in terms of the 
pupil's ability to appropriate and reproduce the 
subject matter in set statements, irrespective of 
its organization into his activities as a developingsocial m e m b e r . 225
Foreign subject matter regardless of its origin was not 
best suited for the accomplishment of meaningful learning. For 
Dewey, this attitude remained one of the most significant evils 
which often accompanied traditional educational theory and 
practice.
224ibid.
225Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 227.
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Play and Work in the Curriculum
1. The Place of Active Occupations in the Curriculum
Horne believed that Dewey's analysis of Plato and his 
account of knowledge was presented in such a way as would 
favor the pragmatic theory. This Horne believed Dewey had 
accomplished when he called attention to the emphasis placed 
on practical knowledge by Plato. Such a reference, therefore, 
necessitated a supplement to Plato's theory, according to 
Horne. The additional interpretation was noted when Horne 
stated:
. . .  he [Plato] recognized also an absolute 
knowledge of the real nature of things, their essences, 
of 'ideas.' The world of practical activities he 
preferred to regard as the region of 'opinion,' 
whereas the world of ideas yielded absolute knowledge. 
Plato's theory of knowledge was not pragmatic.226
Horne's interpretation of Plato's theory was accurate.
The "two-world" concept was a part of Plato's theory.
Since Dewey held little validity for the concept of ideas 
which yielded absolute knowledge, his text disregarded this 
aspect of Plato's philosophy. Instead, Dewey alluded to that 
side of Plato's thought only in order to demonstrate related­
ness which existed between play and work:
Plato gave his account of knowledge on the 
basis of an analysis of the knowledge of cobblers, 
carpenters, players of musical instruments, etc., 
pointing out that their art. . . involved an end, 
mastery of material or stuff worked upon. . . and a
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 252-
253,
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definite order of procedure— all of which had to 
be known in order that there be intelligent skill or art.227
Dewey emphasized the fact that the young were engaged in 
work and play out of school. As a result, he failed to see 
why activities conducted in the school must necessarily be 
concerned with a radical departure from this e x e r c i s e . 228 
When these circumstances prevailed, Dewey believed that 
growth as the result of education was likely to be more or 
less accidental.229 Introduction of artifically designed 
activities in the school often represented an unnecessary 
arrangement whereby conditions outside of school were likely 
to be disregarded.
Further stressing the seriousness of this condition, 
Dewey declared: "But it must not be forgotten that an edu­
cational result is a by-product of play and work in most out- 
of-school c o n d i t i o n s .  "230 summary, Dewey called attention
to one of the essential tasks of the school when he affirmed:
It is the business of the school to set up 
an environment in which play and work shall be 
conducted with reference to facilitating desirable 
mental and moral growth. It is not enough just to 
introduce plays and games, hand work and manual 
exercises. Everything depends upon the way in which 
they are employed.221
22?Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 229.
228ibid.. p. 231. 





Horne identified this section as an illustration of the 
"project m e t h o d . "232 Furthermore, he recognized that the 
essence of this method was found in purposeful activity;
The method is bound up with the pragmatic theory 
of knowledge as a phase of action. That we learn much 
by doing is indisputable; that we learn much more 
without doing, without manipulating materials, is also 
probably true; . . . the project method is only one of 
many worthwhile methods. . . .233
Dewey insisted upon active occupations with the raw mate­
rials of knowledge. From such a posture it may be asserted 
that emphasis was upon things to do, not upon studies per se.
The educational significance of things done in connection 
with the raw material of inquiry was dependent upon the extent 
to which those activities typify social situations.234
The term "project method" may have been implicit in Dewey's
discussion, but it was not found in his text.
Dewey wrote about laboratory work, manual training and
the object lesson. Concerning the employment of these, Dewey 
was quick to point out the inadequacies of each often found 
in educational practice. In both the laboratory and the 
manual training shop, he cautioned against the limitations 
inherent in the use of raw materials when isolated from associ­
ation with the finished product. He warned:
232Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 261.
233ibid.
234Dewey^ Democracy and Education, p. 234.
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The notion that a pupil operating with such 
material will somehow absorb the intelligence that 
went originally to its shaping is fallacious. In 
practice, overemphasis upon formed material leads 
to an exaggeration of mathematical qualities, since 
intellect finds its profit in physical things from 
matters of size, form, and proportion and the relations 
that flow from them.235
Likewise, in the case of the object lesson Dewey noted 
a fallacy in the belief that pupils must know how to use 
tools before they can begin the process of making. The error 
identified by Dewey with respect to the object lesson was in 
the assumption that pupils cannot learn how in the process of
making.236
Horne interpreted Dewey's theory of active occupation 
as meaning an exaggerated preoccupation with physical activ­
ity at the expense of intellectual pursuits. However, this 
position warranted further analysis. Dewey suggested that the 
student learned to do by doing and that active participation 
on the student's part was essential to learning if it was to 
possess personal meaning.
The element of wholeness characteristic of Dewey's philos­
ophy was clearly discernible when he stated:
Intellectually the existence of a whole depends 
upon a concern or interest; it is qualitative, the 
completeness of appeal made by a situation. Exag­
gerated devotion to formation of efficient skill 
irrespective of present purpose always shows itself 
in devising exercises isolated from a purpose.237
235lbid., p. 232. 
236ibid., p. 233. 
237ibid., pp. 232-233.
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Humanism and purpose were the traits which served best 
to qualify the variety of activities and the knowledge attend­
ant to active occupations with things. "The more human the 
purpose, or the more it approximates the ends which appeal 
in daily experience, the more real the k n o w l e d g e . 38
Horne appealed to the historic connotation of the term 
"liberal." His interpretation served well to contrast the 
pragmatic theory of knowledge with that of the idealistic 
theory:
Historically a liberal education was intel­
lectual, not manual, and was associated with 
leisure; here it is intellectual through being 
manual and is associated with physical production 
of some sort. The historic view eliminated the 
commercial motive; the new view only subordinates it.239
Horne believed manual pursuits profited little in way 
of a "liberal" education. In this respect Dewey's philosophy 
was viewed by Horne as anti-intellectual, illiberal, and un­
true in historical perspective.
From Dewey's point of view, no one subject in isolation 
was better equipped to furnish a liberal education than any 
other subject.
Disdainful of traditional views which purported intel- 
lectualism and liberating qualities, Dewey cautioned:
23Bibid., p. 232.
239Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 261,
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The false notion referred to takes the stand­
point of the expert, the one for whom elements 
exist; isolates them from purposeful action, and 
presents them to beginners as the 'simple' things.240
Horne failed to consider economic factors. He also
neglected the significance of scientific content and social
value. Increasingly, a consideration of these factors
becomes imperative in a comprehensive philosophy of education.
It is unlikely that the immature student will pursue problems
merely for the sake of discovery, independent of original,
direct i n t e r e s t . 241 Furthermore:
The continually increasing importance of 
economic factors in contemporary life makes it 
the more needed that education should reveal 
their scientific content and their social value.
For in schools, occupations are not carried on 
for pecuinary gain but for their own content.
Freed from extraneous associations and from the 
pressure of wage-earning, they supply modes of 
experience which are intrinsically valuable; 
they are truly liberalizing in q u a l i t y . 242
Horne conceived manual occupations as that activity tied 
down to physical occupations without regard for mental activ­
ity. "There are thinkers as well as doers. And if we learn 
by doing, we also learn by thinking."243 Again a dualism 
was found in Horne's thinking. Physical activity was viewed 
as part from mental activity. Doing was separated from
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 234.
241lbid., p. 235.
^^^Ibid.
243Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 263,
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thinking. In either case, Dewey believed there existed the 
possibility that adequate conditions and disposition of mind 
could promote both simultaneously.
Active occupations for Dewey were framed within the con­
text of social life. He recalled that science grew gradually 
out of useful social occupations. Physics developed from the 
use of tools and machines, and the science of mathematics had 
its origin in the practical use of numbers in counting and 
m e a s u r i n g . 244 ^ review of the historical development of sub­
jects was not intended as an argument for a recapitulation of 
the history of the race. Nevertheless, an awareness of these 
conditions strongly suggested the possibilities for the present- 
of using active occupations as opportunities for scientific
study.245
Horne made an inadequate interpretation of Dewey on 
scientific method and the implications of such a method for 
other types of knowledge. His interpretation failed, however, 
to give ample consideration to the whole range of possibilities 
in establishing new realms of knowledge. Evidence of his 
limited interpretation is evident when Horne declared: "But
it would be a mistake to limit all scientific investigations 
to solving practical p r o b l e m s . "246 Horne's rationale stemmed
244Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 235-236.
^4^Ibid., p. 236.
^4^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 262.
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from his belief that not all problems contained practical 
applications and consequently did not necessarily warrant 
practical solutions. Even so, logical reasoning and system­
atic thought were justified for "they still furnish intel­
lectual stimulation and satisfaction to the pure s c i e n t i s t . "247 
By contrast, Dewey criticized the traditional concept and 
further emphasized the importance of the experimental method:
Connection of occupations with the method of 
science is at least as close as with its subject 
matter. The ages when scientific progress was 
slow were the ages when learned men had contempt 
for the material and processes of everyday life, 
especially for those concerned with manual pursuits. 
Consequently, they strove to develop knowledge out 
of general principles— almost out of their heads—by logical r e a s o n i n g s . 248
Dewey further concluded:
. . . the rise of experimental methods proved 
that, given control of conditions, the latter operation 
is more typical of the right way of knowledge than
isolated logical reasonings.249
Certain practices found in Dewey's theory Horne criticized 
because he believed they lacked sufficient intellectual qual­
ities. The elements of practical involvement as well as 
emphasis upon social life were also targets of criticism by 
Horne.
24?lbid.
248Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 237.
24*ibid.
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The accumulation of knowledge experienced and transmitted 
by others was held in high esteem by Horne. Certainly recog­
nition of this body of knowledge ought to be taken into account, 
That such a body of information existed was not denied by 
Dewey. The difference between the two theorists was found in 
the method selected by which the learner could be introduced 
to knowledge in such a way as would promote maximum learning. 
Horne suggested that Dewey's method encouraged trial and error. 
From Dewey's point of view, one of the inadequacies of tradi­
tional pedagogy has been its failure to recognize the signif­
icance of trial and error especially during initial stages of 
learning. Dewey placed this phase of learning in its proper 
perspective when he stated:
. . . opportunity for making mistakes is an 
incidental requirement. Not because mistakes are 
ever desirable, but because overzeal to select 
material and appliances which forbid a chance for 
mistakes to occur, restricts initiative, reduces 
judgment to a minimum, and compels the use of methods 
which are so remote from the complex situations of 
life that the power gained is of little a v a i l a b i l i t y . 250
And he suggested further:
The problem of the educator is to engage pupils 
in these activities in such ways that while manual 
skill and technical efficiency are gained and immed­
iate satisfaction found in the work, together with 
preparation for later usefulness, these things shall 
be subordinated to education— that is, to intellectual 




3. Work and Play
Horne raised the question whether or not art could remove 
drudgery from work. He also questioned the proposition that 
intrinsic motivation would sufficiently sustain the individual 
through to the completion of certain tasks designated as work:
It is a little difficult to see how work at 
a machine in one of our factories can be art, or 
in the mines, or in a lumber camp. But such work 
has to be done under any economic order. Extrinsic 
motivation seems to remain in many lives most of the 
time and in all lives some of the time.
One of Dewey's major concerns was that work often is
taken "as a mere means for avoiding some penalty, or for
gaining some reward at its conclusion."^53 Rapidly changing
economic patterns caused Dewey to voice alarm at the prospect
of man becoming a robot-like individual, his activities being
divorced from a sense of personal interest. The contribution
made by the individual under this condition remained remote
if not unintelligible. In contrast with work as drudgery,
Dewey viewed work as a creative activity when accompanied
by motivation engaging the emotions and the imagination.
The end was intrinsic to the act or a part of the course of
the act. With intrinsic motivation serving as a stimulus,
the effort required for the completion of a given task was
real rather than artificial.
252Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 267.
253Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 240.
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Dewey attempted to avoid drudgery as a necessary concom­
itant to work. "Activity carried on under conditions of exter­
nal pressure or coercion is not carried on for any significance 
attached to the doing."254
He further elaborated upon man's plight when social con­
ditions make him subservient to the activity or occupation of 
work:
Under unfree economic conditions, this state 
of affairs is bound to exist. Work or industry 
offers little to engage the emotions and the imag­
ination; it is a more or less mechanical series of 
strains. Only the hold which the completion of the 
work has upon a person will keep him going. But 
the end should be intrinsic to the action; it should 
be its end— a part of its own c o u r s e .  ^5
Dewey recognized the terms play and work but did not view 
these as necessarily opposed to one another. His use of the 
term "active occupation" included both play and work. In 
their intrinsic meaning any sharp division between the two 
was due to undesirable social c o n d i t o n s . ^ ^ G  Upon examina­
tion of the two theorists, the difference between work and 
play was in large part due to the time factor which directly 
or indirectly influenced the connection between means and ends. 
The activity of play allows interest to be close at hand 
instead of having a remote result; ". . . activity is its 






However, Dewey cautioned against blind acceptance of this 
statement because such a concept suggested that the action 
of the moment was purely physical and lacking in meaning.
When play activity is supposed to be taken as having no end 
in the sense of directing an idea then the significance of 
the statement regarding play has been lost. "When an activity 
is its own end in the sense that the action of the moment is 
complete in itself, it is purely physical; it has no m e a n i n g . "^58 
The element of play for Dewey was not the most significant 
aspect of his theory as related to living and learning. It 
was not the mere physical movement associated with play.
Rather, it was the attitude which held significance. In play 
there existed an attitude which involved an anticipation of 
outcome or result. Dewey believed this anticipatory attitude 
would, in turn, stimulate present responses.
Dewey continued to resist the notion that work necessarily 
involved subordination of an activity to an ulterior result;
When the fairly remote results of a definite 
character are foreseen and enlist persistent effort 
for their accomplishment, play passes into work.
Like play, it signifies purposeful activity and 
differs not in that activity is subordinated to an 
external result, but in the fact that a longer course 
of activity is occasioned by the idea of a result.
The demand for continuous attention is greater, and 
more intelligence must be shown in selecting and 





In addition to the economic distinction between play and 
work, Dewey made a further contribution in the following com­
ment:
Psychologically, the defining characteristic 
of play is not amusement nor aimlessness. Work is 
psychologically simply an activity which consciously 
includes regard for consequences as a part of itself; 
it becomes constrained labor when the consequences are 
outside the activity as an end to which activity is 
merely a means.261
Horne believed certain work must be undertaken under 
external motivation. In some cases, this represented a 
desirable condition since such an endeavor "may develop [at 
a later time] a sense of intrinsic v a l u e . "262 And Horne was 
probably correct in saying that " . . .  what began as drudgery 
may end as a r t . "263
The Significance of Geography and History
1. Extension of Meaning of Primary Activities
Dewey's emphasis was focused around direct interests of 
life. The extent to which meaning was acquired from any body 
of knowledge was dependent upon the degree to which perceived 
connections were e f f e c t e d . 264 Meaning and the possibility of 
its increment continued to be the focal point for Dewey.
ZGlibid.. pp. 241-242.
2G2Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 268.
2G3ibid.
264Qewey, Democracy and Education, p. 243.
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In Horne's interpretation little attention was directed 
toward Dewey's text and discussion. Instead, Horne presented 
a discussion of the philosophy of idealism. Special consid­
eration, however, was given to the terms "spatial" and 
"temporal«" When he moved to this subject, Horne criticized 
Dewey's analysis of geography and history as studies in the 
curriculum:
The argument takes it for granted that there 
are only two classes of meanings, the spatial of 
geography and the temporal of h i s t o r y . 265
Believing there existed both a nonspatial and a non­
temporal order, Horne suggested a third class of meanings, 
namely the transcendental. Horne believed that since such 
a realm of meaning could not be refuted, it should not be 
assumed that space and time contained all m e a n i n g s . 266 
Although Dewey differentiated between temporal and 
spatial meanings, his theory maintained unity and continuity. 
Dewey was interested in presenting both geography and history 
as rich sources of meanings which were of concern to mankind. 
Information remote and alien to everyday experience failed to 
further perception and meaning and was, therefore, merely a 
mass of unassimilated i n f o r m a t i o n . 267
265Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 275.
ZG^ibid.
267Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 245.
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The educational significance of these subjects was immense 
from Dewey's point of view:
. . . geography and history supply subject 
matter which gives background and outlook, intel­
lectual perspective, to what might otherwise be 
narrow personal actions or mere forms of technical 
skill. With every increase of ability to place 
our own doings in their time and space connections, 
our doings gain in significant c o n t e n t . 26°
When Dewey viewed history and geography as they were
typically taught in school, he cautioned that a diminishing
effect might be the result. Furthermore, he suggested they
might have a deadening effect unless ordinary experience was
enlarged in meaning as the result of relating connections
If geography and history are taught as ready­
made studies which a person studies simply because 
he is sent to school, it easily happens that a large 
number of statements about things remote and alien 
to everyday experience are learned. Activity is 
divided, and two separate worlds are built up, 
occupying activity at divided p e r i o d s . 2 7 0
The following statement made by Horne deserves some
attention relative to an interpretation of Dewey's discussion:
It should be noted that the term geography as 
used by our author evidently covers all the physical 
and natural sciences, like physics, chemistry, 
astronomy, biology, physiology, and the like; while 
the term history likewise covers all the remaining 
types of learning such as, the social, literary, and 
linguistic subjects. Here is an unusual, if not 





27lHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 276.
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When Horne projected the above interpretation as descrip­
tive of Dewey's position, it appeared he made an extension of 
terminology where the terms geography and history were con­
cerned. These terms were not found in Dewey's discussion 
relative to these subjects. Dewey's major emphasis was a 
reinforcement of earlier attempts aimed at presenting what he 
viewed to be the task of education. He asserted:
The task of education. . . is to see to it 
that such activities are performed in such ways 
and under such conditions as render these connections 
as perceptible as possible. To 'learn geography' 
is to gain in power to perceive the spatial, the 
natural, connections of an ordinary act; to 'learn 
history' is essentially to gain power to recognizehuman c o n n e c t i o n s . ^72
2. The Complementary Nature of History and Geography
Horne subscribed to Dewey's complementary view of history 
and geography. "One can readily see the interdependence of 
these two studies. . . . But the interdependence. . . is not 
the same as 'the interdependence of man and n a t u r e . ' " ^ 7 3  
Horne believed man to be dependent on nature yet he did not 
conceive nature as dependent upon m a n . ^74 Horne saw no inter­
dependence between nature and man since it was man who was 
totally dependent on nature. Man must adjust himself to 
nature in order to survive. While Dewey viewed nature as
272Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 246.
273Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 280.
274ibid.
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concerned with this earth, Horne associated nature as tuned 
to a metaphysical sphere. The generative power for nature 
was not in the hands of man.
In the study of both geography and history the human 
emphasis was central to Dewey's discussion. Information 
available from these studies must provide a unification of 
experience and social direction. The approach to such infor­
mation must be in terms of present-lived experience. Other­
wise, Dewey believed the outcome would be but an accrual of 
isolated facts of knowledge possessing little meaning for 
the learner. In the school, geography and history had often 
been accepted in the curriculum simply because it was custom­
ary that they be taught and learned.
It was interesting to note that Horne failed to define 
the function of these two subjects. Neither did he attempt
to present justification for their existence in the school
curriculum. Horne would have rendered a service had he 
elaborated upon the nature and function of geography and 
history. Dewey clearly specified the function of historical 
and geographical subject matter:
. . . it is to enrich and liberate the more 
direct and personal contacts of life by furnishing 
their context, their background and outlook. While 
geography emphasizes the physical side and history 
the social, these are only emphases in a common 
topic, namely the associated life of men. For this 
associated life. . . does not go on in the sky nor
yet in a vacuum. It takes place on the earth. Nature
is the medium of social o c c u r r e n c e s . 275
275j3e(̂ gŷ  Democracy and Education, p. 247.
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The discovery of this function must be employed as a criterion 
for trying and sifting the facts taught and the methods u s e d . 276
Without this view of interdependence as depicted by Dewey 
there could be little unifying effect. Much teaching and study 
of history has lost its vigor because the human emphasis asso­
ciated with history and the natural emphasis associated with 
geography has not been recognized or has been ignored. Dewey 
believed when this condition was permitted to exist "history 
sinks to a listing of dates with an appended inventory of 
events, labeled 'important'; or else it becomes literary 
phantasy— for in purely literary history the natural environ­
ment but stage scenery."277
Dewey considered geography and history as studies best 
suited to be called information studies. They "are the 
information studies par excellence of the s c h o o l . "278 while 
the two were viewed separately in order to identify the 
implications of each, "these subjects are two phases of the 
same living whole, since the life of men in association goes 
on in nature, not as an accidental setting."279
Horne's interpretation was preoccupied with the terms 





280Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 281.
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have objected to Dewey less if the latter had originally stated 
that nature and earth were equivalent only in terms of their 
physical relationship.
Horne like other theorists dealt specifically with the 
logical aspect of subject matter in connection with history 
and geography. His general views on the nature of subject 
matter disregarded the psychological aspect. From the stand­
point of geography and history, Dewey believed a study of 
these should exemplify human association and living. In this 
way, the individual was brought into closer harmony with his 
surroundings, nature, and the world. Individual experience 
was thus enlarged in meaning by seeing connections between 
that which was studied and activity in present living.
Science in the Course of Study
1. The Logical and the Psychological
The terms "logical" and "psychological" had a unique 
meaning in Dewey's use. Speaking of them, Horne noted;
The 'logical' here refers to a mode of arranging 
subject matter in scientific form and to a method of 
teaching subject matter so arranged. Similarly, the 
term 'psychological' is here used to refer to the 
mode of teaching science through utilizing the 
experiences of the learner.281
Horne was helpful when he clarified the meaning of each 
of these terms. Logical refers to the science of correct 
thinking and psychological carries the general meaning which
ZGlibid., p. 295.
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refers to the science of human behavior. Horne believed 
Dewey's usage of these terms "unusual."282 Certainly, a 
different meaning was used by Dewey from that generally 
applied. Attention should be called to the fact that Dewey's 
discussion was concerned primarily with method. Again, the 
psychological approach to method was consistent with his 
earlier discussions of subject matter and the learner.
Failure to recognize the psychological side of presenting 
subject matter resulted in a deposit of information in a 
vacuum.
Dewey's discussion further revealed that he took into 
account the logical implications of knowledge. "Logical 
order is not a form imposed upon what is known; it is the 
proper form of knowledge as perfected."283
Dewey was concerned that subject matter presented in 
its logical or perfected form would result in an isolation 
of science from significant experience. When presented in 
this manner the learner "acquires a technical body of infor­
mation without ability to trace its connections with the 
objects and operations with which he is familiar— often he 
acquires simply a peculiar v o c a b u l a r y . " 2 8 4
282ibid.
283Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 256.
284.^°*Ibid.. p. 257.
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Dewey's concept of the logical order of scientific knowl­
edge was that it represented the perfected form better suited 
for the expert than for the immature or non-expert;
To the non-expert. . . this perfected form 
is a stumbling block. There is a strong tempta­
tion to assume that presenting subject matter in 
its perfect form provides a royal road to learning.
What more natural than to suppose that the immature 
can be saved time and energy, and be protected from 
needless error by commencing where competent inquiries left off?285
Dewey suggested a method which stressed understanding and 
interest rather than the traditional method where instruction 
was largely a matter of presenting large sums of material 
stated in technically correct scientific form. "When learned 
in this condition it remains a body of inert information."286 
In distinction from the logical method, Dewey recognized the 
chronological method. Such a method "begins with the expe­
rience of the learner and develops from that the proper modes 
of scientific treatment."28? This method Dewey also referred 
to as the "psychological" method. The logical method properly 
remained with the expert or specialist, not with the novice 
learner.
The psychological method had an advantage which sur­
passed any apparent loss of time. Dewey saw such a method
ZG^ibid., pp. 256-257. 
ZGGjbid., p. 259. 
287ibid., pp. 257-258.
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as one which de-emphasized mastery of symbolic learning in 
which the learner gained little in the way of meaning. "What 
the pupil learns [from the chronological method] he at least 
u n d e r s t a n d s . "288 Not only would understanding be greater, 
but Dewey also believed the learner was more likely to gain 
more in the way of independent power to deal with material 
within his range thereby avoiding much mental confusion and 
distaste so often associated with subject matter.
Both Horne and Dewey believed the value of the laboratory 
method of teaching science had been overemphasized. Both 
agreed that in spite of the vast amount of equipment required, 
it had generally failed to obtain the desired results. Horne 
stated that in adapting this method, "there was a tendency to 
return to the older method of class d e m o n s t r a t i o n . "289 From 
his discussion, it was obvious that Horne preferred the psy­
chological method over the scientific laboratory as it was 
"intended for the research work of the s p e c i a l i s t . " 2 8 0  g y  
contrast, Dewey believed that while laboratory exercises 
represented a significant improvement over the use of text­
books "arranged upon the deductive plan, [they] do not of 
themselves suffice to meet the n e e d . "281 Further elaborating
ZG^ibid.. p. 258.
288Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 295.
28Qibid.. p. 296.
281oewey, Democracy and Education, p. 259.
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upon the problems associated with the laboratory method,
Dewey emphasized:
Our attention may be devoted to getting 
skill in technical manipulation without reference 
to the connection of laboratory exercises with a 
problem belonging to subject matter. There is some­
times a ritual of laboratory instruction as well asof heathen r e l i g i o n . 292
Although in disagreement with Dewey's use of the term 
"psychological," Horne's comments revealed he was in general 
agreement with Dewey. Horne believed the psychological 
method needed to be supplemented by the logical, "in the 
case of the novice as well as the e x p e r t . "293
Further emphasizing the importance of the psychological 
approach, Horne stated:
A little psychological learning will carry 
much logical learning. A little first hand expe­
rience of the matter in question will carry much 
vicarious experience. But it is not necessary that 
by the use of the experimental method the pupil find 
out everything for himself and by reflection logically 
organize for himself all he has learned. The psy­
chological method alone is too slow, the logical method
alone is too a b s t r a c t . 294
An analysis of Horne's comments reveals that differences 
may be identified when a consideration is given to emphasis 
and stress upon scientific learning. Dewey placed strong 
emphasis upon method of instruction and quality of learning 
for the pupil. Horne attempted to combine both quality and
292Ibid.
2^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 296,
294ibid.
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quantity by effecting a merger between the psychological 
approach and the logical method of instruction:
And pupils do need to know much about our 
world that, for lack of time, they can not discover 
for themselves. We could never get such knowledge 
by the psychological method a l o n e . ^95
The vast scientific knowledge compiled as the product of
history remained a vital concern to Horne. He held a greater
concern for the quantitative aspect of scientific knowledge,
while Dewey continued to stress qualitative factors with
emphasis upon connections, meanings, and intellectual content.
2. Naturalism and Humanism in Education
On these topics Horne wrote a defense of the humanities. 
Dewey is sharply criticized. For example, "This short sec­
tion seems to have been an a f t e r t h o u g h t . Further, "The 
purpose is obviously to enhance regard for the sciences in 
the course of s t u d y . " ^ 9 ?  And he concluded that Dewey failed 
to provide adequate claims for the humanities in the course 
of study.
Dewey correctly noted our educational tradition has long 
fostered dissension between science and literature. Dewey did 
not declare that science held greater humanistic qualities than
ZS^ibid.
2 9 * I b i d . . p .  3 1 0 .
29?Ibid.
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did literature for neither of these disciplines rightly pos­
sessed a monopoly. He stated:
But the assumption, from whatever side, that 
language and literary products are exclusively 
humanistic in quality, and that science is purely 
physical in import, is a false notion which tends 
to cripple the educational use of both studies.
Human life does not occur in a vacuum, nor is 
nature a mere stage setting for the enactment ofits drama.298
Obviously, the natural sciences were held in high esteem
by Dewey since he viewed man's life as inseparable from the
processes of nature;
Man's power of deliberate control of his own 
affairs depends upon ability to direct natural 
energies to use; an ability which is in turn 
dependent upon insight into nature's processes. ^9
Horne thought Dewey held literary studies in low esteem.
However, Dewey merely attempted to express a caution about
the way these subjects, as well as science, had traditionally
been taught. Specifically, Dewey recognized certain kinds of
teaching which were damaging for both the humanities and the
sciences. He maintained;
That science may be taught as a set of formal 
and technical exercises is only too true. This 
happens whenever information about the world is made 
an end in itself. The failure of such instruction 
to procure culture is not, however, evidence of the 
antitheses of natural knowledge of humanistic concern, 
but evidence of a wrong educational attitude. . . . 
humanistic studies when set in opposition to study of
2^®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 267.
29*lbid.
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nature are hampered. They tend to reduce themselves 
to exclusively literary and linguistic studies, which 
in turn tend to shrink to 'the classics.'"300
In its proper context, Dewey's appeal was to avoid iso­
lating the two disciplines, thus bringing each into close 
association with the other so that together they would pro­
mote an education consistent with the industrial era and 
healthy for a democratic society.
Furthermore, Dewey did not attempt to de-huraanize the 
humanities. He sought to promote humanistic qualities in all 
subjects. Consistent with his view of human experience in 
evolution, Dewey believed new insights were possible in both 
the scientific and social realms. Effecting increased human­
istic attitudes was an imperative, he believed, if a greater 
segment of mankind was to benefit from an industrial, demo­
cratic social order.
Dewey did not intend to subordinate the humanities. He 
contended, however, that scientific studies possessed neglected 
potential :
To be aware of the medium in which social inter­
course goes on, and of the means and obstacles to its 
progressive development is to be in command of a 
knowledge which is thoroughly humanistic in quality.
One who is ignorant of the history of science is 
ignorant of the struggles by which mankind has passed 
from routine and caprice, from superstitious subjection 





Dewey stressed the historical condition which he believed 
prompted a dichotomy between the sciences and the humanities. 
Instruction in institutions of higher learning was especially 
identified as having promoted a breach between these two 
disciplines. With little regard for social implications, the 
sciences had been viewed and treated as a body of knowledge 
best suited for providing factual information about the phys­
ical world and physical things. The humanities on the other 
hand had historically been viewed and treated as that realm 
of study sufficient to supply only knowledge about man and 
his existence. Dewey saw here another destructive dualism;
There exists an educational tradition which 
opposes science to literature and history in the 
curriculum. The quarrel between the representa­
tives of the two interests is easily explicable 
historically. Literature and language and a 
literary philosophy were entrenched in all higher 
institutions of learning before experimental science 
came into b e i n g . 3^2
Dewey charged that attitudes accrued from the historic 
role of the humanities had come to represent a leisured class 
representative of an aristocratic group:
Dislike to employ scientific knowledge as it 
functions in men's occupations is itself a survival 
of an aristocratic culture. The notion that 'applied' 
knowledge is somehow less worthy than 'pure' knowledge, 
was natural to a society in which all useful work was 
performed by slaves and serfs, and in which industry 





Dewey's discussion of this issue was most significant to 
any interpretation of Democracy and Education since the points 
stressed contained essential characteristics of a philosophy 
of education in a democratic society.
Simply to state, "There may be a science of everything, 
but anything is more than the science of it,"304 hardly 
seemed representative of an adequate assessment of the points 
stressed by Dewey. Furthermore, Horne failed to submit a 
definition or characterization of humanities in the curriculum. 
Neither did he elaborate upon the "liberating" value inherent 
in such studies.
Dewey stressed the importance of humanistic studies when 
they were viewed as complements with the study of nature. He 
also provided a generalization descriptive of his definition 
of a study of the humanities:
Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because 
it is about human products in the past, but because 
of what it does in liberating human intelligence and 
human sympathy. Any subject matter which accomplishes 
this result is humane, and any subject matter which 
does not accomplish it is not even educational.305
It was not Dewey's purpose to demean the humanities as
subject matter. However, it was his purpose to criticize the
practice of isolating subjects from one another. His search
was for a method whereby a greater segment of society might
benefit from the fruits of democracy— intellectually, socially,
and economically.
^O^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 311.




1. The Nature of Realization or Appreciation
Herein Horne presented a general interpretation of Dewey's 
theory and questioned the adequacy of the letter's position;
To Dr. Dewey likings become values only when 
they are intelligent. When what we like is seen 
to have desirable connections and consequences, it 
is a value. It is not likings that are values but 
intelligent likings. A thing has value when it is 
both felt as a value and seen to be valuable.
Horne believed values were identified by Dewey only as 
these were couched in forms of human experience; natural 
process lacked value apart from man since it lacked intel­
ligence. Horne concluded that values for Dewey were vested 
only in the human, social, and subjective realms. Beyond 
man, values did not exist.2
Dewey did not include a discussion of nature apart from 
man. Horne did not in his "comments" consider Dewey's position




adequate, and, surprisingly, used an anti-dualistic argument 
against Dewey. "If man has value, and nature has none, then 
there is discontinuity between the two."3 Horne's emphasis 
was in sharp contrast as compared with Dewey. The standard 
of value for Dewey was man-centered while the position favored 
by Horne tended to diminish man. Further, Horne said, "man 
does not create value as much as discover preexistent v a l u e . "4 
Viewed from Horne's point of view, man does not create but 
rather his task is one of discovering values in those elements 
which naturally possess value "inherent in the universe of 
reality."5
Horne's interpretation of values was one clearly con­
trasting the idealistic and pragmatic positions. Horne's 
posture again emphasized the importance of metaphysics. By 
contrast, Dewey presented a theory in which the individual 
in the course of human experience and concrete situations 
determined the measure of value. Dewey warned on this occasion, 
as in earlier discussion, of the danger of allowing symbols 
to supersede that of which they are representative;
. . . there is always a danger that symbols 
will not be truly representative; . . . .  Formal 
education is peculiarly exposed to this danger, 





mere bookishness, what is popularly termed the 
academic, too often comes with it.6
Greater attention to individuality and personal expe­
rience is evident in Dewey’s theory when compared to that of 
Horne.
Horne suggested values ought to be reality-centered.7 
Reality portrayed by Horne was already inherent in the uni­
verse and pointed toward the metaphysical.
Dewey was also vitally concerned that appreciation of 
values be realized through the medium of experience. Without 
this type of appreciation, values remained purely symbolic 
and void of translation into reality. He elaborated;
His ’knowledge’ is second-handed; it is only 
a knowledge that others prize. . . as an excellence, 
and esteem him in the degree in which he exhibits it.
Thus there grows up a split between a person’s pro­
fessed standards and his actual ones. . . the result 
is a kind of unconscious hypocrisy, an instability of 
disposition. He may be able to recite, but the 
recital is a mechanical rehearsal. The formation of 
habits is a purely mechanical thing unless habits 
are also tastes— habitual modes of preference and 
esteem, an effective sense of e x c e l l e n c e . 8
Dewey recognized that much of our experience was indirect. 
"All language, all symbols, are implements of an indirect expe­
rience; in technical language the experience which is procured 
by their means is ’mediated.’"9 Symbols in Dewey’s theory
®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 272.
7Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.
®Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 275-276.
9Ibid., p. 272.
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represented intermediate agents and experience so achieved
"stands in contrast with an immediate, direct experience. . .
instead of through the intervention of representative media."10
Dewey noted a tendency to adopt purely representative forms.
These, then, were allowed to decrease the sphere of direct
appreciation.il He cautioned:
. . . in other words, the tendency to assume 
that pupils have a foundation of direct realiza­
tion of situations is sufficient for the super­
structure of representative experience erected by 
formulated school studies. Sufficient direct 
experience is even more a matter of quality; it 
must be of a sort to connect readily and fruit­
fully with the symbolic material of instruction.1%
While not denying the usefulness of the symbolic, Dewey 
insisted that connections be effected between the direct expe­
rience and symbolic material. In schools, genuine situations 
must be provided so as to encourage personal participation.
Only in this way would the import of the problems and materi­
als submitted be conveyed.
Dewey did not deny the value of imagination; on the con­
trary, he encouraged an active engagement of the imagination. 
The depth and scope of Dewey's significant appraisal of the 
negative and positive aspects of imagination are clear:
lOlbid.
^ Ibid., p. 273.
l^Ibid.
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The imagination is the medium of appreciation 
in every field. The engagement of the imagination 
is the only thing that makes any activity more than 
mechanical. Unfortunately, it is too customary to 
identify the imaginative with the imaginary, rather 
than with a warm and intimate taking in of the full 
scope of the situation. This leads to an exaggerated 
estimate of. . . fanciful symbols, verse, and some­
thing labeled 'Fine Arts,' as agencies for developing 
imagination and appreciation. Meantime mind-wandering 
and wayward fancy are nothing but the unsuppressible 
imagination cut loose from concern with what is done.^^
Placed in its proper frame of reference, Dewey viewed 
the role of the imagination and subsequent responses as 
valuable instruments promoting appreciation.
The term "value" as used by Dewey was forward looking 
and future oriented. Values were not found in some form of 
universal existence waiting discovery. Dewey suggested 
values were realized at that point where thought and action, 
theory and practice, came together. Conclusion of previous 
inquiry was the source of judgments relative to value but such 
conclusions were valuable only as they continued to be instru­
mental in present and future conditions and problems.
Two meanings of the term "value" were suggested by Dewey. 
These he identified as (1) the appreciative, having intrinsic 
value, and (2) the instrumental, distinctively characteristic 
as an intellectual act— to valuate.14 yet, Dewey cautioned 




be divided thus creating an isolation of the one against the 
other. "But every subject at some phase of its development 
should possess, what is for the individual concerned with it, 
an aesthetic quality.
The criterion for determining the worth of instrumental 
values in studies was the contribution these made to immedi­
ate, intrinsic values.16 Furthermore, Dewey questioned the 
practice of assigning separate values to the different subjects 
while at the same time regarding the curriculum as an aggregate 
of segregated values. This condition he believed was the 
result of an isolation of social groups and classes.1? To 
avoid this condition democratic education is necessary.
"Hence it is the business of education in a democratic social 
group to struggle against this isolation in order that the 
various interests may reenforce and play into one another."IB
Horne was skeptical of Dewey's theory which "held that 
we can not appreciate what we have not experienced directly 
. . . that without basic direct experience we lack the organs 





l^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.
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Horne believed, to achieve an appreciative experience vicar­
iously, apart from direct experiences.
Dewey was sensitive to appreciative experience. However, 
he did not wish to focus attention upon "appreciation" as 
something merely academic— not sufficiently connected with 
material of instruction. Securing a sense of direct apprec­
iation held greater meaning for Dewey. In addition to 
increased personal meaning, appreciation gained directly held 
far greater value in forming present habits and dispositions 
as well as making a contribution to future enrichment of activ­
ity.
Were it not for the accompanying play of 
imagination, there would be no road from a direct 
activity to representative knowledge; for it is 
by imagination that symbols are translated over 
into direct meaning and integrated with a narrower 
activity so as to expand and enrich it.^O
2. The Valuation of Studies
Horne identified a dualism and a lack of harmony in 
Dewey's theory of values. This, Horne believed was true due 
to an incompatibility between the pragmatic theory of ideas 
and Dewey's theory of value. From Dewey's point of view,
Horne noted:
An idea has truth only if it is a good 
instrument in controlling a situation. But an 
experience has value in itself or because it 
leads to an experience having value in i t s e l f . 21
20Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 278.
^Iflorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 335.
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Furthermore, Horne failed to take into consideration the ele­
ment of continuity inherent in the process of experience as 
repeatedly presented by Dewey.
"To value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but 
secondarily it means to apprize, to e s t i m a t e . P a s s i n g  
judgment upon the nature and amount of a given value as com­
pared with something else was a vital act when Dewey made an 
assessment of values.23 Both the instrumental and apprecia­
tive were a part of Dewey's theory. One was often found to 
complement the other either presently or at some future time. 
The act of judgment about which Dewey wrote suggested there 
were times when it became necessary to "valuate or evalu­
ate. "24
The distinction coincides with that some­
times made between intrinsic and instrumental 
values. Intrinsic values are not objects of 
judgment, they cannot (as intrinsic) be com­
pared, or regarded as greater and less, better 
or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is 
invaluable, it is neither more nor less than any
other invaluable.25
In his interpretation of Dewey's writing, Horne accurately 
identified the element of immediacy implicit in Dewey's theory 
of values. For Dewey, the nature and worth of values were
22Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 279,




relative to time and occasion. He recognized the appreciative 
condition of values. At the same time instrumentalism played 
a significant role in determining the efficacy of a value. 
Dewey emphasized;
If a man has just eaten, or if he is well 
fed generally and the opportunity to hear music 
is a rarity, he will probably prefer the music to 
eating. In the given situation that will render 
the greater contribution. If he is starving, or 
if he is satiated with music. . . , he will 
naturally judge food to have the greater worth.26
Horne detected the criterion of experience as a control­
ling factor when Dewey established the worth of a value. It 
has "value in itself or because it leads to an experience 
having value in itself."2?
Genuine appreciation, for Dewey, was merely an elaborate 
name for the realizing of a thing as the result of an idea 
"coming home to one," or "really taking it in."28 The prag­
matic theory of ideas was evident when Dewey stated: " . . .
the only way to appreciate what is meant by a direct experi­
ence of a thing is by having it."29
There was in Dewey's theory evidence of a sincere con­
cern with respect to educational values and the notion held
26]
Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 334.
>Ibid., p. 280. 
27
28Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 272.
Ẑ Ibid.
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by some theorists that there were degrees of value. It was 
at this point that the basic tenet of his doctrine was noted:
We cannot establish a hierarchy of values 
among studies. It is futile to attempt to arrange 
them in an order, beginning with one having least 
worth and going on to that of maximum value. In­
sofar as any study has a unique or irreplaceable 
function in experience, insofar as it marks a 
characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is 
intrinsic or incomparable. . . the only ultimate 
value which can be set up is just the process of 
living itself.
Concerning the curriculum, Dewey did not view studies and 
activities as means subordinated to an end.
. . . it is the whole of which they are 
ingredients. . . appreciation means that every 
study in one of its aspects ought to have just 
such ultimate significance. It is as true of 
arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some place 
and at some time it ought to be a good to be 
appreciated on its own account— just as an 
enjoyable experience. . . .31
Horne's interpretation relative to Dewey's theory of 
value represented a contribution in that it provided a keen 
insight which to the casual observer might otherwise go 
undetected. Horne noted Dewey's theory of value held to 
ultimate, intrinsic worth which projected an inconsistency 
with the basic pragmatic doctrine of ideas.
Although Dewey differentiated between the intrinsic and 




had the "greater instrumental value."3% The pragmatic view 
has found it expedient to weigh values in terms of their rela­
tive contribution.
Horne interpreted the views presented by Dewey on the 
subject of values as ultimately eliminating the distinction 
between instrumental and the intrinsic value. While this 
distinction was maintained by Dewey, Horne was correct when 
he detected an eventual merger of the two kinds of value. 
Further, he recognized that "while intrinsic values do not 
merge into instrumental values, instrumental values do merge 
into intrinsic values."33
The justifying trait of an intrinsic value was found in 
its ability to contribute to future use according to Dewey:
For we cannot stop asking the question about 
an instrumental good, one whose value lies in its 
being good for something, unless there is at some 
point something intrinsically good, good for itself.34
Evidence of a merger of instrumental value into the
intrinsic appeared when Dewey stated: "An instrumental
value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an
end."35 if the immediate value was warranted by sufficient
motive, Dewey saw no need for further justification.
S^ibid., p. 284.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 335.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 283.
S^Ibid., p. 284.
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Consciousness of the end was irrelevant. The response to an 
act or to the material furnished by a given subject may serve 
as an adequate function in the individual's life.^^ He 
viewed value per se as unsound "unless teacher or pupil can 
point out some definite assignable future use to which it is 
to be put. . . ."37
Relative value plus "consciousness of connection"38 
represented for Dewey the wisest course when determining 
criteria of value:
In general what is desirable is that a topic 
be presented in such a way that it either have an 
immediate value, and require no justification, or 
else be perceived to be a means of achieving some­
thing of intrinsic value.39
Horne insisted that the distinction between the two 
kinds of value as conceived by Dewey ultimately became vague 
if not inconsistent. From the idealist's point of view, the 
pragmatic theory, as presented by Dewey, was inadequate in 
that no sound base was afforded upon which to make sound 
judgments relative to values and valuing. Viewed from the 
pragmatic frame of reference the aspect of universality was 






especially as these related to educational values consistent
with sound pedagogical practice.
Dewey summarized his theory of values and the distinction
between intrinsic and instrumental values:
Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in 
all their variety in experience is the only criterion 
for determining the worth of instrumental and derived 
values in studies.40
3. The Segregation and Organization of Values
Dewey believed a general classification of values served 
a purpose in that it provided the means to a wide survey of 
aims in the educational e n t e r p r i s e . 41 However, he did not 
favor a classification of values which tended to segregate 
educational values. Isolation of educational values repre­
sented a grave mistake. He believed the outcome of such a 
condition created a "regard [for] these values as ultimate 
ends to which the concrete satisfactions of experience are
subordinate."42
/
Horne suggested Dewey ran the risk of segregating values 
from each other.43 The observation made by Horne resulted 
because Dewey found justification for a general classifica­
tion of values. A study of Dewey's text concerning this
4Qjbid., p. 292.
4 1 l b i d . , p. 285.
*2ibid.
4^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 344.
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subject revealed that the nature of his classification was 
general, not specific and concrete. "They are nothing but 
generalizations.
Dewey recognized the potential danger inherent in a 
segregation of educational values. An avoidance of such a 
pitfall was a major objective in developing his theory of 
values. He rejected the idea that different subjects possess 
a unique kind of value. This concept represented a fallacy 
according to Dewey:
To regard such things as standards for the 
valuation of concrete topics and process of edu­
cation is to subordinate to an abstraction the 
concrete facts from which the abstraction is 
derived. They are not in any true sense standards 
of valuation;. . .
This practice which Dewey described as prevalent meant 
the curriculum would represent merely a gathering together 
of various studies until a sufficient variety of independent 
values had been assembled.^6
The construction of such a curriculum, Dewey noted, con-
/
tained the notion that there existed a number of separate ends 
to be reached, and that various studies could be evaluated by 
referring each study to its respective e n d . 47




This attitude toward subject matter was further opposed 
by Dewey since the view suggested that educative powers inher­
ently resided in the subject irrespective of any functional 
power. Thus the subject received its "rigid justification."48 
"If they do not operate, the blame is put not on the subject 
as taught, but on the indifference and recalcitrancy of pupils."49 
From the numerous references made by Dewey on this point 
there appeared to be sufficient evidence to negate the charge 
of segregating values. The interpretation presented by Horne 
appeared invalid in view of the extensive discussion by 
Dewey in support of his theory. For Dewey, continuity of 
experience remained a major focus in his doctrine of values. 
Moreover, he believed:
The point at issue in a theory of educational 
value is then the unity of integrity of experience. 
Educationally, the question concerns that organiza­
tion of schools, materials, and methods which 
operate to achieve breadth and richness of experi­
ence.^0
A further point which contained significant educational 
implications in Dewey's philosophy was his distinction between 
the appreciative and instrumental values as these related to 





We must not, however, divide the studies of 
the curriculum into the appreciative, those con­
cerned with intrinsic value, and the instrumental, 
concerned with those which are of value or ends 
beyond themselves.51
Dewey's analysis of values revealed that ultimately the 
intrinsic attribute of a value was the determining factor in 
establishing the worth of any value. He contended:
Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in 
all their variety in experience is the only criterion 
for determining the worth of instrumental and derived 
values in studies.52
The text of Dewey sufficiently supported his claim that 
he had not segregated values as was charged by Horne. Dewey 
did adopt a general classification of values. Yet, a study 
of his entire discussion revealed that these were to be held 
as tentative and provisional. His claim that values should 
be organized was not a violation of his concept regarding 
values. Values were separated only to the extent that classi­
fication enabled Dewey to further analyze and project his 
theory relative to specific traits of values:
But every subject at some phase of its 
development should possess, what is for the 
individual concerned with it, an aestheticquality.53
From the above statement, it may be concluded that the 





the extent to which intrinsic values have been enhanced, 
encouraged, and promoted.
Labor and Leisure 
1, The Origin of the Opposition
Horne noted that Dewey discounted the dualistic view of 
labor and leisure projected by Aristotle. Such a view cre­
ated a division within social life. Horne questioned Dewey's 
habit of rejecting psychological and philosophical theories 
by recourse to their presumed social implications.54
Horne also seriously questioned Dewey's argument that 
Aristotle held the views he did simply because he found it 
necessary to rationalize the kind of society in which he 
lived.55 Horne continued his interpretation by identifying 
another view which he believed was questionable in Dewey's 
analysis. He stated;
It is also suggested that views which were 
the effect of one kind of society are no longer 
tenable when the social pattern changes. Both 
of these positions are open to question.56
In another instance, Horne stated, "Modern conditions
themselves may and do need c h a n g i n g .  "57 this point, Horne





appeared to recognize the necessity for considering and com­
paring characteristic social conditions of the Greek society 
with that of contemporary social conditions. The point Horne 
stressed was that man may subscribe to certain views apart 
from economic and social conditions of which he is a part.
Yet, further study revealed Horne did not believe the latter 
condition was ever completely effected. Additional discussion 
made clear his recognition that man's thinking was never com­
pletely independent of present social life:
It is only to suggest that a man's thinking 
is not wholly dependent upon the time in which he 
lives. Some thinking is rationalizing, conformative; 
some thinking is creative; reformative.58
Horne's remarks relative to thought and social conditions 
found in a particular period failed to project a significant 
disagreement between Horne and Dewey. Conditions and cir­
cumstances described by Horne did not represent disharmony 
with the essential discussion presented in Dewey's text. 
Horne's interpretation did not represent an analysis of the 
specific concerns as expressed by Dewey. Some of Horne's 
discussion was not relevant to Dewey's remarks.
Dewey specifically called attention to social conditions 
promoting isolation of aims and values in education that pro­
duced a division within social life. He expressed concern 
toward the resulting condition which he believed had prompted
58Ibid., p. 351.
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one type of education for useful labor and another type for 
those deemed worthy for the life of leisure. Such a condi­
tion, Dewey believed, reflected a serious division within 
social life.59 The effect of this philosophical attitude 
had served to produce a dichotomy and a serious antithesis 
in educational theory and practice. Dewey expressed opposi­
tion to this condition primarily because ultimately society 
would be further divided. He believed the business of edu­
cation was not to promote such a conflict, but rather the 
proper aims of education should and could do much toward 
promoting values of both labor and leisure.
The impact of Dewey's discussion at this point was noted 
when he identified the nature and cause for such a distinction 
as well as the isolation of educational aims and values. The 
circumstances leading to and promoting what Dewey viewed as 
a dichotomy would be traced to historical and social atti­
tudes ;
These general considerations are amply borne 
out by the historical development of educational 
philosophy. The separation of liberal education 
from professional and industrial education goes 
back to the time of the Greeks, and was formulated 
expressly on the basis of a division of classes 
into those who had to labor for a living and those 
who were relieved from this necessity.60
59Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 293.
G°Ibid., p. 294.
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Dewey continued his assertion that the identification of 
work with material interests and leisure with ideal interests 
was a social product and a reflection of the society in which 
such an attitude was permitted to exist;
Only when a division of these interests 
coincides with a division of an inferior and a 
superior social class will preparation for useful 
work be looked down upon with contempt as an 
unworthy thing: a fact which prepares one for
the conclusion that the rigid identification of 
work with material interest, and leisure with 
ideal interests is itself a social p r o d u c t . 61
Dewey believed the ideas found in Greek thought had per­
mitted the social conditions described above to have little 
justification and no attempt was made to rationalize them.
By contrast, Horne preferred to provide some justification 
for the Greek thought which Dewey identified as the histor­
ical factor that had laid the basis for isolation of aims 
and values:
Now thinking that arises under one set of 
social conditions may be true as representing ideals 
and so may carry over to other social conditions 
unlike themselves.62
In the broadest sense, a contribution was made by Horne 
when he emphasized the necessity of considering existing 
social conditions. While he recognized changing ideas and 
new concepts to be a part of historical developments, Horne
^^Ibid.
62Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 351.
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placed the greater emphasis upon changing intellectual con­
ditions as accounting for the validity of new patterns of 
thought. Illustrating this position, Horne stated:
Ideas arising under conditions of slavery 
may have truth under conditions of freedom.
Aristotle's conception of the soul may have 
validity under modern democratic conditions;. . . .
It is no refutation of his psychology to say we 
no longer believe in slavery.°3
Much of the disparity existing on the subject of liberal 
and technical education was due to the definition of these 
terms. An examination of the discussion by both Horne and 
Dewey strongly suggested this was the case. This is not to 
imply that they agreed on a philosophical definition. For 
Dewey these terms implied two types of education as well as 
two modes of occupation. Any discussion or planning relative 
to education in a democratic society necessarily meant a 
rejection of this framework from Dewey's point of view. Such 
a rejection also represented one of the basic elements which 
served to differentiate between the pragmatic theory of edu­
cation and that traditionally held by the idealist.
The distinction noted by Dewey held far greater signif­
icance and concern than was revealed in Horne's interpretation 
of this subject. A clear distinction between the two types 
of studies was a proper and necessary one, according to 




servitude nor did it suggest a social division culminating 
in an inferior and superior class. Indeed, a separate iden­
tification in terms of education was desirable even in a 
modern democratic society. Horne declared:
The distinction between them is not wiped 
out by the extinction of Greek slavery. A liberal 
education is no longer intended for freemen; it is 
still that which makes men free. A technical edu­
cation is no longer that intended for slaves; it 
is still that which enables men to earn a betterliving.65
The educational implications of liberal or technical 
education were not included in Horne's interpretation. There 
was in Horne's view, however, sufficient evidence to support 
two types of education. Horne believed Dewey expressed too 
great an alarm relative to this subject. Dewey believed this 
dualism resulted in unfavorable educational practices. He 
also believed certain negative aspects of social and economic 
affairs were the product of this arrangement.
Voicing strong objections to the maintenance of a strict 
distinction between a liberal and a technical education, Dewey 
emphasized:
Individually and collectively there is a 
gulf between merely living and living worthily.
Means are menial, the serviceable is servile.
To these two modes of occupation, with their 
distinction of servile and free activities 
(or 'arts') correspond two types of education ; 
the base or mechanical and the liberal or 
intellectual.6 6
G^Ibid.
G^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 296.
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Dewey rejected the notion that certain individuals, 
because of suitability, ought to be trained for practical 
endeavors— for doing. A dualistic absurdity was furthered 
when Dewey noted that some, due to a superior intellectual 
capacity, should, presumably, be nurtured in a liberal edu­
cation— to know:
Liberal education aims to train intelligence 
for its proper office: to know. The less this
knowledge has to do with practical affairs, with 
making or producing, the more adequately it engages 
intelligence.67
Dewey further noted that no justification was required 
for the "knowing" or information possessed by the individual 
deemed worthy of the purely intellectual life. He stated:
In knowing, in the life of theory, reason 
finds its own full manifestation; knowing for the 
sake of knowing irrespective of any application is 
alone independent, or self-sufficing. . . education 
that makes for power to know as an end in itself, 
without reference to the practice of even civic 
duties, is truly liberal or free.68
Horne did not believe a liberal education necessarily 
represented the antithesis of professional or technical 
education. Indeed, he affirmed the value of liberal tra­
dition first, with technical education to be built upon these 
studies. Thus, Horne viewed liberal studies as the base of 
future technical studies while at the same time serving as a 




Very likely each man’s education should be 
liberal at the base and technical at the apex, but 
the conclusion does not follow automatically from 
the change from Greek aristocratic to modern demo­
cratic conditions.69
Further discussion by Horne did not consider the exis­
tence of traditional divisions of social class. Probably 
he failed to assess adequately this condition which Dewey 
recognized as historical fact.
Dewey viewed the habituation and technical skill which 
accrued as the products of mere training as deplorable since 
these generally were not accompanied with understanding and 
were often void of reflective thought and choice of action;
This training. . . operates through repetition 
and assiduity in application, not through awakening 
and nurturing thought. Liberal education aims to 
train intelligence for its proper office: to know.'"
In the analysis presented by Horne no description was 
provided of the conditions whereby men might be free. Fur­
thermore, he did not specify what contribution should be 
made by a liberal education. That which made men free 
remained his definition of a liberal education. By contrast, 
Dewey was more realistic. The elements of choice and active 
participation were closely bound to his philosophy of liberal 
and technical education. From Dewey’s point of view, the 
professional or vocational school might be liberal or illiberal.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 352
7 0Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 296.
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At the same time, the liberal arts curriculum might be illib­
eral and would be illiberal insofar as it was permeated with 
a narrow sectarian bias, or employed methods of mere mass 
appeal. In other words, any study or activity when reduced 
to the level of drudgery and routine, or which failed to 
awaken-independent thought and imaginative choice had attained 
the characteristics of the label, "illiberal."
2. The Present Situation
Dewey's social-economic criticism is sharp. For Horne, 
Dewey was a radical. Horne's personal belief was that Dewey 
had gone too far and too fast in his recommendations for 
economic reorganization of s o c i e t y . H e  observed that;
. . . Dr. Dewey is revolutionary in his aim 
but not in his method. He aims at an industrial 
democracy but his method is that of educational 
reform. An education that could give us an 
industrial democracy might mean either a modified 
capitalism or the overthrow of c a p i t a l i s m . ^2
In another instance, Horne stated: "The objectives
of Dr. Dewey are similar to those of Soviet Russia; his 
'ideology' and methodology are d i f f e r e n t . A n d  Horne 
raised another basic objection:




Historically, he [Dewe^ holds that society 
has made our schools; but he recommends for the 
future that our schools make our society. The 
schools work with the young generation; they are 
supported by adult society; they reflect the adult 
society that supports them. How can they do other 
than continue the type of society in which adults 
believe? The adults live where the economic 
problems are, where the changes are going on.'^
This statement represents the conservative philosophy.
As he viewed the role of the school, Horne seemed to express 
a note of resignation. A break from traditional social 
patterns seemed highly unlikely and possibly undesirable in 
the scheme projected by him. The school remained a passive 
agent of society, particularly the society composed of and 
maintained by adults. The adult world had prevailed and 
would continue to do so.
Dewey recognized social change as inevitable and con­
sistent with an emerging scientific and technological era. 
This represents the very core of Dewey's concern. He 
remained steadfast in his belief that dehumanization and 
alienation of the individual need not result if intelligent 
planning and thought accompanied social and economic reform. 
Scientific thought was but a form of learning which had grown 
out of the history of man's interaction with the world. This 
type of learning, Dewey believed enabled men to reconstruct 
and further their understanding of society and themselves. 
Clearly a distinctive feature of Dewey's philosophy was his
^^Ibid., p. 359.
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persuasion that social reform could be achieved by the appli­
cation of scientific values. These, he insisted, were not 
antagonistic, but rather were complementary to and consistent 
with those values included in the democratic tradition. Dewey 
denied our national problems were the necessary outcome of 
scientific knowledge and practical achievement. Such a 
position, Dewey believed, was an error;
. . . the inferiority and subordination of 
mere skill in performance and mere accumulation 
of external products to understanding, sympathy 
of appreciation, and free play of ideas. If there 
was an error, it lay in assuming the necessary 
separation of the two: in supposing that there
is a natural divorce between efficiency in pro­
ducing commodities and rendering service, and 
self-directive thought. . . .75
Present and future projections in Dewey's theory did call 
for fundamental change in the social arena. The school was 
assigned the role of social and economic change. Dewey 
further recognized that far more was required than a mere 
correction of Aristotle's theoretical assumption. No longer 
could the social state of affairs which had generated such a 
concept be tolerated. Neither could the Greek philosophy of 
life be transcended by a mere shifting of theoretical symbols 
suggestive of the free, the rational, and the w o r t h y : 76
75Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 299.
76Ibid., pp. 299-300.
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Important as these theoretical and emotional 
changes are, their importance consists in their 
being turned to account in the development of a 
truly democratic society, a society in which all 
share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy 
leisure.77
In one instance, Horne suggested that Dewey had given 
prime consideration to both social and economic factors 
especially as he viewed these in the light of new patterns 
yet to be formed as a result of science and technology. In 
another instance, Horne suggested Dewey had gone too far in 
defining the role of the school as constituting a leadership 
position. In short, Horne questioned the validity of both 
aim and method as he interpreted Dewey's theory. In reality, 
Dewey had taken into account both cultural changes and edu­
cational reform as he viewed emerging conditions which he 
believed necessitated change. Educational change envisioned 
by Dewey was one which was harmonious with societal develop­
ments. The following statement is indicative of his belief 
in this concept;
It is not mere change in the concept of 
culture— or a liberal mind— and social service 
which requires an educational reorganization; 
but the educational transformation is needed to 
give full and explicit effect to the changes 
implied in social life.78
7 7 l b i d . ,  p. 300.
^®Ibid.
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There was implicit in Dewey a definite rejection of psy­
chological and political distinctions which had traditionally 
promoted a dualism of thought. Educationally, such a division 
had effected a distinction between a liberal education devoted 
to a life of leisure and knowing for its own sake and the use­
ful or practical training void of intellectual content.
Dewey recognized these did not exist in pure form, but he was 
concerned. "It would be hard to find a subject in the curric­
ulum within which there are not found evil results of a compro­
mise between the two opposed ideals."80
To the extent that a compromise did exist, Dewey believed
educational values and human life had been depreciated. The
historic distinction accompanied with compromise tended to 
"reduce the efficacy of the educational measures."81
Intellectual and Practical Studies
1. The Opposition of Experience and True Knowledge
Relative to this segment of Dewey's text, Horne made the 
following statement;
Again, let it be noted that Dr. Dewey is 
utilizing the genetic mode of refutation. The 
practical and intellectual should not be opposed




to each other because the social conditions under 
which the opposition arose have changed.82
Horne continued to disagree with Dewey. There was in 
Horne's comments an obvious skepticism when he assessed 
Dewey's account of the opposition between intellectual and 
practical studies. The incongruency noted by Horne in Dewey's 
theoretical discussion was invalid essentially for the same 
reason as the dualism Dewey projected in the former chapter 
pertaining to labor and leisure. Horne insisted that social 
conditions had changed sufficiently so that no longer was the 
historic situation relevant as a problem confronting educa­
tional theories. Horne believed the condition which earlier 
presented a problem had now somehow been solved and that no 
longer should the division be viewed as constituting a dualism 
in educational practice. For this reason Horne concluded 
that Dewey's method of refutation was both emotionally and 
intellectually unsatisfactory.83
The basic question for Horne remained a speculative one 
in spite of an apparent attempt to draw attention away from 
traditional philosophies:
What we want to know is whether there really 
is a world of reality, changeless in character, 
which is grasped by the intellect, which remains 
despite man's denial and social change, which is 
implied even by the process of change itself.




On the surface it would appear that the philosophic 
tension between Horne and Dewey was the result of a divergent 
posture relative to absolutes. Evidence of this appeared when 
Horne raised the issue of absolutes especially as these existed 
in the context of known reality and its close approximation 
to supreme reality, if not God:
Now thought does possess such a world, and 
it can be shown to do so. In general, it is the 
realm of concepts, essences, universels. The 
very notion of change implies the changeless,
without the permanent there is no impermanent.85
Dewey's discussion did not place emphasis upon the nega­
tive or positive aspects of absolutes nor did he attempt to 
prove or disprove their existence. Horne, however, believed 
an identification of this realm was necessary before consid­
eration could be given to the concept of change. The pre­
cise location of this world, according to Horne, was in the
mind. The activity of mind or thought process remained the 
surest grasp of the formal, changeless truths.
Horne was correct when he suggested that change in social 
conditions had brought about new perceptions and this he 
believed applied to traditional philosophical thought. Never­
theless, in view of Dewey's discussion, Horne underestimated 
the profound influence social conditions exerted upon modern 
educational philosophy. Dewey insisted that social change 
had only produced modification of the traditional opposition
G^ibid.
277
with varying degrees of reorganization. These modifications 
often were accompanied by a compromise in the establishment 
and maintenance of studies in the curriculum. Furthermore, 
Dewey emphasized the fact that history had not eradicated 
the opposition existing between theory and practice, intel­
ligence and execution, knowledge and activity.®^ In tracing 
the historical antecedents to the thought which had produced 
this condition, Dewey called attention to the concept of 
experience and reason as formulated by Plato and Aristotle. 
Although contemporary thought differed in many respects, 
Dewey argued that a recognizable agreement persisted and 
that:
. . . they agreed in identifying experience 
with purely practical concerns. . . . Knowledge, 
on the other hand, existed for its own sake free 
from practical reference, and found its source 
and organ in a purely immaterial mind. . . . Hence 
the practical life was in a condition of perpetual 
flux, while intellectual knowledge concerned 
eternal truth.87
Dewey expressed doubt as to the continued existence 
of all these distinctions in their full technical meaning. 
Nevertheless, he held to the firm belief that man's sub­
sequent thought about education continued to be influenced 
by the original contempt expressed for the practical and 
the supremacy expressed for the intellectual. Dewey issued 
the following warning:
p gDewey, Democracy and Education, p. 306,
87lbid.
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Medieval philosophy continued and reenforced 
thé tradition. When we add to this motive the 
force derived from the literary character of the 
Roman education and the Greek philosophic tradition 
. . .  we can readily understand the tremendous power 
exercised by the persistent preference of the 'intel­
lectual' over the 'practical' not simply in educa­
tional philosophies but in the higher schools.88
2. Experience as Experimentation
For the purpose of interpreting Dewey on experience 
and experimentation Horne identified two propositions; one 
was that all practical pursuits should be intellectualized; 
the other was that all intellectual pursuits should be prac­
tical. In agreement with Dewey, Horne subscribed to the 
notion that both were involved in the functional unity of 
the intellectual and the practical methods of knowing and 
doing.89 ^he first of these propositions Horne accepted 
except for noting that some practical activities possessed 
a greater degree of intellectual content than others. The 
second proposition was condemned by Horne. "It keeps the 
intellect of man in working c l o t h e s . " ^ 0  While the practical 
pursuits should be intellectualized, intellectual pursuits 





Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 381.
90.
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Closely allied with this criticism was Horne's rejec­
tion of Dewey's concept of experience and experimentation. 
"Experimentation is indeed one phase of experience, but 
experience is much more than experimentation."^^ Thus, Horne's 
appraisal of Dewey's mode of knowing through experience- 
experimentation, revealed a dissatisfaction both emotionally 
and intellectually. Experimentation, according to Horne, 
represented a strictly intellectual and practical activity, 
while experience contained the additional ingredient of cer­
tain emotional factors.92
Horne failed to recognize the reciprocal effect of 
response which was a central feature of Dewey's theory rela­
tive to experience as experimentation. This neglect accounted 
for the condition which permitted Horne to conclude; "The 
dentist may engage in experimentation, while the patient gets 
the experience."93 As viewed from this position, both parties 
had engaged themselves in uncommon effort and activity. The 
responses of each of these persons held little significance.
The experimenter was involved in an active pursuit, while the 
other, receiving the experience, remained passive.




Differences of opinion and attitudes concerning activity 
accounted for much of the disagreement found in the discus­
sions of both theorists. Dewey never recommended activity 
for the sake of activity; on the contrary, he stated "mere 
activity does not constitute experience."94 His concept of 
activity must be understood only in the context of the meaning 
of experience. The controlling influence on activity was 
always the problematic situation. Out of the interaction 
which resulted from attempts to relieve an imbalance in the 
environment there existed of necessity activity;
The combination of what things ^  to us (not 
in impressing qualities on a passive mind) in 
modifying our actions, furthering some of them and 
resisting and checking others, and what we can do 
to them in producing new changes constitutes expe­rience. 95
In Dewey's philosophy, experience enjoyed a close rela­
tionship with knowledge. No longer was experience placed in 
opposition to rational knowledge and explanation as was sug­
gested by Horne.96 Experience, for Dewey, assumed "deliber­
ate control of what is done with reference to making what 
happens to us and what we do to things as fertile as possible 
of suggestions and a means for trying out the validity of the 
suggestions."97 Activity was not to be equated with unguided,
94oewey, Democracy and Education, p. 163.
95ibid., p. 317.
96Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 382. 
9?Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 319.
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gross, bodily movement. In Dewey's theory, it meant the 
organism was interacting with the environment toward the 
solution of a problem:
When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be 
blinded by impulse or custon, when it is guided by 
an aim and conducted by measure and method, it 
becomes reasonable— rational.98
Conditions, particularly those which we can regulate, 
were the determining factors which suggested change to the 
prevalent notion of a necessary opposition between the purely 
practical studies and those held to be purely intellectual. 
Further :
Practical activities may be intellectually 
narrow and trivial; they will be so insofar as 
they are routine, carried on under the dictates 
of authority, and having in view merely some 
external result.99
Dewey designated the term experience as the name given 
to the active-passive relations sustained between the indi­
vidual and his social surroundings:
In just the degree in which connections are 
established between what happens to a person and 
what he does in response, and between what he does 
to his environment and what it does in response to 
him, his acts and things acquire meaning.100
Dewey taught that education designed for a purpose should





acquisition of meanings so important that they become instru­
ments of further learning. He believed activities out of 
school were sometimes important but often ineffective. Activ­
ity out of school was often carried on under conditions which 
were not specifically and deliberately designed with the in­
tent of promoting understanding and adapted to the formation 
of effective intellectual dispositions.101 Educationally, 
this suggests the following:
It is not the business of the school to 
transport youth from an environment of activity 
into one of cramped study of the records of other 
men's learning; but to transport them from an 
environment of relatively chance activities 
(accidental in the relation they bear to insight 
and thought) into one of activities selected with 
reference to guidance of learning.1^2
Dewey's goal was to make education scientific. He was 
sensitive to the advances of psychology and industrial methods, 
and thought that education should use the methods of science. 
Furthermore, he argued that activity in the school situation 
ought to exemplify the experimental problem-solving method 
of science.
Horne was critical of what he termed Dewey's doctrine of 
learning by doing. For elementary education, Horne found this 
theory acceptable. Adult education, however, must also involve 
"learning to think by thinking."103
lOllbid.
lOZlbid.
103|jQme, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 
381-382.
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In alluding to Dewey's doctrine of "learning by doing," 
Horne would have demonstrated a greater degree of accuracy 
had he been consistent with his phrase, "learning to think 
by thinking." Dewey's doctrine correctly interpreted would 
then have read "learning to do by doing."
Dewey recognized that the historical idea of experience 
as purely practical and void of intellectual qualities would 
be transformed only by the realization:
. . . that doing may be directed so as to 
take up into its own content all which thought 
suggests, and so as to result in securely tested 
knowledge. 'Experience' then ceases to be 
empirical and becomes e x p e r i m e n t a l . 1^4
Dewey's theory of activity did not involve taking a 
"known" and through use in some external activity making it 
a "know how." Knowledge remained the result of the activity 
of the whole organism and its environment in a problem situ­
ation. "Reason ceases to be a remote and ideal faculty and 
signifies all the resources by which activity is made fruit­
ful in meaningj'105
Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and Humanism
1. The Historic Background of Humanistic Study
Horne's interpretation of Dewey's historical account of 
naturalism and humanism led Horne to conclude that "Dr. Dewey
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 323.
lO^ibid.
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has here probably overdrawn the doctrine of unity between man 
and nature in the Greek t h i n k e r s . "106 Horne argued in favor 
of a dualism which had its roots entrenched in Greek philos­
ophy, and he found no precedent for unifying humanism and 
naturalism in the thought of either Socrates or Plato. " . . .  
Plato was a quantitative dualist but a qualitative idealist.
. . ."107
While Dewey may have gone to the extreme in stressing 
unity of man in Greek thought, Horne had probably over­
drawn the doctrine of dualism when he approached Aristotle.
The form-matter hypothesis formulated by Aristotle probably 
did not represent a dualism to the extent indicated by 
Horne. Aristotle could not accurately be cited as a human­
istic naturalist. Nevertheless, the forms and essences 
representing the common characteristics of his theory were 
found in nature as well as in man. To this extent, there 
did exist an element which tended to serve as a unifying force 
in the philosophy of Aristotle.
Dewey noted that the conflict existing between the 
naturalistic and humanistic studies could not be attributed 
to classic Greek philosophy.108 in his historical account.
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 388.
lÔ Ibid.
108Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 324.
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Dewey saw these characteristics of Greek thought; (1) Socrates 
did not believe a science of nature was important; (2) Plato 
furthered the belief that any discussion of the good of man 
must concern itself with the essential good or end of nature 
itself; and (3) Aristotle exceeded prior Greek thought and 
extended it in the direction of naturalism. Knowing in pure 
form found nature a most suitable s u b j e c t . T h e  argument 
presented by both Horne and Dewey relative to the origin of 
this dualism remained unsettled and open for debate.
While the problem of dualism and its subsequent threat 
to a unified scheme in education may or may not be traced 
historically to Greek philosophy, their method was apparently 
responsible for the origin of the conflict between man and 
nature.
Horne failed to take into account the great influence 
exerted by the Roman culture, especially that of the Church.
In addition, Dewey identified the method and philosophy of 
Scholasticism as furthering the entrenchment of this dualism. 
This period in history represented a time when attention was 
directed toward the control of man rather than a concern for 
the control of nature:
And its dependence upon tradition was increased 
by the dominant theological interests of the period.
For the authorities to which the Church appealed were 
literatures composed in foreign tongues. Scholasticism
10*Ibid., pp. 324-325.
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. . .  is nothing but a highly effective systematization 
of.the methods of teaching and learning which are 
appropriate to transmit an authoritative body oftruths.110
Dewey presented a sound summary to this historical argu­
ment when he stated:
If we take what the philosophers stood for in 
Greek life, rather than the details of what they say, 
we might summarize by saying the Greeks were too much 
interested in free inquiry into natural fact and in 
the aesthetic enjoyment of nature. . . t o  think of 
. bringing man and nature into conflict.m
The unfortunate significance of this condition, however, was 
clear to Dewey. The result of such a scheme "is reflected 
in the division of studies between the naturalistic and the 
humanistic, with a tendency to reduce the latter to the 
literary records of the past."112
Horne maintained the Greeks, not the Romans, were respon­
sible for the formative thought giving rise to the physical- 
social dualism in educational theory:
The Greek thinkers were dualists with emphasis 
on the intellectual as the more real, to whom no 
scientific study of nature was equal in educational 
value to philosophy.113
Horne avoided an analysis of the dialectical method of 
the Scholastics. This was the age and the method which Dewey
^^°Ibid., p. 327.
^^^Ibid.., pp. 325-326.
112Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 338.
113Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 389
287
determined had made the greatest contribution to the already 
existing division between the physical and social studies. 
Whereas Greek thought probably gave birth to this dualism in 
theory and practice, the Romans and their method of Scholastic­
ism provided the link between earlier educational practices 
and those which were found existing in contemporary practice. 
Dewey concluded:
So far as schools still teach from textbooks 
and rely upon the principle of authority and 
acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and 
inquiry, their methods are Scholastic. . . . For 
their practical genius was not directed to the 
conquest and control of nature but to the conquest 
and control of men.114
2. The Present Educational Pattern
Horne thought the historic division of the practical 
sciences and the humanities a profitable one. Divisions 
and sub-divisions among studies afforded a practical approach 
to the organization of the curriculum. Separation among sub­
jects also represented the best rationale for an analysis of 
a particular subject in the curriculumllS Horne's traditional 
bias is reflected in the following quote:
Among the sciences include physics and chemistry.
The natural sciences include biology and related 
studies. The social studies may also be sub-divided 
into the humanistic and social studies. The humanities 
include languages and literatures. The social sciences 
include history, sociology, and e c o n o m i c s . 116
ll^Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 327-328.




Dewey was not interested in classifying and formulating 
divisions among studies in the curriculum. His attempt was 
to decrease the influence exerted upon the curriculum by sharp 
demarcations traditionally maintained in educational practice. 
On the positive side Dewey sought to harmonize the relation­
ship of man-nature, rather than that of man and nature. 
Strongly influenced by the doctrine of biological development, 
Dewey viewed man as one continuous with nature. "Man's home 
is nature; his purposes and aims are dependent for execution 
upon natural conditions":^!?
From the standpoint of human experience, and 
hence of educational endeavor, any distinction 
which can be justly made between nature and man is 
a distinction between the conditions which have to 
be reckoned with in the formation and execution of 
our practical aims, and the aims themselves. . . . 
Knowledge accrues in virtue of an attempt to direct 
physical energies in accord with ideas suggested in 
dealing with natural objects in behalf of social 
uses.118
Horne's discussion of humanistic and naturalistic studies 
presented a strong case from the idealist's point of view. 
Whether or not he grasped the essential elements of Dewey's 
discussion remained questionable. Dewey, nevertheless, argued 
in favor of a close relationship between humanistic and 
naturalistic studies. Relative to this concern, Dewey con­
tended :
117Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 333.
!!®Ibid.
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. . . education should take its departure 
from this close interdependence. It should aim 
not at keeping science as a study of nature apart 
from literature as a record of human interests, 
but at cross-fertilising both the natural sciences 
and the various human disciplines such as history, 
literature, economics, and politics.119
Pedagogically and philosophically, this is one of the 
most significant contributions found in Dewey's text. A 
merger of studies was not recommended by Dewey. Horne's 
interpretation, nevertheless, while proposing a "monism of 
studies" in order to overcome the dualism of the physical 
and social had in effect caused a new pluralism to appear 
on the scene— increased unification and greater diversifica­
tion in the curriculum.
The position maintained by Dewey was both humanistic 
and democratic. It was humanistic in that it called into 
play an intelligent sense of human interests. It was demo­
cratic in the sense that pluralism pervaded. Thus, the nar­
row scope of the Greek humanistic spirit has been avoided as 
well as the one-sided condition typical of Classical H u m a n i s m ; 1 2 1
Any study so pursued that it increases concern 
for the values of life, any study producing greater 
sensitiveness to social well-being and greater 
ability to promote that well-being is humane study.122
119lbid., p. 334.
120norne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 401.
121Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 337.
122ibid.
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Dewey believed a dichotomy existed between the sciences 
and the humanities only when science provided factual infor­
mation about the physical world while the humanities remained 
the sole depository of knowledge about man. To assume this 
philosophic stance was fallacious, according to Dewey, for 
both the sciences and the humanities. This state of affairs 
provided for and encouraged the continuance of the dualism 
Dewey strived to overcome. Educationally, the abandonment 
of this theory had to be effected in keeping with the develop­
ment of a philosophy of education in a democratic society.
Dewey characterized his definition of humane studies as 
follows: "Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it
is about human products in the past, but because of what it 
does in liberating human intelligence and human sympathy."123
Then he issued a warning relative to the philosophical dualism
which he believed was reflected in the division of studies 
between the naturalistic and humanistic:
But the more immediate applications of science 
were in the interests of a class rather than of men 
in common; and the received philosophic formulations 
of scientific doctrine tended either to mark it off 
as merely material from man as spiritual and immater­
ial, or else to reduce mind to a subjective illusion.
In education, accordingly, the tendency was to treat 
the sciences as a separate body of studies, consisting 
of technical information regarding the physical world, 





The Individual and the World
1. Mind as Purely Individual
Horne found this section of DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION one 
of the most confusing ones. It was true that the discussion 
was highly concentrated and presupposed the reader possessed 
a wide range of background especially in the realm of history. 
Horne was correct when he declared that the student of Dr. 
Dewey's text, "needs to have a large background in history, 
in the history of philosophy, and in the history of educa­
t i o n . "125 Unlike previous discussions, it was difficult in 
this chapter to ascertain how the views presented were related 
to Dewey's own v i e w s . 126
In addition to the dualisms which Dewey believed had been 
effected by divisions between work and leisure, knowing and 
doing, man and nature, he identified another dualism. Phil­
osophically, this dualistic theme had occurred as the result 
of a "sharp demarcation of individual minds from the world, 
and hence from one another."127
Dewey admitted that the educational implications of this 
dualistic philosophy of mind and the world were not so obvious 
as previous accounts of influences resulting from dividing the
^^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 408.
IZGibid.
127Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 340.
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subject matter of education into separate s t u d i e s . 128 There
were, however, specific educational bearings associated with
this dualism;
. . . the dualistic philosophy of mind and 
the world implies an erroneous conception of the 
relationship between knowledge and social interests, 
and between individuality or freedom, and social 
control and authority.129
The underlying assumptions of those philosophies elab­
orating upon the question of cognitive relationship of the 
individual to the world seemed to be the point stressed by 
Dewey. These assumptions "have found expression in the 
separation frequently made between study and government 
and between freedom of individuality and control by others."1^® 
Horne rejected the historic overview presented by Dewey.
In particular, Horne noted a discrepancy in Dewey's discussion 
when Dewey claimed that private individualism was "compara­
tively modern" and that its origin was found in the medieval 
nominalist.131 Horne believed the identification of this
period as the origin of the idea of individualism was far too




1 3 1 Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 408,
IS^ibid.
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suggested at this point that Dewey's intent was to "dispose 
the reader in advance to reject it."133
For all practical purposes, Dewey believed that indi­
vidualism, or the struggle for greater freedom of thought, 
had been translated into philosophic subjectivism and was 
the product of the early modern period.
Horne's aim in providing certain historic illustrations 
was meant to establish that the concept of the mind as purely 
individual was an ancient one. Secondly, his objective was 
to establish that this concept could not be rejected on the 
basis that it was formulated in the early modern period:
If rejected at all, it must be on other than 
historic grounds. Meantime, there is considerable 
ground that the universe itself is a Self and selves 
(Personalism), or even a Self of selves, including 
the realm of physical nature (Objective Idealism).134
2. Educational Equivalent
In this section, Horne agreed with Dewey and admitted
that the body was united with the m i n d . 135 There is insuf­
ficient evidence to support the claim that Dewey discounted
mind individually or collectively. He voiced strong objec­




world as separate entities. This was because he believed 
this dualistic view produced an erroneous concept of the 
relationship between knowledge and social interests, between 
individuality or freedom, and social control and authority.136 
Dewey insisted the social factor is present in learning. 
In its absence, "learning becomes a carrying over of some 
presented material into a purely individual consciousness 
. . . ."137
From Dewey's point of view, the student may at a given 
time work alone. At other times he may necessarily be 
engaged in group activities. Individual activity should 
not be taken to mean a student has been left to work by 
himself or alone.
There is no inherent opposition between 
working with others and working as an individual.
That a child must work alone and not engage in 
group activities in order to be free, is a 
notion which measures individuality by spatial 
distance and makes a physical thing of it.
In terms of learning, Horne correctly identified Dewey's
position relative to freedom of thought and personal thinking.
When learning has been cast in any other framework, learning
and its meaning in an internal sense has been lost.




Dewey's analysis of freedom was presented in terms of 
intellectual freedom. Horne believed such a discussion was 
insufficient and lacking since there was "no discussion of 
moral freedom, or the freedom of the individual as a self­
determining agent."139
Concerning freedom. The view presented is 
that freedom resides in the set of physical and 
social conditions allowing effective thinking to 
go on. This is intellectual f r e e d o m . 1^0
It should be noted that Dewey was a foe of any social 
arrangement whereby the individual was controlled by others. 
Without intellectual freedom, the individual became the 
victim of "intellectual servility."1^1
Dewey drew no distinction between freedom and individ­
uality. Like thinking, freedom represented a personal and 
individual achievement.
Although physical and social conditions were counterparts 
of the theoretical framework proposed by Dewey, these were 
not foremost. The existence of these conditions did not nec­
essarily insure the successful attainment of freedom;
Regarding freedom, the important thing to 
bear in mind is that it designates a mental 
attitude rather than external unconstraint of 
movements, but this quality of mind cannot
139Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 427.
l^Oibid.
^^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 356.
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develop without a fair leeway of movements in 
exploration, experimentation, application, 
etc.142
In Dewey's discussion there was a double meaning to the 
term "individuality." In the first place, the individual was 
seen as one mentally involved in reflective thinking relative 
to his own purposes and problems. His activity is in large 
measure self-directed, receiving impetus from his questions, 
his concerns, and his curiosity. To the extent that these 
elements are permitted and encouraged to flourish, he is 
intellectually free. In the second place, "there are varia­
tions of points of view, of appeal of objects, and of mode of 
attack, from person to p e r s o n . "143 Mental confusion and 
artificiality resulted when these variations among persons 
were suppressed in behalf of uniformity.
Horne continued with a persuasive bent toward a consider­
ation of personality rather than a consideration of the indi­
vidual. This was another instance, according to Horne, where 
the idealistic philosophy would have presented a broader 
spectrum in relation to the self, its learning, and approaches 
to methodology. Essentially, Horne believed Dewey failed to 





Here the omission is consistent with the 
denial of the private, personal, self. Person­
ality is not here presented as a fundamental 
category. Freedom is thus lack of constraint 
on thinking; such freedom might just as wellbe called d e t e r m i n i s m . 1^4
Horne, at this point, seemed to confuse free thinking 
with the concept of thinking freely. It was the latter which 
Dewey accepted and taught. It was democratic social condi­
tions which liberated thinking. He remained optimistic in 
his belief that men would voluntarily seek to improve condi­
tions when they found themselves functioning in a free society. 
In Horne's philosophy, however, moral freedom was only 
achieved as the result of man's free will and a recognition 
of human responsibility. In this respect Horne contended 
that this dimension of freedom was more stable. Horne again 
urged for a return to fundamental categories as a sound basis
for thinking and f r e e d o m . 1^5
Social conditions, as well as physical, were character­
ized by Dewey as those elements which must be confronted if 
a democratic society was to be a truly progressive society.
In summary, Dewey stated;
A progressive society counts individual 
variations as precious since it finds in them 
the means of its own growth. Hence a demo­
cratic society must in consistency with its 
ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the
144Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 427.
l^^ibid.
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play of diverse gifts and interests in its 
educational measures.146
Vocational Aspects of Education
1. The Meaning of Vocation
Horne placed great emphasis upon the definition of the 
term "vocation." He also believed Dewey chose an unfamiliar 
meaning to the term. Noting this condition, Horne reaffirmed 
his criticism of Dewey's definition:
Usually, by vocation we mean the occupation 
by which one earns his living. The definition 
given in the text extends the usual meaning of 
one's vocation to cover all his personally sig­
nificant and socially useful activities; one's 
vocation is to be usefully human.147
Horne believed that Dewey used vocation and occupation as
synonymous terms— those interests the individual shared with
others were also a part of his existence. But Horne noted,
"It is commonly recognized that one's vocation is not his
only interest."148
The term "vocation" assumed a much broader meaning and 
its implications extended into all life's activities. This 
extension was inappropriate according to Horne:
. . .  the definition is too broad, including 
too many of the worthy interests of life. It is 
also too broad in excluding from the definition 
some worthy interests in life.149
l^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 357.




Horne rightfully recognized that there existed certain 
negative or "useless" vocations bearing little or no social 
worth. On this point he stated;
There are socially useless vocations, such 
as racketeering, burglary, banditry, dope-peddling.
These are all vocations in the sense that they are 
ways of making a l i v i n g . 150
Unworthy vocations remain just that. Like bad habits 
and other negative increments to growth, the positive and 
worthy concept should not be deemphasized merely because of 
the existence of their opposites. There was in Dewey's text 
sufficient evidence to support his recognition of the condi­
tions cited above by Horne, and Dewey's criterion for habits 
and growth still prevailed in his philosophy. Only when the 
individual's activities contributed to the well-being and 
happiness of others in his society were his activities deemed 
to be worthy ones. From Dewey's point of view, the central 
question remained: Do the actions and activities of the indi­
vidual lead in the general direction toward making a positive 
contribution to those goals and ideals preferred by members 
of society? Social vices such as those described by Horne 
did not meet the requirement demanded for social acceptance.
Admittedly, ways of making a living comprise one aspect 
of a vocation. However, Horne's interpretation of Dewey 
exceeded the emphasis warranted relative to this aspect of
15°Ibid.
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the concept of a vocation. The real issue intended by Horne's 
comments was to revive the controversy of liberal versus voca­
tional education. Although this issue was not presented in 
Dewey's discussion, Horne maintained that Dewey, by subtle 
means, had raised the question.
2. Present Opportunities and Dangers
Referring to Dewey's definition of the term "vocation," 
Horne made the following observation:
In this case the effect of the meaning given 
the term is so to widen it that vocational education 
will be equivalent to liberal and vocational educa­
tion. This is to beg the question at issue by 
initial definition.l5l
Dewey consistently sought to decrease the element of 
narrowness as well as any restrictive quality upon man's 
activities and interests. The role of interest continued to 
be a vital one. Interest, according to Dewey, must be viewed 
as inherently involved in the interactive process. An occu­
pation fulfills the requirements laid down previously in 
connection with aims, interests, and thinking, when pursued 
under conditions whereby the realization of the activity 
rather than merely the external product is the aim.
Dewey did express concern over the philosophic dualisms 




There seems to be too great a gap between 
the remote and general terms in which philosophic 
ideas are formulated and the practical and concrete 
details of vocational education. . . it is necessary 
to define the meaning of vocation with some fulness 
in order to avoid the impression that an education 
which centers about it is narrowly practical, if 
not merely pecuniary.152
The definition offered by Dewey was simple, yet broad 
and inclusive:
A vocation signifies any form of continuous 
activity which renders service to others and engages 
personal powers in behalf of the accomplishment of 
results.153
Attention should be called to the fact that Dewey was 
not concerned with "■«f’ocational" education per se, but rather 
with the intellectual quality of all learning. His objective 
was not to make vocational education an equivalent to a 
liberal education. Neither did Dewey attempt to elevate 
vocational education to a position of superior worth. While 
it might be possible to confuse Dewey's expansion of intel­
lectual pursuits to practical studies by suggesting he advo­
cated vocational education, such an assumption would be false 
and would only serve to confuse the issue:
Any scheme for vocational education which 
takes its point of departure from the industrial 
regime that now exists, is likely to assume and 
to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses. . . .
Such a vocational education inevitably discounts 
the scientific and historic human connections. . . .
152Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 358.
IS^Ibid., p. 373.
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To. include such things in narrow trade education 
would be to waste time. . . ,154
Dewey noted a tendency for a particular vocation to 
become too dominant, too exclusive, and absorbed in its nar­
row specialized aspect. He believed this condition ultimately 
led to an increased emphasis upon skill and technical method 
at the expense of meaning.155 Dewey believed these conditions 
could possibly exert negative influences upon educational 
practices. Aware of these restrictive circumstances, he 
warned:
Hence it is not the business of education 
to foster this tendency, but rather to safeguard 
against it, so that the scientific inquirer shall 
not be merely the scientist, the teacher merely 
the pedagogue, the clergyman merely one who wears 
the cloth. . . .156
The term "vocation" represented for Dewey but a name 
designated to single out that one calling which distinguishes 
one individual from all others. Words and their definition 
should not subject an analysis to a denial of the many other 
callings when consideration is given to the vocational phases 
of education.157
154Ibid., p. 372. 




Horne claimed that Dewey had omitted the greatest of all 
vocations— that of being oneself. "Most of the service we 
can render society can be as well or better rendered by some 
other person.158 gy contrast, Dewey called attention to the 
individual as well as to the society in which he functioned. 
"The dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is 
living— intellectual and moral growth."159
Dewey's theory denied the right of any person to enjoy 
leisure at the expense of another person's labor. This posi­
tion was admitted by Horne as an ethical right, not to be 
confused with the historic meaning of the terms "liberal" 
and "vocational."160 in addition, Dewey insisted that all 
workers should understand the cultural backgrounds of their 
occupations in order to increase the surety of intellectual 
and emotional satisfaction.
A significant principal was repeated by Dewey:
. . . training may develop a machine-like 
skill in routine lines but it will be at the 
expense of those qualities of alert observation 
and coherent and ingenious planning which make 
an occupation rewarding.161
Dewey pointed out that this would be the condition when the 
work pursued by man was devoid of essential social bearings.
158iîorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 439. 
IS^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 362.
IGORorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 451. 
IGlpewey, Democracy and Education, p. 363.
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Intelligence would then be limited to technical, non-humane, 
and non-liberal channels.162
There was an absence of any discussion by Horne relative 
to the nature of vocation and work demanded by a democratic 
society. Dewey, however, predicated his discussion upon this 
very point. The negative aspects of work in the pursuit of 
a vocation necessarily had to be eliminated if the individual 
was to function effectively and participate freely in intel­
lectual and moral growth:
In an autocratically managed society, it is 
often a conscious object to prevent the develop­
ment of freedom and responsibility; a few do the 
planning and ordering, the others follow directions 
and are deliberately confined to narrow and pre­
scribed channels of endeavor.163
Such a scheme, according to Dewey, might serve to insure
prestige and profit of a privileged class but this was
accomplished at the expense of limiting the development of
the worker.164 He believed that the great majority of
workers had no real insight into the social aims of their
work and no direct personal interest in them. Consequently,
results achieved were for all practical purposes not the ends
of their actions, but of their employers'. In summarizing




his concern, Dewey stated:
They do what they do, not freely and intelli­
gently, but for the sake of the wage earned. It 
is this fact which makes the action illiberal, and 
which will make any education designed simply to 
give skill in such undertakings illiberal and 
immoral. The activity is not free because not 
freely participated i n . 1 6 5
There was both a challenge and warning raised by Dewey. 
The extent to which industry and education have been respon­
sive appears to be minimal in terms of contemporary society 
and the participating individual. Possibly a narrowly con­
ceived scheme of vocation and vocational education has 
prompted and perpetuated the philosophic division between 
social aims and interests and the endeavor of work.
The question of vocational education continues to stand 
in a crucial position. According to Dewey, two fundamental 
questions remain to be dealt with, each significantly related 
to social, economic, and educational activities:
Whether intelligence is best exercised apart 
from or within activity which puts nature to human 
use, and whether individual culture is best secured 




THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
Philosophy of Education
1. A Critical Review
Horne identified this chapter of Dewey's text as a 
significant one; he believed Dewey's review in this section 
"critical." The extent of Horne's respect for Dewey is 
well indicated in the following quote:
One rarely meets such concentrated expressions 
of thought, such meaning-laden sentences, such brief 
and weighty observations.^
Nevertheless, Horne maintained Dewey had neglected the 
evaluative aspect of philosophy in his writing. "The review 
does not do justice to the richness of the content of the 
preceding twenty-three chapters."% The summary provided by 
Dewey at the conclusion of each chapter did contain concise 
statements intended to serve as a supplement. In this section 
of his text, statements were often brief. Yet, these often 
served to clarify discussion in the preceding portion of the




chapter. Clarification, not evaluation, was the primary 
objective of Dewey's summary.
2. The Nature of Philosophy
In retrospect, Horne reviewed the material presented by 
Dewey up to this point. He concentrated upon providing a 
summary of significant philosophical positions which he 
believed were similar to Dewey's theory. Additional observa­
tions contrast Dewey's reconstructed philosophy and that of 
traditional theorists prior to Dewey. Herbert's philosophy 
was the first contrasted;
Dr. Dewey is not an Herbartian in his educa­
tional philosophy. . . but he has Herbert's 
conception of the relation of philosophy to educa­
tion. Herbert, however, did not limit philosophy 
to formulating the interests of social life.^
Horne's analysis would have been more effective if he 
had concentrated upon the fact that social conditions present 
at the time Herbert made his formulations were vastly differ­
ent from those which confronted Dewey. Dewey was cognizant 
of the disharmony between pre-scientific and scientific con­
ditions. Consequently, one of the most persistent problems 
in Dewey's inquiry was that of restoring a balance between 
man's beliefs about the world and his beliefs about values 
and purposes that should direct conduct. The findings of 
science demanded a new integration and a spirit of coopera­
tion if man was to live with a sense of purpose and commitment
^Ibid., p. 471.
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to human endeavors. Dewey noted that the same problems of 
life recur from time to time and that changes were due to 
change of social context, "including the growth of the 
sciences."4 Furthermore, he insisted that philosophy and 
education bore a special responsibility when society is faced 
with drastic revolutionary change. Scientific investigations 
give rise to new insights about the nature of thinking. For 
Dewey, the intellectual task must now be viewed quite differ­
ently. The implications of instrumentalism are more than 
philosophical rhetoric:
The fact that philosophic problems arise 
because of widespread and widely felt difficulties 
in social practice is disguised because philosophers 
become a specialized class which uses a technical 
language, unlike the vocabulary in which the direct 
difficulties are stated.5
The relationship between philosophy and education was 
vividly expounded by Dewey. At no time in the history of 
philosophy of education had the connection been so closely 
appraised as that which was portrayed by Dewey. He described 
this relationship as an intimate one and believed education 
offered the best vantage point from which "to penetrate to 
the human, as distinct from the technical, significance of 
philosophic discussions."6




Dewey felt that previous philosophical inquiry had played 
only a minor role in the course of human events because philos­
ophers had merely been engaged in a kind of discourse often 
not attached to problematic conditions encountered in the soci­
ety of this world. Since he adopted the evolutionary point of 
view, thought as a process assumed a new role— a role which he 
hoped would reverse the direction of traditional philosophical 
history. Philosophy, to be vital and instrumental, must now 
find its way into the stream of conscious life. The point of 
entrance into life, Dewey believed, must necessarily be educa­
tion. To education he assigned the task of bringing philosophy 
out of the ivory tower and into contact with life. Philosoph­
ical theories must be put to the educational test:
The educational point of view enables one to 
envisage the philosophic problems where they arise 
and thrive, where they are at home, and where accept­
ance or rejection makes a difference in practice. . . . 
Philosophy may even be defined as the general theory 
of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain sym­
bolic— or verbal— or a sentimental indulgence for a 
few, or else arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past 
experience and its program of values must take effect 
in conduct.?
Horne recalled that Hegel's philosophy also held to the 
theory of reconciliation of opposites and noted this theory 
resembled that of Dewey's in that each sought to unify and 
comprehend conflicts of interests:®
^Ibid.
OHorne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 471.
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The method is Hegel's; the difference is that 
Hegel applies his method to all phases of reality 
and to reality itself, while Dewey applies his only 
to social struggles.9
By way of analogy, Horne claimed that Dewey had rejected those 
philosophical and educational systems from which he had inher­
ited so much. There is little reason to doubt that Hegel's 
theory, as well as those theories held by Herbert, did serve 
as an influence upon Dewey's philosophy. The influence, how­
ever, was ultimately negative, and often resulted in a rejec­
tion of earlier theories. There was truth in Horne's analysis 
which concluded that Dewey had rejected most of Hegel's 
system.
Horne suggested that Dewey did seek to understand and 
unify conflicting interests in social life for it was in the 
social arena that he believed the conflict of interests 
existed. As a result of the disturbing conditions which 
Dewey recognized in society, he felt there was a real need to 
restore equilibrium between man and the world and that this 
was the task for philosophy and education. In effect, he 
labored to effect a new integration which would be consistent 
with the findings of science. Dewey maintained there must 
always be the endeavor, "to attain as unified, consistent, 
and complete an outlook upon experience as possible."^0
Sibid.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 378.
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The interpretation by Horne in this section would have 
been enlarged had he noted Dewey's rejection of that element 
in Hegel's philosophy which resulted in determinism. Dewey 
was not a determinist. It would probably be more nearly 
accurate to claim that Dewey rejected Hegel's system to a 
greater extent than he rejected his method.
An examination of Dewey's logic and psychology would 
also have provided greater insight. Both of these in combin­
ation served to explain the natural evolution of effective 
thought and the conditions which gave rise to it. Dewey's 
concept of reflective thinking was rooted in the biological 
scheme of things and the method of scientific inquiry. The 
unifying theme which gave direction to Dewey's educational 
proposals stemmed from his intense concern for the civilized 
experience, the nature of evolution and its role in furthering 
growth. Although this theme was repeated throughout Dewey's 
text, Horne failed to assess adequately the assignment of a 
joint responsibility for philosophy and education. Civiliza­
tion, according to Dewey, amounted to a process of growth in 
human experience. The task for philosophy was to work out 
those conditions which would lead to greater human fulfillment 
within the conditions emerging in the specific civilization 
in question. Philosophy should illuminate the course that 
experience had taken and project possible modes of conduct for 
the future.11 Thus, the partnership was an imperative from
lljbid.
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Dewey's point of view. Philosophy must maintain an awareness 
of advances in knowledge arising from research in the natural 
and social sciences in order to keep in contact with man's 
real situation. At the same time, work in psychology and 
education must continue to be pursued in order to assure 
that knowledge would properly function in the affairs of 
men's lives. Dewey affirmed that philosophy had a dual task:
. . . that of criticizing existing aims with 
respect to the existing state of science. . . and 
also that of interpreting the results of specialized 
science in their bearing on future social endeavor.
It is impossible that it should have any success 
in these tasks without educational equivalents as 
to what to do and what not to do. . . . B y  the 
educative arts philosophy may generate methods of 
utilizing the energies of human beings in accord 
with serious and thoughtful conceptions of life. 
Education is the laboratory in which philosophic 
distinctions become concrete and t e s t e d . 12
Specific traits of Dewey's philosophy were identified 
by Horne in an attempt to point out what he viewed as defi­
cient or inconsistent. Horne made the following claim in 
describing some of the characteristics of Dewey's philosophy:
His own philosophy is epistemological, and 
ethical or social. . . .  He does not intend his 
philosophy to be metaphysical. . . and so raise 
questions about the nature of being, the order of 
being, and man's relation to the whole of reality.
He rejects these problems of ontology and cosmology 
as non-philosophical, and so omits them from his 
list. . . . But it takes a metaphysics to reject a 
metaphysics. Ontology creeps in.l3
l̂ Ibid., p. 384.
13Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 471.
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Philosophical reform was of utmost importance to Dewey.
He directed his greatest effort toward its accomplishment. 
Science, which Dewey believed held great promise, was also 
the source of many disruptions. The creation of a technolog­
ical-urban social order necessitated that attention be given 
to nev; alternatives since old community forms were beginning 
to disappear. Much of Dewey's involvement and concern were 
focused toward the emerging society— its potential as well as 
its problems. With this in mind, he applied all facets of 
human endeavor which he felt his ontology permitted. The 
inclusion of unnecessary metaphysical concepts would have been 
of little assistance to Dewey's objective which was to recon­
struct philosophy and philosophical thought.
Horne made an unwarranted assumption when he claimed 
Dewey rejected questions posed by ontology and cosmology on 
the ground that these were "non-philosophical."14 Questions 
raised out of concern for ontology were rejected because such 
speculative questions yielded little to Dewey's view of phi­
losophy. Democratic social conditions and educational objec­
tives were of far greater concern to Dewey. A rejection of 
metaphysics and related questions was never a major concern 
in theory or in practice.
Horne tended to lean in the direction of absolutes, and 
he argued in favor of placing the new construct in an old
l^Ibid.
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framework. He apparently failed to recognize that it was 
physics which had dislodged metaphysics just as astronomy had 
replaced astrology. New developments in psychology had char­
tered new attitudes regarding metaphysics. From Dewey's point 
of reference, epistemology and the import of epistemological 
considerations caused ontology and cosmology to receive less 
attention. Dewey believed these areas of thought should remain 
the domain of speculative philosophers.
Further characterizing Dewey's philosophy, Horne stated:
His bias is on the side of the scientific as 
against languages and literature; he does not 
recognize the a priori, and the transcendental 
element in thinking; he does not care for speculative 
philosophy; he does not acknowledge the experience 
of the mystic. . . .15
Dewey did express a preference for the scientific method 
yet he did not neglect the possibility of value to be found 
in language and literature. He merely questioned those 
studies enjoying traditional sanction only. The pragmatic 
philosophy with its concern for instrumental values implies 
a certain bias for the scientific. The criterion of value, 
however, was not found in the content of any subject matter 
per se. The deciding factor in determining value was the 
method employed and the extent to which these contributed to 
subsequent solutions to human problems.
Recognition of the a priori and transcendental would have 
represented a contradiction in Dewey's philosophy. In his
^^Ibid., p. 474.
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perspective, no knowledge existed prior to or outside experi­
ence. Therefore, an acceptance of the a priori would have 
reduced thinking to submission to some external authority. 
Speculative philosophy, according to Dewey, ultimately found 
itself grounded in dogmatic traditions. Therefore, those ele­
ments found in traditional philosophy such as Horne's, were 
incompatible with the pragmatic philosophy,
Horne was correct when he claimed Dewey gave little recog­
nition to the experience of the mystic. It should be pointed 
out, however, that Dewey never denied the possibility of a 
subjective experience for the individual. Such an experience 
should be viewed as private, and as such, could not be assumed 
to be the condition for verifying true knowledge.
Noting that Dewey had failed to acknowledge the "expe­
rience of the mystic," as well as a priori truth and tran­
scendental elements in thinking, Horne was led to conclude 
that Dewey's philosophy did not exemplify the disposition of 
"totality."16 At this point another striking contrast was 
called to attention by Horne. From his frame of reference, 
philosophical totality was attainable only as reference was 
made to the abstract and to a theory which embraced orthodox 
universels. Totality had been achieved for Horne only when 
completeness and finality had been exacted. Dewey's concept 
of totality was associated with the individual's experience
l ^ I b i d .
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and did not suggest finality in the sense of terminating or 
disposing of philosophical questions. His position relative 
to totality was further clarified when he stated that "com­
pleteness and finality are out of the question in any literal 
or quantitative sense. . . ."1?
From this point of view, 'totality' does not 
mean the hopeless task of a quantitative summation.
It means rather consistency of mode of response in 
reference to the plurality of events which occur.
Totality means continuity— the carrying on of a 
former habit of action with the réadaptation necessary 
to keep it alive and growing. 18
Experience was represented as an ongoing, changing process. 
The very nature of experience as conceived by Debey prohibited 
the use of the terms "final" and "total" in the sense these 
had been adopted by Horne. These he included because he 
believed that philosophy and a philosophy of education were 
complete and comprehensive only as these attitudes were applied 
to experience.19
Dewey discussed these and similar terms quite differently. 
Totality and finality were false concepts when viewed as traits 
pointing toward "ultimateness of p h i l o s o p h y . "20 when taken 
literally, Dewey discredited such language and declared these
l^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 379.
IBibid., pp. 379-80.
l^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 474.
20Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 379.
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terms to.be "absurd pretensions; they indicate i n s a n i t y . "21
Finality does not mean. . . that experience 
is ended and exhausted, but means the disposition 
to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning— to go 
below the surface and find out the connections 
of any event or object, and to keep at it.22
One of the most definitive arguments presented by Dewey
in this chapter was his statements concerning the role and
function of philosophy and science. A clear distinction was
drawn between these when he discussed the relationship between
theory and practice, knowledge and intelligence, and facts
and values. Dewey was convinced that theory and abstract
thought must be brought into a position of harmony in order
for man to effectively interact with the world of nature and
the problems faced by man in the social context. Philosophy,
he maintained, had played only a minor role in the course of
human events largely due to the fact that it had been retained
in the ivory tower far removed from experience. Although an
intimate and direct connection existed between philosophy and
science, Dewey believed it was necessary to differentiate






. Particular facts and laws of science evidently 
influence conduct. They suggest things to do and 
not to do, and provide means of execution. When 
science denotes not simply a report of the particular 
facts discovered about the world but a general atti­
tude toward it— as distinct from special things to do—  
it merges into philosophy.24
Further elaboration by Dewey provided additional insights
into the respective character and function of science and
philosophy ;
. . . obviously it is to mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, biology, anthropology, history. . . that 
we must go, not to philosophy, to find out the facts 
of the world. It is for the sciences to say what 
generalizations are tenable about the world and what 
they specifically are. But when we ask what sort of 
permanent disposition of action toward the worldthe 
scientific disclosures exact of us we are raising a
philosophic question.25
For Dewey, science provided facts— grounded knowledge—  
about the world. As distinct from science, philosophy repre­
sented a particular disposition of attitude. This general 
attitude, Dewey emphasized, was the factor which enabled man 
to decide what to do with those facts about the world as 
reported by the products of science. At this stage of 
involvement man became philosophic. An integration consistent 
with the findings of science must of necessity be effected 
before the aggregate of known things could reach into men's 
lives in such a way as to govern their conduct and permit them 




discovers facts while philosophy assumes the responsibility 
for guiding and determining alternatives which ultimately 
suggest the best course to follow in utilizing the facts 
which have resulted from scientific inquiry. Philosophy as 
projected by Dewey was important in that it provided the 
linkage between that which has been settled, i.e., knowledge, 
and the application of those findings. An understanding of 
these two intellectual enterprises was imperative if educa­
tional implications were to be understood in terms of Dewey's 
philosophy and his general theory of education:
Since education is the process through which 
the needed transformation may be accomplished and 
not remain a mere hypothesis. . . we reach a justi­
fication of the statement that philosophy is the 
theory of education as a deliberately conductedpractice.26
Unlike the orientation of Horne, Dewey's central theme 
was that educational problems were to serve as a testing 
ground in which philosophical ideas had to prove themselves 
before they could be construed as viable educational compon­
ents containing instrumental value.
Theories of Knowledge
1. Continuity versus Dualism
Prominent ideas drawn from Dewey's text were analyzed by 
Horne in this section of his summary. The overview of Dewey's 
chapter was presented by adopting certain key phrases which
^^Ibid., p. 387.
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Horne believed were descriptive of the language used by Dewey. 
Some of these terms were valid in terms of Dewey's expressions, 
while others were only similar. Horne identified the follow­
ing as deserving of special comment: (1) social origin and
nature of philosophy; (2) social and educational equivalents 
of epistemological dualism; (3) validity of the conclusions 
of physiological psychology; (4) philosophy of evolution;
(5) flexible responses to environmental stimuli.27
The adequacy of the experimental method as well as the 
feasibility of schools devoted to this method was a special 
target for Horne's criticism. He not only questioned the 
practicality of the experimental method, but he also ques­
tioned whether or not Dewey's theory actually exemplified 
the experimental approach.28
. . . Dr. Dewey uses the literary and dialectic 
methods which he decries, not the experimental method 
which he praises. . . he goes into his study and 
writes a book advocating the experimental method. . . .
If his theory is correct, then he has made for us, not 
knowledge, but more beliefs. Besides having stated 
his beliefs, he is transmitting them with whatever 
authority attaches to his great reputation.29
Horne's criticism of Dewey's theory and method at this
point is not clear. His basic argument was apparently to
call attention to a monistic ontology. His argument was for





a return to a unified theory of reality wherein both the 
knower and known could be assessed adequately in terms of 
knowledge which held validity.30
Horne's comments indicated that he never fully recog­
nized the full scope of Dewey's theory of knowledge espec­
ially as it was related to the experimental method with its 
scientific basis.
The philosophical equivalent of this theory could only 
be understood when Dewey's commitment to the evolutionary 
view of human experience had been carefully noted. Repeatedly, 
Dewey stressed that it was not the external procedures of 
empirical science that needed to be adopted, but rather the 
dynamic relationship between science and experience. He 
viewed science instrumentally— free of traditional rigidity 
and rhetorical dictates. Science, Dewey was convinced, repre­
sented an effective instrument for use in present problem­
atic conditions. At the same time, it was recognized as a 
valuable factor in projecting consequences of behavior in 
future situations.
Horne further criticized Dewey when he insisted " . . .  
his method is not in accord with his theory. "31 The theory 
of continuity advanced by Dewey in previous chapters was a 




comments. For a more comprehensive understanding of the 
philosophic significance of Dewey's developmental theory, 
the investigator must take into account biological evolu­
tion. Dewey emphasized;
For the philosophic significance of the doctrine 
of evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon 
continuity of simpler and more complex organic forms 
until we reach man. As activity becomes more complex, 
coordinating a greater number of factors in space and 
time, intelligence plays a more and marked role, for 
it has a larger span of the future to forecast and 
plan for.32
Meaning continued to be a significant factor for Dewey. 
The greater the increment of perceived meaning in terms of 
the experimental method, "the more our trying out of a cer­
tain way of treating the material resources and obstacles 
which confront us embodies a prior use of intelligence."^^ 
The scientific experimental method was not a trial of luck 
but a trial of ideas. Immediately or in the future, success­
ful or unsuccessful, . . it is intellectual, for we learn 
from our failures when our endeavors are seriously thought­
ful."^^ Dewey described the experimental method as a "new 
scientific resource," yet it was, "as old as life as a prac­
tical device."35 However, he was not surprised that certain





philosophers and intellectuals found this method difficult 
to comprehend as a vital element in the pragmatic tradition*.
It will doubtless take a long time to secure 
the perception that it holds equally as to the 
forming and testing of ideas in social and moral 
matters. Men still want the crutch of dogma, of 
beliefs fixed by authority, to relieve them of the 
trouble of thinking and the responsibility of 
directing their activity by thought.36
Horne was not accurate when he expressed the belief 
that Dewey had employed "literary and dialectic methods."37 
From his discussion, there was reason to believe Horne's 
criticism stemmed from the fact that he had not found Dewey 
in the laboratory practicing his experimental method.
It is apparent Horne failed to understand the intimate 
connection between philosophy and education as maintained 
by Dewey. Yet, the letter's view is clear: "Education is
the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become con­
crete and tested."38 Education, for Dewey, affords the best 
vantage point from which to penetrate into the human signif­
icance of philosophic discussions. Dewey expressed skepti­
cism, if not contempt, for the literary and dialectic method 
and cautioned that these methods had promoted undesirable 
practices in the school:
S^ibid.
3 7 Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 483.
38Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 384.
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But every advance in the influence of the 
experimental method is sure to aid in outlawing 
the literary, dialectic, and authoritative methods 
of forming beliefs which have governed the schools 
of the past, and to transfer their prestige to the 
method which will procure an active concern with 
things and persons. . . .39
Dewey proposed the experimental method as that method 
best suited for getting knowledge and certifying it as 
knowledge and not mere opinions, guesses, or hypotheses.
It represented the method of both "discovery and proof."40 
He firmly believed this approach was the last great force 
in bringing about a true transformation in the theory of 
knowledge.
The theory of continuity expressed a theme character­
istic of Dewey. From his point of view, the theory was a 
logical appendage to the doctrine of evolution— the develop­
ment of simple organic forms to the more complex. Horne, 
however, assessed such a concept as inadequate and he believed 
the scheme was far too impersonal.41 His interpretation of 
Dewey's "continuous flow of experience," was greatly simpli­
fied. As a result he diminished the value of the concept 
and minimized its role in acquiring valid knowledge. In 
fact, Horne thought Dewey psychologically inadequate:
3*lbid.
*°Ibid.
41Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 484.
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"Dewey leaves only the organism making flexible responses to 
environmental s t i m u l i . " ^ 2  In the final analysis, Horne 
found Dewey's thinking relative to knowledge intellectually 
wanting.
Horne sought to establish that the knower in the case of 
man must necessarily be recognized as a conscious being 
distinct from the object which he comes to know. Thus, with 
Descartes, he could affirm that language has meaning when it 
says, " I  t h i n k . " 4 3  From this criticism, it was evident that 
Horne was expressing his belief that Dewey eliminated the 
distinction between the knower and the known, thereby reduc­
ing mind to a mere agent of response to external stimuli. 
According to Horne, Dewey had, in effect, created an epis­
temological dualism.44
Dewey viewed both the knower and the known as a part of 
the same world. Each existed as a separate entity, yet 
neither existed in opposition to the other. The two elements 
were not to be isolated in such a way as to permit one to be 
independent of the other. Dewey proposed a plan which elimin­
ated the traditional dualistic character of the knower and 





intellectually grasped. His theory of knowing was an attempt 
to displace the notion that the individual's role was to 
engage himself as a spectator, not as a participant. Whereas 
the spectator theory cast the individual in the role of a 
mere onlooker, Dewey cautioned that this view, "goes with 
the idea of knowing as something complete in itself."45
. . . the doctrine of organic development 
means that the living creature is a part of the 
world, sharing. . . and making itself secure in 
its precarious dependence only as it intellect­
ually identifies itself with the things about it, 
and, forecasting the future consequences of what 
is going on, shapes activities accordingly.*6
Horne called man a "conscious being. . . as distinct 
from that which he knows. "47 However, Dewey regarded the 
knower as an "experiencing being. . . an intimate partic­
ipant in the activities of the world to which he belongs."48 
In Dewey's theory, knowledge was a mode of participation and 
was valuable in the degree to which it was effective. "It 
cannot be the idle view of an unconcerned spectator."49 
Horne ' s argument appears to be that before a being can iden­
tify with things in his environment, he must first be a 
spectator of that environment.
45Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 393.
46Ibid.
4?Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 485,
49Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 393.
49ibid.
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Horne viewed Dewey's theory of exprience and thinking as 
void of any awareness of the sensations. Thus, Horne was 
persuaded Dewey's continuity of experience was but a process 
whereby the organism made flexible responses to sporadic 
environmental stimuli.50 Dewey refuted such a simplistic 
notion when he recalled the function of the nervous system 
and the reciprocal arrangement of stimuli received from the 
environment.
But in fact the nervous system is only a 
specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily activ­
ities working together. . . it is the organ by which 
they interact responsively with one another. The 
brain is essentially an organ for effecting the 
reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli 
received from the environment and responses directed 
upon it.51
In this section Dewey is also concerned with the problem 
of interest:
Thus in education we have that systematic 
depreciation of interest. . . plus the necessity 
in practice, . . .  of recourse to extraneous and 
irrelevant rewards and penalties in order to induce 
the person who has a mind. . . to apply that mind to 
the truths to be known.52
Dewey cautioned that reliance upon extrinsic forms of moti­
vation impeded learning. In addition, such an attitude had 
encouraged disruptive discipline problems in the school.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 484.
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 392.
^^Ibid., p. 391.
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Further evidence of his concern in this matter is revealed 
when Dewey warned;
Thus we have the spectacle of professional 
educators decrying appeal to interest while they 
uphold with great dignity the need of reliance upon 
examinations, marks, promotions and emotions, prizes, 
and the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and
punishments.53
The effects of this condition which discounts the impor­
tance of both intellectual and emotional disposition were 
serious ones, according to Dewey. It is realistic to assume 
that much of the disruptive character currently found in the 
educational setting has its roots directly or indirectly in 
the supposed opposition between the intellect and the emotions 
Because of this condition, Dewey gave much attention to prac­
tices in the school resulting from this dualism.
Horne, nevertheless, continued to express doubt as to 
the validity of Dewey's argument: "In the discussion of this
same dualism it is not clear what the school equivalent is
for pure intellect as distinct from the e m o t i o n s . T h e  
probability of a dual role for the intellect and the emotions 
was sustained as Horne summarily dismissed the consideration;
It might only be that the opposition arose 
through the fact that the intellect grasps facts 
and relations coldly through insight and the emotions 
lay hold on truth warmly through intuition, or
sensing the whole of a situation.55
53lbid.
S^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 486.
55lbid.
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Since the major portion of Horne's interpretation was 
in the form of questions, it is difficult to determine pre­
cisely his position on this issue. He did, however, clearly 
differentiate the character and function of the emotions and 
the intellect and maintained that each held a distinctive role 
in the attainment of knowledge for the individual.
2. Schools of Method
Horne, in this section contrasts Dewey on knowing and 
habit: "Knowing is flexible, habit is rigid. This account
makes all habits 'passive' and so opposes the theory of 'ac­
tive' habits earlier accepted."5^ An examination of Dewey's 
discussion in this section revealed no inconsistency as sug­
gested by Horne. The assertion that knowing was flexible 
while habit was rigid appeared to be the nomenclature adopted 
by Horne. The focal point of Dewey's analysis was neither 
flexibility nor rigidity in terms of knowing and habit. 
Knowledge, according to Dewey, may be flexible and active. 
Likewise, habits need not be viewed as passive. They may con­
tribute directly to the function of knowledge in a complemen­
tary manner.
Dewey often referred to habits as active. His reference 
to "habit" in this discussion was analogous to knowing. The 
proper perspective and attitude toward method seemed likely 
to be the determining factor as to whether or not habit made
S^Ibid., p. 498.
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a positive contribution to knowledge. When habit enabled 
the individual to undergo certain modifications through expe­
rience, the outcome was the formation of a "predisposition 
to easier and more effective action in a like direction in 
the future."57 On the other hand, habits which did not yield 
themselves to successful future experiences tended to enslave 
rather than free the mind for change and réadaptation.
One of Dewey's criticisms of the various schools of phi­
losophy was due to the fact these often "regarded knowledge 
as something complete in itself irrespective of its availabil­
ity in dealing with what is yet to be."58 Dewey was persistent 
in his belief that previous concepts of knowledge and truth 
had been distorted. As a result, educational practitioners 
had come to believe that a mere appropriation of subject matter 
stored in a textbook constituted knowledge. Methods which 
accompanied this attitude were generally ineffective in terms 
of effective learning;
No matter how true what is learned to those 
who found it out and in whose experience it func­
tioned, there is nothing which makes it knowledge 
to the pupils. It might as well be something 
about Mars or about some fanciful country unless it 
fructifies in the individual's own life.59




The pragmatic theory of knowing was the method advanced 
by Dewey. To maintain continuity of knowing with an activity 
which purposely modifies the environment was the essential 
feature of this doctrine.60 The organization of conscious 
dispositions was an imperative if knowledge was to possess 
meaning in application:
Only that which has been organized into 
our dispositions so as to enable us to adapt 
the environment to our needs and to adapt our 
aims and desires to the situation in which we live 
is really knowledge.61
Dewey believed that knowledge as something possessed 
consisted of all our intellectual resources and all habits 
which make our action intelligent. Truth and knowledge, 
according to the pragmatic philosophy, must be; (1) func­
tional; (2) adaptable; (3) practical; (4) capable of change; 
and (5) friendly to the doctrine of continuity. In short, 
the pragmatists are: "Those concerned with progress, who
are striving to change received beliefs, while emphasizing 
the individual factor in k n o w i n g . "62
Knowledge, democracy, and education represented prime 
factors in Dewey ' s philosophy. Democracy, in theory and in 





for its sustenance. Dewey gave further credence to this 
position when he stated:
In an analogous way, since democracy stands 
in principle for free interchange, for social 
continuity, it must develop a theory of knowledge 
which sees in knowledge the method by which one 
experience is made available in giving direction 
and meaning to another. The recent advances in 
physiology, biology, and the logic of the experi­
mental sciences supply the specific intellectual 
instrumentalities demanded to work out and formulate 
such a theory.63
Unlike the rationalists, realists, and the idealists, 
the pragmatic philosophy broke away from those philosophic 
systems whose primary considerations were set apart from 
social conditions. The positive and progressive nature of 
the pragmatic doctrine was noted by the urgent appeal for 
reconstruction:
If there is especial need of educational 
reconstruction at the present time, . . .  it 
is because of the thoroughgoing change in social 
life accompanying the advance of science, the 
industrial revolution, and the development ofdemocracy.64
Thus, the reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of 
social ideals and methods must go hand in hand, according to 





1. The Inner and the Outer
Dewey criticized the philosophic tendency to divide 
moral ideas into "inner and outer, or the spiritual and the 
physical."65 As a result of this condition he believed a 
sharp demarcation had been drawn between the motive of action 
from its consequences, and of character from conduct;
Motive and character are regarded as something 
purely 'inner,' existing exclusively in conscious­
ness, while consequences and conduct are regarded 
as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with 
the movements which carry out motives; consequences 
with what happens as a result.66
Dewey appealed for unity and continuity in moral theory. 
Morality viewed in terms of an "inner" and an "outer" repre­
sented another dualism. The continuation of this dualism 
served only to abort the cultivation of morals in a prag­
matic sense. Dewey maintained that moral principles were to 
act as guides in directing conduct. Morality and conduct 
were central to his theory. "Results, conduct, are what 
counts; they afford the sole measure of morality."6?
Horne insisted there existed the "outer" element to 
morality without an "inner." He did not produce any valid 





behavior was not always continuous attested to a disunity 
between mind and activity. He stated:
In the case of a multiple personality. . . 
the unity and continuity of behavior is disturbed.
The different personalities within the same organism 
alternate; successive states of the same personal­
ity are continuous with each other but are discon­
tinuous with the alternating personality. In the 
case of a disranged personality there is but little 
unity and continuity l e f t . 68
With respect to Dewey's concept of the theory of morals,
Horne's analysis at this point provided little insight. His 
success was in proving that behavior was not always contin­
uous. Dewey believed there was no substitute for realistic 
thinking in combination with unifying principles. Both tended 
to increase the probability that a contribution would be made 
in behalf of development of the whole self. The principles 
of reflective thinking and growth were indispensable concepts. 
An understanding of these is a necessary condition for under­
standing Dewey's theory of morals.
Horne's interpretation of the "inner" and "outer" com­
ponents of moral ideas vastly differed from the analysis pre­
sented by Dewey. Horne made little attempt to establish 
unification between the two. The dualism of mind and body 
remained the formula providing the impetus to his theory.
For Horne, the inner facet was associated with the psychical 
phase of experience while the outer realm was associated with 
overt conduct. Absolutism and transcendental motives continued
68Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 508-
509.
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to serve as the foundation for Horne's judgments concerning 
the right and wrong in making moral decisions. On the other 
hand, authentic support for Dewey's argument was vested in 
life experiences of the human organism— a unity of mind and 
body. While Horne retained the institutionalized and doctrin­
aire orientation, Dewey rejected this in favor of an approach 
grounded in the spirit and methods of evolutionary theory, of 
science, and of democracy.
Possibly Horne underestimated the character of Dewey's 
psychological base. In this chapter, as in previous ones, 
the principle of growth provided the foundation for Dewey's 
analysis of moral acts. The act was to be guided by an idea. 
The moral act when committed represented an expression of the 
conscious self. In the case of moral theory, Dewey maintained 
that feeling, thinking, and muscular response must be viewed 
as coordinated functions. Their equilibrium would be perpet­
uated by conscious effort and disciplined intent. Thinking, 
in Dewey's philosophy, served as a substitute for overt action;
Action with a purpose is deliberate; it 
involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental 
weighing of considerations pro and con. During 
this time complete overt action is suspended. . . 
activities are confined to such redistributions of 
energy within the organism as will prepare a deter­
minate course of action.69
In effect, this means that consciousness has been accented 
and one's own attitudes seriously evaluated. The aggregate
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 403.
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of the individual's mental and emotional dispositions were 
taken into consideration as a guide to subsequent behavior.
The suspension of overt action allows thinking to play a 
major role. As related to morals and moral judgments, Dewey's 
appeal resulted in what might properly be termed reflective 
morality. He continued to voice strong opposition to tra­
ditional or customary methods in making moral choices:
Morals concern nothing less than the whole 
character, and the whole character is identical 
with the man in all his concrete make-up and mani­
festations. Virtue means to be fully and adequately 
what one is capable of becoming through association 
with others. . . .^0
The 'good' from Dewey's point of view was "an empty term
unless it includes the satisfactions experienced in concrete
situations."71 Moral and ethical values could not be separated
from human experience. He rejected the ready-made formula
in making moral selections. Nevertheless, in the framework
of his methodology, many traditional values would continue to
be valuable and instrumental. Instead of ascribing to them
transcendental relationships which had no basis in experience,
Dewey hoped that all ethical formulations would one day be
viewed from the experiential conditions which brought them
into existence. When Horne stated, " . . .  there is in man a
moral judgment concerning the right and the wrong,"72 there
70lbid., p. 415.
71lbid., pp. 412-413.
72Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 522.
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was an obvious inclination to escape to transcendental abso­
lutes. This position can not be reconciled with pragmatic 
theory.
2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest
Dewey was emphatic when he asserted that in moral dis­
cussions there was probably no greater antithesis than that 
set up between acting from "pri-:iple" and from "interest. 
Neither action stemming from principle nor that which ensued 
from interest provided the single clue which would alleviate 
the opposition he believed had been effected: "To act on
principle is to act disinterestedly. . . .  To act according 
to interest is. . . to act selfishly, with one's own personal 
profit in v i e w . " 7 4  These statements made by Dewey on duty 
and interest do not appear to be "vague and g e n e r a l " 7 5  as 
alleged by Horne. Dewey identified a specific condition 
which he believed had contributed to the controversy. Those 
who supported the "interest" side consistently used the term 
"self-interest." Both modes of acting implied that the self 
was a fixed and isolated entity. As a result, a conflict 
emerges between acting with interest for the self and without 
interest.
/
^^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 407,
74lbid.
^^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 510.
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With reference to this section of Dewey's text, Horne 
stated that effort, not interest, won the battle. The result, 
according to Horne, was that interest becomes that which sides 
with agreeable habit, and effort is aligned with "disagreeable 
readjustment."76
Dewey believed that the cause for the underlying opposi­
tion between interest and effort was the false idea of inter­
est. False concepts of interest were criticized by Dewey in 
a previous chapter (See Chapter X). Reference to the nature 
of habit, self-discipline, and effort would have promoted 
greater clarification in Horne's interpretation. Several state­
ments presented by Dewey served to refute Horne's argument.
The position taken by Dewey was concise. He stated;
The moment we recognize that the self is not 
something ready-made, but something in continuous 
formation through choice of action, the whole situ­
ation clears up. The mistake lies in making a 
separation between interest and self, and supposing 
that the latter is the end to which interest in objects 
and acts and others is a mere m e a n s . ?7
In general, the critique presented by Horne was an exam­
ination of Dewey's pedagogy with emphasis upon the conflict of 
interest and effort. The nature of habit as a readjusting ele­
ment involving effort as a deliberate function did not receive 
the attention it deserved. Horne often alluded to the authori­
tative thus injecting his meanings into Dewey. In doing so.
7*ibid., p. 517.
77oewey, Democracy and Education, p. 408.
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Horne moved from discussion to disputation. The examples 
below illustrate this point:
1. . . .  there is no ought in this ethics, 
no universal binding principles, no obligatory 
duties, no rapturous apostrophe. . . to the starry 
heavens above and the moral law within, no clear 
universal distinction between right and wrong. Any 
individual has received more than he has given.
VThat he owes is his ought ; what is due is his d u t y . '8
2. Interest is presented as the adequate 
motivation of work. This overstates the case.
Probably most of the world's work is actually done 
under extrinsic motivation, . .
3. The self is presented as identical with 
interest. This is confusing. The self has interest 
but is not interest. Interest is the emotional 
attraction an actual or ideal object has for the 
self.80
4. But there is in man a moral judgment con­
cerning the right and the wrong. . . its form is
the same in all men. Enlightened, it is man's safest 
guide in conduct; though changing in content, it is 
permanent in form. . . .  A man may know. . . what the 
right is, and yet after long deliberation decide to 
do the wrong. The lacking element is that he does 
not adequately love the right.81
But does merely preferring the right over the wrong provide
a solution for the man who goes on to commit the wrong act?
Neither was this condition an adequate guide to proper conduct
according to Dewey. The answer to the problem was not found
Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 516. 
7 9 l b i d ., pp. 516-517.
G O l b i d ., p. 517.
Gllbid., pp. 522-523.
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in simply knowing the right from the wrong, but the formations 
of proper habits, practice, and motive were the elements re­
quired in making moral judgments concerning right and wrong. 
Within Dewey's framework, the establishment of character could 
be achieved only as the result of intelligence.
3. The Social and the Moral
Dewey identified morals as a constituent of the whole 
character and he viewed the whole character as identical with 
the individual. The extent to which one became that which he 
is capable of becoming is dependent upon his social interaction
with others.82
Horne found Dewey's identification of the moral with the 
social confusing. Horne was convinced the identity of the per­
son has been lost as a result of Dewey's view. "After all, 
there are the personal and the social aspects of experience.
They may not be separable in fact; they are ao in thought."83 
From this point of view, morals might or might not have an 
accompanying social connotation and connection. The social 
dimension of morals came into existence only when personal 
ideas, feelings, and purposes found expression in overt behavior 
affecting others. By contrast, Dewey's attitude toward the 
moral-social arrangement suggested that moral life and social 
relationships were reciprocally related. He stated that moral
82Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 415.
®^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 527.
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qualities such as truthfulness, honesty, chastity, and amia­
bility were moral only in the functional sense.84 Such traits 
were not held to be moral because of their identification with 
transcendental verities nor due to the fact they were inherent 
in the universe. For Dewey, these attributes continued to be 
instrumental because they represented essential components 
carrying with them other desirable attitudes. Consistent with 
this belief, Dewey stated:
They are moral in an emphatic sense not because 
they are isolated and exclusive, but because they 
are intimately connected with thousands of other 
attitudes which we not explicitly recognize— which 
perhaps we have not even names for.85
Dewey maintained that moral laws received their significance
from their effectiveness. The primary aim of philosophy is
to effect intelligent guides for moral action. These guides
to conduct derive from reflective evaluation of the past, and
at the same time require consideration of their instrumental
value.
The school, as a miniature society, should provide a 
program conducive to human growth and moral development. For 
the achievement of this goal, a democratic social order is a 
prerequisite. Dewey continued to criticize those social insti­
tutions which opposed or failed to support conditions for sound 
growth of mind and character:
®^Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 415.
G^ibid.
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And education is not a mere means to such a 
life. Education is such a life. To maintain 
capacity for such education is the essence of 
morals. For conscious life is a continual 
beginning afresh.86
In effect, Dewey held that all those aims and values desir­




The purpose of this study is to present a critical anal­
ysis and evaluation of Herman H. Horne's interpretation of 
John Dewey's Democracy and Education. This study attempts 
to determine which of the two interpretations provides a more 
nearly adequate philosophy of education in a democratic soci­
ety. The material for this investigation is The Democratic 
Philosophy of Education, the text in which Horne's efforts 
are directed toward providing a discriminating interpretation 
of Dewey's educational philosophy.
The themes upon which Horne concentrated are developed 
in accordance with those topics presented by Dewey in Democracy 
and Education. A summary of the findings of this study and a 
statement of the conclusions follow.
Summary
Although the chief objective of Horne is to present an 
interpretation of Dewey's theories, it is evident that he did 
not intend to confine his study to this endeavor alone. Of 
equal importance, he directs his efforts toward providing an 
opposite point of view from that held by Dewey. In general,
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this does not detract from the import of Dewey's argument.
At times, this approach provides a worthy addition and serves 
to stimulate reflection. The result of studying those views 
presented by both Horne and Dewey is that areas of strengths 
as well as weaknesses are further identified.
For the purpose of establishing a contrast, Horne presents 
a valid appraisal of the Idealist and Pragmatic philosophical 
postures. This approach provides the basis for the remainder 
of his interpretation of Dewey's Democracy and Education.
Horne is concerned with the speculative and transcendental 
dimension relative to the origin of life. By contrast, Dewey 
rejects the metaphysical orientation since he believes such 
attempts are non-productive in terms of supplying a sound 
basis for a philosophy of education. From his point of view, 
life and society serve as inseparable counterparts each inter­
woven with the other. An understanding of biological life 
represents a prerequisite in man's attempts to effect a genu­
ine and effective transmission of life and society. Unlike 
Horne, Dewey rejects a priori considerations for education and 
notes these are invalid presuppositions.
Thinking as developed by Horne is best described as an 
intellectual endeavor— one which enables man to transcend 
human intelligence. For Dewey, the concept of thinking is 
viewed as a process and the highest kind of thought process 
receives its stimulus from social activity and mutual sharing 
in the social environment of which the individual is an integral 
part.
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Horne claims Dewey has placed too great an emphasis on 
the social medium as an educative force and as a result his 
philosophy of education is restricted. Essentially, Horne 
objects to Dewey's naturalistic approach to learning and his 
failure to provide necessary considerations to self-conscious­
ness and individual personality. Horne ascribes far greater 
relevancy to the influence of example, imitation, and emula­
tion. The significant aspect of environment for Dewey is a 
central theme and is summed up by the term, "situation- 
response." Within this view, objects are seen as producing 
the necessary stimulus which in turn enables certain capac­
ities to respond.
Horne partially accepts Dewey's concept of direction in 
education. However, Horne is reluctant to accept the environ­
ment as providing the primary force behind such direction. He 
assigns to the teacher the primary task of providing direction 
in the learning process. Horne believes the design afforded 
by the teacher prohibits direction in education from being 
aimless and vague. The control set by Horne assumes an arbi­
trary position ultimately resulting in external direction if 
not coercion. Dewey believes the results achieved from this 
system tend to be temporary and eventually promote negative 
behavioral patterns. Rather than the force of extrinsic and 
external control, Dewey believes a more effective control is 
achieved in educational direction when intrinsic and internal 
motivation is applied.
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The key factors for growth in Horne's scheme are direction 
and guidance. These two facets of growth are supplied and 
maintained by the mature for the benefit of the young. Only 
in this way can we hope to effect growth in the right direction. 
Growth for Horne is purposefully planned and induced by the 
adult society. In contrast, Dewey insists the young possess 
far greater social responsiveness than supposed by the adult.
He believes that immaturity itself designates a positive force 
and power to grow. As such, the immature probably possesses 
a greater facility and capacity for growth through social inter­
action than does the adult. While Horne believes the ultimate 
solution may be established by creating a dependence on the 
part of the young, Dewey envisions conditions which are condu­
cive to a state of interdependence. Satisfactory induction 
of the young into the adult community represents a major goal 
for Horne. Growth is viewed as having an end, rather than 
being an end. Educationally, Dewey views growth as a life 
process.
Horne observes a certain limiting factor in Dewey's recon­
struction of experience theory. From Horne's point of view, 
Dewey places an undue emphasis on the objective experience at 
the expense and neglect of the subjective self. Although 
Dewey alludes to both the social and personal aspects of expe­
rience, Horne visualizes a more definite self— the person—  
as being involved in the experience. Dewey expresses a pref­
erence for the quality of experience while Horne focuses his
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attention on the outcome or the reconstructed self; Dewey 
prefers to remain attentive to the growing and developing 
individual. Emphasis, for Dewey, remains with the experience 
and its personal counterpart, the social matrix.
The role of perception occupies a far greater role in 
Dewey's theory than in Horne's. Dewey insists that percep­
tion remains a major force in learning. From Dewey's con­
struct, the learner's role in the process of learning is 
elevated. The increment of meaning achieved as a result ■ f 
perception not only contributes to present meaning, but also 
provides necessary connections between activities in which 
the individual becomes engaged in the future. The strong 
involvement of external stimuli to action as found in Horne's 
philosophy negates the value of perception and decreases the 
likelihood of a recognition between the act and the result.
Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy embraces three kinds 
of democracy— political, industrial, and social. When Dewey 
traces the origin of democracy to industry, Horne notices a 
paradox since he finds little democracy existing in the indus­
trial complex. While Dewey does associate the development of 
democracy with industry, he points out that industry may cause 
democracy to flourish or it may serve as a barrier to the pro­
motion of democratic arrangements. Dewey's point is that 
industry has the potential for democratic advancements, but 
it is not the model which necessarily guarantees the fulfill­
ment of democratic ideals.
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Dewey believes democracy is produced not by deliberate 
effort, but is sustained and extended by it. His concept of 
democracy essentially consists of the intelligent social in­
terplay of men. Any social action which is limited to the 
special interests of a particular segment of society is injur­
ious to his basic concept of democracy. Progressive change 
from Dewey's point of view is achieved as interests within 
and between groups are mutually shared.
Horne's interpretation of Dewey is limited since he over­
looks Dewey's concept of democracy as an ideal consisting of 
far more than a mere form of government. For Dewey, democracy 
represents a way of life. In order for the traits of democracy 
to be most effective, Dewey calls for deliberate effort in order 
to sustain them. He believes the proper philosophy of education 
in a democracy must necessarily be deliberate and systematic—  
the result of planning, yet not planned. The scope of Dewey's 
philosophy is viewed as a social process and the application 
of his democratic aims is concerned with the societal, not the 
national aim. The conflict between nationalistic aims and the 
variety of social aims represents, for Dewey, one of the funda­
mental problems of education in and for a democratic society. 
Horne goes on to question whether or not a national state can 
conduct an educational process consistent with the full social 
meaning of democracy while Dewey maintains that such an arrange­
ment is possible only if deliberate attention and effort con­
tinue to be exerted toward effecting such an educational process.
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Another objection is raised by Horne relative to Dewey's 
analysis of good aims. This is because Horne believes Dewey 
fails to establish a worthy standard or criterion. There is, 
in Horne's criticism, a call for some absolute or at least 
some standard of perfection before the criteria of good aims 
are established. In Dewey's philosophy, neither is available 
nor desirable since such a condition would result in the estab­
lishment of an aim set up outside existing conditions and 
would, therefore, give rise to external priorities. Dewey 
finds it necessary to reject external standards since he 
believes these ultimately lead to conformity, a condition 
which tends to become an aim in and of itself void of con­
siderations to present activities. He warns that activity 
so directed necessarily becomes static in character.
A philosophical difference between Horne and Dewey is 
noted when means and ends are analyzed. For Horne, a separa­
tion betwen an end and the means for achieving that distinc­
tive end must not be left to mere convenience, Horne rejects 
the theory that means are ends and ends are means. Where 
democracy is concerned, Horne views the end as distinct from 
the means and, as such, democracy itself becomes one of the 
absolutes. By contrast, Dewey seeks to effect a merger between 
ends and means into a means-ends relationship. As a result 
of this arrangement, Dewey logically gives us means and no 
ends, or means as the only ends. Dewey's philosophy states 
that the end becomes a means which in turn serves as an impetus
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toward the achievement of the end. The aim continues to 
serve as a means of action. It appears Horne is less con­
cerned with the concept of value or values than is Dewey. The 
significance of Dewey's democratic concept is that through 
means we achieve value. Emphasis is not necessarily placed 
upon the attainment of the ideal, but rather upon attainment 
as it develops in conjunction with activity.
Horne believes man may be a spectator and that he may 
well be an active, not merely a passive one. The latter he 
believes is true when interest and attention are strong—  
when the individual's emotions are involved. Furthermore, 
he rejects Dewey's theory of interest and discipline because 
he believes Dewey neglects the spectator theory of learning. 
From Horne's point of view, one may be a participant without 
an immediate interest, and one may be a spectator without an 
immediate interest. By comparison, Dewey notes that the indi­
vidual as mere spectator, even with interest, is not involved 
in such a way so as to directly influence the probable con­
sequences in a problem situation. For Dewey, the involve­
ment of the emotions alone does not suffice as an effective 
force for causing things to be different. He believes the 
essential difference between spectator and participant is 
that of attitude. According to Dewey, the attitude must be 
connected in some way with personal interest and concern. In 
turn, the individual engages himself in the activity in an 
attempt to direct conditions. Interest combined with concern 
consequently serves to motivate the participant.
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In terms of learning, Horne does not insist upon the 
close identification of interest with effort which Dewey sees 
as necessary counterparts. While these may accompany one an­
other, Horne does not believe this arrangement is necessarily 
the case. His theory readily admits two kinds of interest; 
namely, the immediate and the remote. Horne contends, how­
ever, that effort sustained by remote interest may be equally 
as effective as that yielded by immediate interest or interest 
associated with and found within the activity itself. When 
necessary, he does not object to externally imposed or even 
forced interest if it appears necessary in order to accomplish 
a given task or fulfill an obligation. Dewey finds far greater 
validity in immediate interest and goes on to warn that forced 
interest results in unsound psychology. Where learning is con­
cerned, interest so induced tends to diminish relatedness and 
connections between present conditions and that which the learn­
er perceives. As a result, meaning for the learner is minimized.
Horne denies Dewey's concept of thinking primarily because 
Dewey views constructive thought in terms of problematic con­
ditions which arise out of experience. From Horne's point of 
view, the accuracy of the outcome as the imperative in Dewey's 
tested hypotheses is not a necessary prerequisite for produc­
tive thought. Horne is convinced that reflective thought is 
limited when restricted to the experiential realm alone. In 
addition to this dimension Horne advances thought to the realm 
of transcendental reflection believing value is achieved from 
accompanying intellectual constructs. In terms of Dewey's
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philosophy, thinking is active. Reflective thinking is nec­
essarily linked with intelligent action. He believes that 
without the possibility of reaching a conclusion or solution 
to a problem, little benefit can be realized from speculative 
thought except for its intellectual quality. Horne not only 
sees value in the intellectual content of speculative thought, 
but also views this realm of thought as extremely significant 
when the solution of an existing problem appears to be beyond 
actual experience.
Dewey rejects any treatment of subject matter which 
applies an external impetus to learning. The student's role 
is simply to utilize the material of subject matter in such 
a way as to effect a purpose. He views method as that element 
arising out of the individual’s experience and abandons the 
notion of uniformity in his pedagogical theory. Furthermore, 
he insists that method and activity must not be separated, one 
functioning at the expense of the other. Dewey remains con­
vinced that good methodology operates from and is an outgrowth 
of contact with experience and observation. At this point, 
Horne agrees such a theory is sometimes valid, but he believes 
there are instances when separation of method and activity must 
logically be made. He further suggests that learning is intrin­
sically good in and of itself.
Horne finds the pragmatic theory of knowledge which is 
basically intellectual and social useful insofar as it goes.
He believes, however, such a theory is limited and may be
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strengthened when the appreciative aspect is added. Tran­
scending experience as a mode of increasing the appreciative 
capacity represents a valid and necessary exercise for Horne. 
Consistent with the pragmatic philosophy, Dewey rejects infor­
mation gained as the result of transcendental speculation 
because he believes it consists merely of knowing about some­
thing without knowing it in a personal and meaningful way.
The value found in this form of knowledge remains for Dewey 
secondary except as it is taken into account for its instru­
mental value.
In a general way, Horne subscribes to Dewey's complemen­
tary view of history and geography. At the same time, Horne 
notes that the interdependence of these two studies is not 
the same as the interdependence of man and nature. Horne 
believes man is totally dependent upon nature, yet he does 
not conceive nature as dependent upon man since man must 
adjust himself to nature in order to survive. Horne's inter­
pretation of this relationship is preoccupied with the terms 
nature, earth, nature study, and human nature. Had Dewey 
originally stated that nature and earth were equivalent only 
in terms of their physical relationship, Horne's objection 
would be lessened.
His views relative to these studies have for the most 
part disregarded the psychological aspect. By contrast,
Dewey believes a study of these subjects should exemplify 
human association and living. Dewey views nature where man
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is concerned with this earth. Horne associates nature with 
a metaphysical sphere and relegates the generative power for 
nature to the transcendental realm and not in the hands of 
man.
Horne provides a helpful clarification to the terras 
"logical" and "psychological." He notes that logical refers 
to the science of correct thinking while psychological conveys 
the general meaning which refers to the science of human 
behavior. An analysis of Horne's comments reveals his belief 
that the psychological method adopted by Dewey should sup­
plemented by the logical even in the case of the novice. He 
insists it is not necessary that by use of the experimental 
method the learner finds out everything for himself. The 
psychological method alone is too slow and the logical method 
alone is too abstract.
Since Dewey's discussion is primarily concerned with 
method, the psychological aspect of learning receives the 
greater emphasis. However, his discussion does take into 
account the logical implications associated with knowledge.
His primary concern is that subject matter should not be pre­
sented in its logical or perfect form isolated from science 
and experience. For this reason, he gives greater recog­
nition to the "psychological" method. The logical method, for 
Dewey, should properly remain with the expert or the special­
ist, not forced upon the immature learner. Horne holds a far 
greater concern for the quantitative aspect of scientific
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knowledge, while Dewey continues to stress qualitative fac­
tors with emphasis upon connections, meanings, and intellec­
tual content.
Horne contends that Dewey identifies values only as 
these are found in human experience. He further concludes 
that values for Dewey are only vested in the human, social, 
and subjective realm; beyond man, values do not exist. Since 
Dewey fails to include a discussion of nature apart from man, 
Horne surprisingly uses an anti-dualistic argument against 
Dewey. If man has value, yet nature, has none, Horne believes 
there is discontinuity between the two. For him, man does 
not create value; rather, his task is one of discovering 
values in those elements which naturally possess value.
These, he believes, are inherent in the universe of reality. 
Again, the importance of metaphysics is evident in Horne's 
discussion of values. VJhen he insists values ought to be 
reality-centered, he alludes to a reality already inherent in 
the universe. Essential values which man must seek and come 
to know can best be drawn from a metaphysical orientation. 
Dewey's concept of reality demonstrates a different concern.
He insists that an appreciation of values must be realized 
through the medium of experience. Without this element, appre­
ciation of values remains purely symbolic and void of trans­
lation into reality. While Dewey does not deny the usefulness 
of the symbolic, he insists that connections between the direct 
experience and the symbolic material be taken into account.
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When purely representative forms are adopted, Dewey warns 
there is an increased tendency toward decreasing the sphere 
of direct appreciation on the part of the individual,
Dewey differentiates between intrinsic value and instru­
mental value but is careful to note that intrinsic values 
which have greater instrumental value are of more worth. The 
pragmatic view finds it expedient to weigh values in terms of 
their relative contribution. For Dewey, the justifying trait 
of an intrinsic value is found in its ability to contribute 
to future use. Horne presents a convincing argument when he 
suggests such a distinction between the two kinds of value is 
vague if not inconsistent. He maintains Dewey's distinction 
is unnecessary since the two eventually merge into one— the 
instrumental ultimately merges into the intrinsic. While 
Horne correctly identifies this condition in his interpreta­
tion, his scheme of universal values seems questionable.
Viewed from the pragmatic frame of reference, the aspect of 
universality is of little consequence when related to a theory 
of values which contributes to sound pedagogical practice.
He concludes that the only true criterion for determining the 
worth of any value is the extent to which intrinsic values 
have been promoted and enhanced.
In Horne's interpretation, no description is provided 
regarding conditions whereby men might be free nor does he 
specify what contribution is made by a liberal education.
That which makes men free remains his definition of a liberal
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education. By contrast, Dewey presents a more realistic 
approach. He portrays the elements of choice and active par­
ticipation as closely bound to his philosophy of liberal and 
technical education. His position suggests that the profes­
sional or vocational school may be liberal or illiberal. At 
the same time, the liberal arts curriculum may be illiberal 
and does assume this characteristic when it becomes permeated 
with a narrow sectarian bias or employs methods of mere mass 
appeal. His warning is that any study or activity when 
reduced to the level of drudgery and routine and fails to 
provoke independent thought has properly attained the label, 
"illiberal."
Dewey's account of the opposition between intellectual 
and practical studies results in a skeptical attitude in 
Horne's evaluation. The philosophic tension between Horne 
and Dewey is due for the most part to divergent points of 
view relative to absolutes. Evidence of this appears when 
Horne raises the issue of absolutes as these exist in the 
context of known reality and their close approximation to 
supreme reality. Horne believes such an identification of 
this realm is imperative before valid consideration can be 
given to the concept of change. Dewey's discussion does not 
emphasize either the negative or positive aspects of abso­
lutes nor does he attempt to prove or disprove their exist­
ence. In view of Dewey's entire text, it appears Horne 
underestimates the profound influence social conditions have 
exerted upon modern educational philosophy.
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Horne rejects Dewey's concept of experience and experi­
mentation. His appraisal of Dewey's mode of knowing by way 
of experience-experiraentation reveals a dissatisfaction both 
emotionally and intellectually. Experimentation, according 
to Horne, represents strictly an intellectual and practical 
activity, while experience contains the additional ingredient 
of certain emotional factors. In this context, Horne fails 
to recognize the reciprocal effect of response which is a 
central feature found in Dewey's concept of experience as 
experimentation. Dewey never recommends activity for the 
sake of activity; on the contrary, he insists that mere activ­
ity does not constitute experience. The arrangement promoted 
by Dewey pertaining to activity can best be understood whe*;. 
reference is made to the meaning of experience. From Dewey's 
viewpoint, the controlling influence on activity is always 
the problematic situation. Out of the interaction which 
results from attempts to relieve an imbalance in the environ­
ment, there exists of necessity activity.
One of Dewey's major goals was to make education scien­
tific. He is, therefore, especially sensitive to advances 
in psychology and industrial methods. He argues in favor of 
the kind of activity in the school situation which exemplifies 
the experimental or problem-solving method of science. Horne 
finds this theory acceptable in terms of elementary education, 
but is generally critical of that which he terms the doctrine 
of "learning by doing." In addition to this concept he
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designates an additional dimension to learning; namely learn­
ing to think by thinking.
In Horne's discussion of humanistic and naturalistic 
studies, he presents a strong case from the idealist's point 
of view. Dewey remains a strong advocate of maintaining a 
close relationship between the humanistic and the naturalistic 
studies. VJhile Horne prefers a monistic approach to these 
two studies, Dewey declines a merger between them. Pedagog- 
ically and philosophically, Dewey's position represents one 
of the most significant contributions found in his writing.
His attitude remains both humanistic and democratic. As a 
result of Dewey's posture, he avoids the narrow scope of the 
Greek humanistic spirit as well as the one-sided condition 
typical of Classical Humanism.
The relationship between philosophy and education is 
vividly expounded by Dewey, but Horne claims Dewey has re­
jected those philosophical and educational systems from which 
he has inherited so much. There is little doubt that Herbart's 
theories influenced Dewey's philosophy.
Horne makes an unwarranted assumption when he states 
Dewey rejects questions posed by ontology and cosmology on 
the ground that these were "non-philosophical." Horne is 
correct when he maintains Dewey gave little recognition to 
the experiences of the mystic. Unlike Horne, Dewey's central 
theme is that educational problems serve as a testing ground 
where philosophical ideas prove themselves.
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The experimental method is a special target for Horne's 
criticism; however, Horne fails to recognize the full scope 
of Dewey's theory of knowledge. Dewey believes knowledge as 
something possessed consists of all of man's intellectual 
resources and all habits which make his action intelligent. 
Knowledge, democracy, and education represent prime factors 
in Dewey's philosophy.
Horne insists there exists the "outer" element to moral­
ity without an "inner," but fails to produce valid illustra­
tions in proof of his position. He makes little effort in 
establishing unification between the two and his analysis of 
Dewey's theory of morals provides little insight. Dewey main­
tains moral laws receive their significance from their effec­
tiveness. The school, as a miniature society, should provide 
a program conducive to human growth and moral development.
To achieve this, a democratic social order is a prerequisite. 
Horne underestimates the character of Dewey's philosophical 
and psychological base.
Dewey takes for granted the democratic criterion and 
employs his philosophy as a means of application to present 
social life and its enrichment. Horne assumes the idealistic 
philosophy and then attempts to apply appropriate philosoph­
ical criterion to the conditions of his interpretation of 
democracy. Thi pragmatic epistemological view which Horne 
rejects is in effect a rejection of the concept that freedom 
in a democracy means that truth in its practical sense has an 
opportunity to realize its fullest expression in men's lives.
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Conclusions
Both Horne and Dewey purport to discuss issues in light 
of the relationship between democracy and education. Each 
claims his philosophy provides a theory of education consist­
ent with and in support of democratic ideals. In the process 
of the argument, democracy and aristocracy are ultimately 
projected as opposing social programs.
The conclusions of this dissertation are:
(1) Horne discusses democracy as an incidental factor 
and then proceeds to emphasize a philosophy based on fixed 
principles, tradition, and a rigid adherence to dogmatism.
He presents a less convincing attitude in identifying the 
characteristics of a democratic community than does Dewey.
(2) Dewey emphasizes the conditions necessary for a 
democratic society and then applies the pragmatic philosophy 
to those conditions. His choice of democracy is definite 
and continues to represent the dominant influence in his 
development of the pragmatic philosophy of education.
(3) Dewey's theories, unlike those of Horne's, stem out 
of a pragmatic, naturalistic orientation while Horne's prin­
ciples assume a passive stance based on the supernatural which 
calls for emulation, imitation, and hero worship.
(4) Horne approaches philosophy as philosopher; Dewey 
faces philosophical issues as philosopher and educator.
(5) Horne maintains a greater degree of philosophical 
consistency than does Dewey. This is probably attributable
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to the fact he works from a systematized philosophical frame 
of reference supported by principles transcending and not 
subjected to experiential conditions and human involvement.
(6) Horne's interpretation is probably inadequate in 
terms of Dewey's arguments in Democracy and Education. Dewey 
conceived the nature of social conditions as scientific and 
increasingly urban; this receives minimal attention in Horne's 
interpretation.
(7) Democracy as a form of associated living is not 
granted the consideration from Horne that is deserved; Horne's 
interpretation, therefore, is weakened since democratic con­
ditions are at the very heart of Dewey's philosophy.
(8) Economic and political factors receive far greater 
attention by Dewey than by Horne since Dewey believes these 
considerations affect man's thoughts, his actions, and the 
direction of his entire life.
(9) Horne often interprets Dewey from his own philosophical 
orientation. This presents a major obstacle when he attempts
to penetrate the full realm of Dewey's philosophical thought.
(10) There is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclu­
sion that Dewey was a philosopher of revolt. His emphases 
appear to be extreme as a result of his break with tradi­
tional views and patterns of thought. Dewey's revolt against 
formality in education should continue to warrant the edu­
cator's attention.
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(11) The pragmatic philosophy represents in theory and 
in practice a philosophy more compatible with a democratic 
society.
(12) A wholesome balance is maintained by Dewey when he 
stresses the need for aims in education which center about 
the developing individual as a person while at the same time 
educating him in such a way as to encourage his productive 
membership in society.
(13) Horne recognizes in Dewey a preoccupation with 
dualisms and correctly identifies this as a negative factor 
rather than a virtue for Dewey.
(14) Horne appropriately notes there is not sufficient 
attention allocated to the appreciation of the emotions of 
man in Dewey's text. Most of Dewey's references to the emo­
tions are associated with active responses to man's environ­
ment and are generally restricted to the activities of the 
intellect.
(15) Another relevant conclusion pertaining to contem­
porary issues is Dewey's inadequate recognition of education 
for leisure. From his discussions, it is apparent he views 
leisure as self-contained and a companion to labor. Dewey 
objects to the traditional dualism prompted by t\ ) classes—  
one of leisure and another of work. For this reason, he does 
not emphasize to a great extent the importance of educating 
for leisure time.
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(16) Horne concludes Dewey devotes little attention to 
the subject of physical education. Only in one strong para­
graph does he devote recognition to the value of health edu­
cation.
(17) A final conclusion drawn by Horne which summarizes 
his interpretation is found in the following statement;
Dewey does not mean to reject discipline, but 
only discipline without immediate interest; nor 
natural development, but only natural development 
in an unsocial atmosphere; nor culture, but only 
culture that is inefficient; nor personal refine­
ment, but only personal refinement that is unsocial.
All of these values as isolated, he rejects; all as 
integrated in a social ongoing process, he accepts.^
^Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 529.
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